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II. Abstract 
Low-cost carrier airlines such as Ryanair and EasyJet in Europe, and Southwest Airlines in 
the US, have largely changed the face of the civil aviation markets in their respective 
regions by providing an accessible form of air transport for the masses. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, where current transport options are unsafe and slow, and distances vast, a massive 
market of potential passengers exists. Yet the region comes with significant challenges and 
obstacles not present in other parts of the world. By utilising a grounded theory approach, 
and identifying the factors that were critical to the success of the abovementioned airlines, 
inferences were drawn with the results of four separate exercises which were undertaken, 
which collected primary data relevant to the Sub-Saharan African low-cost market. The 
results obtained indicate that while certain low-cost carrier critical success factors are 
universal to all regions, Sub-Saharan Africa exhibits many unique characteristics which 
require any low-cost entrant to apply a unique, innovative approach in order to maximise 
the chance of success. 
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4. Definition of Terms 
 LCC – low cost-carrier which seeks to minimise costs and maximise efficiencies, 
which in turn leads to lower fares. Such airlines generally offer a basic service with 
additional services charged for separately, and tend to operate on a point to point 
network rather than hub-and-spoke network. 
 Legacy Carrier – higher fare carrier often utilising a hub-and-spoke structure, flying 
traditional routes and providing a full service offering which offers both an 
economy and business class section on the aircraft.  
 Hub-and-spoke – a network structure usually utilises by legacy carriers whereby all 
flight routes originate from one main source. Passengers are typically moved 
through the hub onto other locations. 
 Revenue Passengers Kilometres (RPKS) - a measure of revenue earning kilometres 
flown by an airline. 
 Bilateral air service agreements - an agreement which two countries sign in order to 
allow international commercial air transport services between their territories. 
 Costs per seat kilometre – measure of cost incurred per passenger, per kilometre, 
utilised for normalising and comparing costs across airlines, routes and regions. 
 Widebody – larger commercial aircraft usually having multiple passenger classes, 
mostly used for longer sector length travel such as the Boeing 777 and Airbus A340. 
 Narrowbody – smaller commercial aircraft, often used for shorter haul flights, 
commonly used by LCCs for regional trips such as the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320. 
 Apron - the area of an airport where aircraft are parked, unloaded or loaded, 
refuelled, or boarded. 
 GDS - a network operated by a third party company that enables automated 
transactions between third parties and booking agents in order to provide travel-
related services to the end consumers.  
 VFR -  Tourism related to visiting friends and relatives 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a land mass larger than the US, China and India combined, 
consists of fifty-two countries (Library of Congress, 2010) and is home to nearly one billion 
people (World Bank, 2015). SSA, however, remains relatively insignificant in terms of global 
trade, tourism and the general migration of people.  According to statistics released by the 
World Bank on www.worldbank.org, SSA’s GDP per capita in 2013 was $1,624, compared to 
$8,622  in Asia and $29,570 and $27,249  in Europe and America (North and South), 
respectively. In addition, only a small fraction (11 percent) of SSA’s trade is with SSA trading 
partners, compared to Asia where over 50 percent of trade is inter- regional (Schlumberger 
and Weisskopf, 2014).  
Connectivity between SSA’s fifty two countries is extremely low (Christie et al., 2011) .  The 
terrain varies greatly from desert to rainforest, generally affecting critical transport 
infrastructure such as road networks or rail. Most travel occurs via roads which remain 
largely unpaved or in poor condition, including certain national or and trans-SSA highways 
(Christie et al., 2011). Furthermore, in many cases, rail networks are remnants of the 
colonial period (Christie et al., 2011) and it remains a herculean task to coordinate rail 
transportational integration on the continent given the massive funding requirement and 
lack of political will and cooperation. Whilst aviation travel is very effective at creating large 
transportation networks with smaller investment in infrastructure, rail is well-suited to 
carrying overland heavy cargo and passengers over shorter distances (Boeing, 2013). The 
investment required to create an aviation network linking two airports being 100 
kilometers (kms) apart or 10,000 km apart is effectively the same (Boeing, 2013).  
With regard to aviation infrastructure, SSA has several international airports; the largest is 
OR Tambo in Johannesburg which sees 21 million passengers per annum passing through its 
terminals (OAG, 2012).  East Africa boasts a strong network through both Nairobi and Addis 
Ababa, offering links to various locations both on the continent and internationally. West 
Africa however lacks a hub-and-spoke structure by which passengers can be ferried through 
a central hub to various location (OAG, 2012). Despite reasonably adequate aviation 
infrastructure and general connectivity (albeit through three major hubs) according to 
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Boeing (2013), the Revenue Passengers Kilometers (RPKS) flown in Africa in 2012 were a 
mere $55.76 billion. This is compared to $403 billion RPKS flown in China, $152 billion in 
South East Asia, $60 billion in South Asia and $104 billion in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) region in the same year (Boeing, 2013). In this statistical data, 
Africa’s number also includes North Africa, and therefore the figure for SSA would be even 
smaller when correcting for this. These statistics highlight the fact that aviation activity in 
Africa remains significantly below that which exists in most other regions, notwithstanding 
SSA’s large population and the adequate capacity that exists in its aviation sector. That said, 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is of the view that “nowhere is the 
potential for aviation greater than on the African continent” (The Economist, 2013).  
The term “aviation mega city” has been coined for a city that handles more than 10,000 
long-haul passengers per day (Smith, 2013). According to Airbus (2013), as of 2013, the 
world had 42 such mega cities, with the vast majority located in the US, Europe, Middle 
East and Asia Pacific region (defined to also include China).  Airbus estimates that by 2032, 
Africa will contain seven of the top twenty fastest growing air traffic countries and will 
require at least 970 new aircraft to satisfy this demand (Airbus, 2014) .  As increased 
urbanization occurs, demand for travel is forecast to grow at above 6 percent for several 
countries in SSA; such as South Africa, Nigeria, Angola, Namibia and Mozambique (Airbus, 
2014) .  
It is apparent from various sources that in the United States (US) and in Western Europe, 
the emergence of the low cost carrier (LCC) has been fundamental to the growth exhibited 
in the domestic and regional air traffic networks and passenger RPKS In the European 
market. In particular, the advent of LCCs has created new demand in market segments that 
had previously not been well-served by legacy network carriers. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that in Europe in 2004, 59 percent of demand came from new passengers who had 
never flown before on an aircraft (Forsyth et al., 2010). Compared to LCC penetration rates 
of 37 percent in Europe, 30 percent in North America and 34 percent in central/South 
America, LCCs accounted for approximately 11 percent of total capacity (including both 
domestic and international) in Africa (Forsyth et al., 2010).  This number however, includes 
the capacity in the North Africa market which should be removed to accurately measure 
SSA figures, while it is also positively skewed by the South African domestic market which is 
highly developed compared to the rest of SSA. 
 
3 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
It is clear that SSA requires a major boost as far as air travel and linkages are concerned, 
and the solution is the development of a region wide LCC market. That said, significant 
challenges remain, raising the question whether the LCC model, which has proven to be so 
successful in other parts of the world can be successfully applied to the SSA market.  The 
situation prevailing in the SSA environment is where so many of the attributes that support 
the model are simply non-existent in the region. Furthermore, it is common knowledge that 
despite the apparent strong potential that exists  in the region,  several LCCs have tried and 
failed to successfully implement their low cost model in SSA, such as  Fly540 (MRO 
Network, 2014). It is unclear whether factors responsible for this contradiction are simply 
insurmountable, or can be overcome.  
1.3 Objectives 
The research objectives pertaining to this study are: 
 To establish the factors, both market related and airline specific, that are primarily 
responsible for the success of LCCs in markets where they are well established. 
 To establish the factors, both market related and airline specific, that are likely to 
have a profound effect on the chances of success for LCCs in the SSA region. 
 To determine the degree to which the critical success factors identified for LCCs in 
well-established markets compare with the critical success factors for LCCs in SSA. 
 To propose a business model for increasing the likelihood of success for an LCC 
operating in SSA. 
1.4 Research Question 
What is required to adapt the typical LCC model used successfully elsewhere in the world 
for a LCC to operate successfully in the SSA market? 
1.5 Research Propositions 
 
1.5.1 Proposition 1 
The factors that are critical to the success for LCCs in developed markets such as Western 
Europe, US and Asia differ to some extent from developing markets, and in particular SSA.  
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1.5.2 Proposition 2 
There are SSA specific factors that are likely to affect the success of a LCC in the region both 
positively and negatively. 
1.5.3 Proposition 3 
A unique business model, adapted to the specific conditions in SSA is required in order for a 
regional LCC to prove as successful as several have in more developed LCC markets such as 
Europe, the US and other emerging markets. 
1.6 Assumptions 
In undertaking the research, the following assumptions have been made: 
 Industry leaders interviewed are assumed to be experts on the subject matter, 
given their industry experience and positions they hold at airlines in SSA.  
 Southwest Airlines, RyanAir and Easyjet are deemed to be market leaders in their 
respective markets given how they have effectively applied the LCC model. Key 
attributes which are found to be common to all three of these airlines, will be 
assumed to be critical to all LCCs, regardless of the market in which they operate.  
 India and Mexico have remarkable similarities with SSA, and it is assumed that 
critical success factors identified in these two countries could largely be applied to 
SSA. 
1.7 Significance of the study 
Whilst a significant amount of literature relating to more developed LCC markets exists, the 
African and, more specifically, the SSA LCC market remains largely untapped. Certain 
studies have been undertaken to explore the potential for LCCs in developing markets or to 
establish the benefits that air connectivity would have on the African continent. There is 
however, limited research into the reasons why, to date, LCCs have failed in the region or 
how such obstacles could be overcome. There is therefore a distinct gap in the research 
relating to LCCs, and there exists a need for a study that seeks to identify the factors that 
are critical to the success of an LCC in SSA. This study endeavours to address this gap by 
identifying the critical success factors at play and applying them to the peculiarities of the 
SSA market. In essence, what are the critical success factors for a LCC in general and can 
these factors be adapted to ensure success in the SSA market. 
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1.8 Structure of the Reports / Paper 
The content to follow is separated into 8 chapters, the first of which is Chapter 2 which 
focusses on the existing literature which pertains to the study at hand.  This chapter first 
describes the aviation sector in general, before drawing on both market and airline specific 
factors which are likely to impact the outcome of the study. This is followed by Chapter 3, 
containing two case studies on LCCs in India and Mexico respectively, providing real-world 
examples of LCCs in developing markets. Chapter 4 then provides three theories pertaining 
to airlines, and the manner in which these theories can be utilised to analyse the results of 
the study. Following that, Chapter 5 describes the research methodology utilised,  
pertaining to the data collected, and the manner in which it was analysed and applied. 
Chapter 6 then describes the results of the exercises undertaken, which include the survey, 
ticket comparison study, fuel cost analysis and one-on-one interviews. Following that, an 
analysis and discussion pertaining to the results in the previous chapter is provided in 
Chapter 7. Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks and recommendations. The Appendices 
follow. 
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter draws on a selection of the existing literature relating to the global aviation 
sector, more specifically the SSA aviation market, and its participants, being both legacy 
carriers and LCCs. Furthermore, the generic LCC business model is described, looking to 
address the factors which tend to affect the success of LCCs in other markets, and how they 
might apply to the SSA region.   
2.1 Global Aviation market 
According to Boeing (2013), the global aviation market is a highly dynamic industry which is 
constantly adapting and adjusting given many different market forces. Factors such as fuel 
prices, economic growth other modes of transport, emerging markets, environmental 
regulation and market liberalisation, to name but a few, are constantly altering the manner 
in which the industry operates. Market participants, and particularly airlines as the 
dominant players in the industry, have to constantly monitor and alter their respective 
business models requiring regular intervention. Overall in 2012, passenger traffic grew at a 
relatively strong 5.3 percent year-on-year, with industry wide load-factors reaching 79.1 
percent. The US and Asian markets displayed the strongest profits as overall airlines earned 
$7.6 billion (Boeing, 2013). 
Forty-two aviation mega-cities exists globally according to Airbus (2013), and these cities 
remain the epicentres of global aviation travel. That said over the next twenty years 
another forty nine cities are expected to enter this elite group (Airbus, 2014). Economic and 
population growth, as well as disposable incomes are expected to have a major impact on 
travel trends in the coming years, this especially so as aviation travel becomes increasingly 
accessible to people from all parts of the globe. As emerging markets continue to offer the 
strongest growth prospects globally due to emerging middle classes which are expected to 
double globally over the next twenty years, trends are displaying somewhat of a shift in 
global air travel from traditionally strong markets in developed economies, to developing 
ones (Airbus, 2014). While this is expected to take several years before a significant shift 
occurs, strong signs have already emerged, especially as tourism statistics, a major factor in 
driving aviation growth, support movement to previously underserviced markets (Airbus, 
2014). 
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2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) Aviation Market 
According to OAG (2012), a consultancy owned by UBM Aviation, South Africa remains by 
far the most developed aviation market in SSA being home to South African Airways (SAA), 
the continent’s largest airline. South Africa also boasts a developed domestic market, being 
serviced by six domestic airlines, four of which are LCCs with two legacy carriers also 
operating. Followed by Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia, South Africa saw nearly 13 million 
passengers travel through it in 2012, while Nigeria recorded less than half of that which 
indicates that the gap remains relatively large. Further, while Nigeria no longer has a 
national carrier, the national carriers of South Africa, Kenya and Ethiopia accounted for 30% 
of the total African airline market share in 2012, and adding the airlines operating in South 
Africa’s domestic market, this accounts for a further 17%. Therefore almost 50% of the 
entire market share held by African airlines in 2012 was accounted for by airlines 
originating from these three countries.  
InterVISTAS (2014) undertook a study for IATA, whereby they displayed that in countries in 
Africa where liberalisation of air markets had taken place, substantial benefit was realised. 
According to this study, in the early 2000s, the route between Johannesburg (JNB) and 
Nairobi (NBO) saw a 69 percent rise in passenger traffic, while allowing an LCC to operate 
on the route between South Africa and Zambia resulted in a 38 percent reduction in fares 
and a 38 percent increase in passenger traffic. Further, Ethiopian airlines has benefitted 
substantially from its home country having a more liberalised policy with respect to 
bilateral air service agreements (BASAs), seeing the airline becoming one of the largest and 
most profitable on the continent. Ethiopians benefit from 10 – 21 percent lower fares and 
25 – 38 percent higher frequencies. 
Genesis Analytics (2006), mentions that despite the many international agreements that 
remain in place and serve to open up air travel between the rest of the world and SSA, 
regional and domestic markets continue to suffer due to lack of cooperation between the 
region’s players. This has fostered an environment where many small, non-viable, state 
owned airlines continue to fly unabated while being subsidised at the expense of viable 
private carriers. At a domestic level, while some countries have liberalised domestic 
markets to some extent, the most successful of which has been Tanzania, many domestic 
markets remain highly regulated. Competition between private carriers in Tanzania has 
flourished, benefitting passengers, and the market overall. Genesis Analytics (2006) further 
predicts that full liberalisation of the South African Development Community (SADC) would 
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reduce airfares by 18-40 percent, as LCCs would enter the market, increasing volume by 20 
percent. In addition, another 500 000 tourists would arrive by air each year, spending more 
than $500 million in the region. 
Foster et al. (2010) alluded to how air transport in SSA remains expensive by international 
standards. Due to high landing charges and lower volumes, such costs are usually passed 
onto the passenger. Furthermore, government support of state owned carriers creates 
unfair competition and hinders efficiencies in the market, while lack of competition on 
regional routes, a function of a lack of liberalisation, keeps ticket prices relatively high.  
While several small LCCs operating both regional and domestic routes exist, their share 
remains somewhat insignificant according to the CAPA Centre for Aviation (2013). In 2013, 
LCCs accounted for approximately 11 percent of total seat capacity in Africa as a whole, this 
compared to a 37 percent penetration rate in Europe, 30 percent in the US, 34 percent in 
South America and 24 percent in the Asia-pacific region. The figure in Africa includes North 
Africa, and hence with that part of the continent being better represented by LCCs, the 
figure in SSA alone is somewhat lower. While the LCC Fastjet has made significant inroads 
into the continent, the region’s largest LCC remains a foreign carrier being FlyDubai, which 
competes through a hub-and-spoke type network, yet offers low cost linkages to various 
locations in Africa and the globe.  
Shlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) focuses somewhat on the regions most integrated area, 
the East African Community (EAC), which is a regional economic community formed 
between five East African countries namely Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. 
The region covers an area of 1.82 million square kilometres, and contains a total population 
of 141.1 million people, as per 2013.  According to the authors, there are a few, high 
frequency routes, both domestically and regionally which makes up a large majority of the 
overall traffic in the region. As of 2013, there were 15 – 17 return daily flights between 
Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, displaying the significant demand that exists. Similarly in 
Tanzania, high frequency occurs between Dar Es’ Salaam, with Mwanza, Kilimanjaro and 
Zanzibar, connecting the economic hub with these three tourism centres. As far as regional 
/ international routes are concerned, the busiest regional routes are between Entebbe and 
Kigali, Kigali and Bujumbura, as well as flights to Mombasa and Zanzibar from cities outside 
of Kenya and Tanzania respectively. Intra-EAC traffic however is heavily dominated by a 
limited number of carriers and competition remains extremely limited.  
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Figure 1: Number of Carriers serving major EAC routes, July 2013. (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014) 
Overall, Boeing (2013) remains highly optimistic with respect to African aviation growth in 
the medium term, particularly as SSA weathered the global recession of 2008 / 2009, with 
long-term economic growth of 4.4 percent being well above global averages. Further, air-
traffic demand is expected to grow at 5.7 percent annually, outpacing global figures as the 
flexibility offered by aviation networks is likely to be exploited, offering a relatively low cost 
per network kilometre compared to other modes of transport requiring significant 
investment in infrastructure.  
2.3 Alternative Forms of Transport 
Ruske and Kauschke (2013) state that while SSA may be viewed as one large homogenous 
region by some, connectivity between its fifty two countries is extremely low.  The terrain 
also varies greatly from desert to rainforest, generally affecting critical transport 
infrastructure such as road networks or rail. Most travel occurs via roads which remain 
largely unpaved and in poor condition, save for South Africa, with Kenya, which scores only 
second to South Africa in terms of road quality, only having 14% paved roads. Road quality 
tends to deteriorate even more as one leaves major metropolitan areas. According to the 
authors, In Nigeria, SSA’s most populous country, roads carry over 90% of both people and 
freight despite regional roads being in a state of disrepair. While certain trans-SSA highways 
exist, such as the Lagos-Abidjan highway, road quality is below par, while some other 
highways which do exist, remain unusable.  Further the authors observe that as far as rail is 
concerned, general conditions on the continent are dire. Many rail networks remain 
remnants of the colonial period, and while East Africa is seeing investment in new inter-
53% 
26% 
21% 
1 carrier  2 carriers > 2 carriers
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country rail links, such as between Tanzania and Rwanda, and Kenya and Uganda, such 
activity in West SSA is non-existent.  It remains a herculean tasks to coordinate 
transportational integration on the continent given both massive funding requirements and 
a lack of political will and cooperation between several countries. Furthermore, with many 
countries in SSA remaining land locked, the situation is even more dire. 
According to the World Bank (2011), more than half of all migration in East Africa occurs 
within the region. While data supporting this can at times be inconsistent from country to 
country, such migration does occur, and is supported by economic, educational and 
political factors. Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014), mention how through the EAC Treaty, 
the free movement of labour has been accelerated, particularly from smaller, historically 
less politically stable countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, and there is therefore 
substantial communities from both Rwanda and Burundi in neighbouring Uganda and 
Tanzania. High levels of migration have also been witnessed between Uganda and Kenya. 
The vast majority of visitors to Rwanda and Uganda, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, still 
enter the country utilising land transport in the form of cars and buses. Figure 2 below 
shows the breakdown across the four countries, relating to the mode of transport utilised.  
 
Figure 2: Arrival Mode of Transport (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014) 
Shlumberger and Weisskopf (2104) looked at Rwanda in more detail, where in 2011, 61 
percent of all tourism arrivals into the country occurred via land transport. By delving 
deeper, and looking at cost, efficiency, safety and reliability, one is able to better 
understand whether ground transport is likely to be replaced if certain alternatives are 
offered. In the EAC up to 80 percent of regional roads are in fair to good condition, and 
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apart from Uganda, most countries have relatively good maintenance records 
(Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014). Often with the assistance of foreign aid and 
development organisations, these countries have been able to maintain a relatively decent 
standard of roads.  Roads in rural parts of the region are however in in far worse state, with 
over 50 percent of rural roads in Uganda being of low quality, whereas in the other 
countries this figure is slightly below 50 percent. That said, car ownership and usage 
statistics in the region are low at 0.5 cars per 1,000 inhabitants as of 2007 compared to the 
US at 423 car per 1,000 or 457 in the UK in 2007 (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014).  This 
supports the reasons why buses or trains are utilised travelling regionally utilising ground 
transport, such services being provided by many bus operators offering linkages between 
the region’s major cities. Other companies have been particularly focussed on tourists, 
connecting people from Nairobi to places such as Kilimanjaro, charging approximately $20 
for a one-way trip.  Safety however is of major concern, with the WHO estimating that 
8,484 people were killed on Kenyan roads in 2010. This is a death rate of 20.9 per 10,000, 
compared to the US and UK where cars usage is significantly higher, and death rates are 1.4 
and 3.7 per 100,000 respectively.  
Table 1 below displays a comparison of bus travel times versus flight times for several 
routes across EAC. 
Table 1: Bus versus flight times for several routes in SSA 
  
(Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014) 
2.4 Low Cost Carrier (LCC) versus Legacy Carrier 
Binggeli and Pompeo (2002) describe the typical LCC model which has proven so successful 
in Europe and the US, which includes, but is not limited to, the utilisation of one type of 
narrow-body aircraft with one passenger class, maximising load-factors, not providing 
reserved seating, no flight connections, and internet based bookings making up a large 
Route Bus time (hours) Flight time (hours)
Nairobi-Mombasa 8 1
Nairobi-Kampala 12 1,13
Nairobi-Dar es Salaam 13 1,42
Nairobi-Kigali 24 1,37
Entebbe-Kigali 9 0,83
Nairobi-Kisumu 5.5 0,83
Dar es Salaam-Arusha 9 1,42
12 
 
majority of all reservations. Vidovic (2013) compares the business model of a legacy carrier, 
to that of an LCC, which can be summarized as follows: 
 LCCs typically utilise narrow-body jets as opposed to the wide-body aircraft used by 
legacy carriers for long haul flights; 
 Legacy carriers have a wider geographical coverage, including domestic, intra-
continental and long haul flights, with a particular focus on utilising a home country 
base; 
 Legacy carriers tend to adopt a hub-and-spoke network rather than the LCC’s point 
to point network; 
 LCC’s utilise secondary airports where possible, whilst legacy carriers establish 
themselves at major airports; 
 Legacy carrier offer a wider range of destinations with a higher frequency of flights; 
 Legacy carriers offer a range of passenger classes with a high level of service 
throughout; and 
 Legacy carriers practice complex yield management with a much larger range of 
prices within each seating class. 
 
Table 2: LCC compared to Legacy Carrier Business Model 
 
 (Vidovic, 2013) 
Showing one particular example, O’Connell and Jon (2005) mention the manner in which 
AirAsia transformed from being a regional loss making legacy carrier into a successful LCC 
LCCs Legacy Carriers Advantage of LCCs
Utilisation Short stops at airport (approx 
25 min)
Prolonged stops (approx 45 
min) due to using main 
more congested airports
Increased utilisation
Additional services "no frills", additional charges 
for catering, extra baggage, etc
Entertainment programs, 
paper tickets, business 
class, catering
Lower costs, low 
complexity
Airports Secondary and regional airports Main "hub" airports Lower landing and airport 
fees
Fleet Standardised fleet with high 
density seating
Different types of aircraft, 
lower density seating
Lower maintenance and 
training costs
Ticket Sales Direct channel sales with agent 
costs passed onto passenger if 
essential to use this type of 
distribution
Travel agencies and ticket 
offices
Lower distribution costs 
and less complexity
Connections network Direct, point-to-point, short 
haul
Longer haul and indirect 
flights
Reduced complexity with 
connections, higher 
utilisation
Personnel Large variation in salary High base salary. Worker 
unions
Lower fixed costs of 
employing staff
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under the direction of an ex-Ryanair director. AirAsia achieves turnaround times of 25 
minutes, with a crew productivity level that is triple that of Malaysia Airlines, with an 
aircraft utilisation rate of 13 hours per day. As a comparison, Air Malaysia achieves 
turnaround times of one hour, and has an aircraft utilisation rate of 8 hours per day on 
domestic flights. The example illustrates some attributes that differentiate LCC from legacy 
carriers in the manner in which they operate. 
2.5 Origins of LCCs 
Olipra (2012) discusses the origins of the LCC, by drawing on parallels between charter 
airlines which originated in the 1950s and modern day LCCs, with the former being the 
early ancestors of LCCs as we know them today. Charters were successful due to their 
ability to operate freely in otherwise highly regulated markets. By first establishing 
themselves in home based high demand tourism related domestic markets, and then 
selectively offering services on regional tourism routes which legacy carriers were not 
interested in due to seasonality, their business models were both profitable and 
sustainable. Charters also filled a gap meeting a significant demand for cheap air travel 
along routes where travellers would otherwise not have utilised this form of transport. That 
is, by virtue of the fact that tour companies had an interest in the revenues earned from 
holiday-makers accommodation, car hire and other related expenses, reduced cost air fares 
could be offered in order to attract tourists to specific destinations, not feasible for legacy 
carriers who would be required to dedicate regular scheduled services to the destinations 
without the additional revenue streams.   
2.6 Market Factors affecting LCCs 
 
2.6.1 Market Demand 
Bhatti et al. (2010), describe how in Europe from 1998 to 2005, passengers utilising LCCs 
grew from 8 million to 59 million, as a new market of passengers who could not previously 
afford to fly, emerged.LCCs in Europe have also been successful at attracting business 
travellers given a safe, reliable lower-cost alternative to legacy carriers.  Wharton (2013) 
presents the case whereby growth in LCC passenger numbers has been exponential in Latin 
America, a market with a population of 600 million people, and a middle class that grew by 
50% in the last ten years, as prior to 2006 it remained largely underserviced as far as 
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affordable air travel was concerned. Similarly in India, according to Seshadri and Henry 
(2005), the entrance of Air Deccan, the first LCC, saw the entire market being disrupted, as 
for the first time ever passenger from India’s massive middle class of 150 million people 
were able to utilise air travel. In a country where 13 million people travelled by train each 
day, the same amount of people travelled by air each year in the country prior to the 
entrance of Air Deccan.  
 
Figure 3: Number of passengers carried by LCCs in Europe from 1999 – 2011 (in millions)  (Vidovic, 2013) 
Vidovic (2013) showed that in the European market during the early 2000s, only 37 percent 
of LCC passengers had actually changed their preferred mode of air travel, from having 
utilised legacy carriers prior to LCCs. The balance of passengers represented new demand 
from a market that had not travelled before.  Of this new demand, 71 percent of 
respondents declared that they would not have travelled at all, had no low cost option 
existed.  
Bhatti et al. (2010) documented how LCCs have also enjoyed particularly strong growth in 
certain markets by targeting specific routes and cities that are inadequately serviced by 
legacy carriers or other forms of transport. In Europe in particular, LCCs exploited the lack 
of service by legacy carriers and high speed trains to certain cities, or where such services 
did exist, the existing rail connections were slow (such as in the UK) or were expensive 
(such as in Germany). In Europe, the number of passengers utilising air travel grew 
significantly from 8 million in 1998 to 59 million in 2005, with a major contributing factor 
being the more than fifty LCCs that existed in Europe by 2010.  
The Economist (2014) in an article on GoAir, the latest entrant into India’s LCC market, 
showed that even today, in India, one third of GoAir’s passengers are small business owners 
or employees. The alternative to a ninety minute air trip is an eighteen hour bus ride on an 
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overcrowded vehicle utilising unsafe roads. Furthermore, up until the early 1990s, India’s 
aviation industry was serviced by only two inefficient state-owned carriers. As a result of 
the deregulation of the industry in 1998, however, private operators began to take hold 
and several charter carriers were formed, and by 1993, their combined market share had 
grown to 30 percent (The Economist, 2013). In a country with a population of a billion 
people and only 15 million air passengers, there was enormous opportunity for LCCs such 
as Air Deccan to create new demand when the LCC launched in the early 2000s. While 
much has changed since then, in October 2014, IndiGo, the country’s current LCC market 
leader placed the largest order for aircraft that Airbus (the company which accounts for 
roughly half of the world’s large passenger jets) has ever received being 250 in total (The 
Economist, 2013). 
Wharton (2013) provides a case study on VivaAerobus, where the largest order Airbus has 
received to date in Latin America was also not from a legacy carrier, but rather from 
VivaAerobus in 2013. The airline is an LCC specialising in short haul routes between Mexico 
City, and several regional and domestic locations.  VivaAerobus is a joint venture between 
Ryanair of Ireland, and IAMSA, a large Mexican ground transportation company. The 
company was established to service Latin America and the Caribbean’s large and growing 
population (currently numbering 600 million) and to exploit the general lack of LCCs in the 
market. The authors highlight how discount air travel in the region has the potential to 
grow in the same way that it did in Southeast Asia. As the middle class in the region 
expands, such opportunities are akin to that seen in Brazil in the early 2000s, where the 
country went from 30 million air tickets sold in 2002 to approximately 100 million sold in 
2012, transforming Brazil into the third-largest domestic market in the world, behind the 
United States and China (Wharton, 2013). The growth in air travel is directly linked to the 
economic strides made in Brazil, as the emerging low-middle class increased by 
approximately 40 million people over a ten year period which was critical to increased 
demand for regional travel.  
The African Development Bank (AfDB) (2011) describes in a report that In more developed 
LCC markets, and particularly so in India and South America, the emerging middle classes, in 
each respective country / region, were largely responsible for the significant growth in the 
low cost sector. The AfDB estimates that Africa’s middle class is made up of approximately 
350 million people, equal to 34 percent of the total population (Ncube et al., 2011). As per 
the report published, the middle class were defined as those consuming goods to the value 
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of between US$2 - $20 per day, which provides a fairly broad range. Yet Standard Bank 
(2012) notes that this range also includes three sub-categories, the bottom of which is the 
floating class, who spend just $2-$4 per day yet account for 60 percent of the entire middle 
class. At the same time Standard Bank (2012) also notes that, eleven SSA countries, when 
combined, account for half of Africa’s entire GDP being Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The problem 
however is that some 86 percent of households in the eleven countries mentioned remain 
in the low-income band, although this figure is expected to improve, falling to 75 percent 
by 2030. It is expected that between 2014 and 2030 the number of middle-class households 
will almost triple across the eleven countries mentioned (Ncube et al., 2011). 
2.6.2 Competition 
Ford (2009) mentioned how in 2009 there were only four LCCs in Europe, yet five years 
later there were more than fifty. The relatively low barriers to entry and misconstrued 
belief that profits were easy to come by with the market having no saturation fueled this 
exponential growth. Nevertheless, according to the author, since 2007, there have been 
many casualties and bankruptcies, with Ryanair the darling of the LCC sector, even issuing 
its first profit warning that year as its shares slid 30 percent. EasyJet, the other large player 
in the European LCC market similarly downgraded forecasts that year seeing its shares sell 
off 25 percent. Other LCCs however were not able to weather such unfavorable business 
conditions, as Duo became the first British LCC to go into administration in 2007 while in 
the same year KLM’s Buzz was rescued by Ryanair in the eleventh hour. Ryanair and EasyJet 
however, despite issuing profit warnings, looked to step in and increase capacity where 
possible, snapping up casualties where it made sense to do so. This strategy proved to be 
highly successful leading to above market rate growth while eliminating competition at the 
same time.  
Binggeli and Pompeo (2002) are of the opinion that an even larger threat to LCCs is legacy 
carrier adopting a low cost offering on certain short haul routes. By virtue of a lower cost 
structure, which has been ring-fenced on those routes, it can justify the lower ticket prices. 
British Airways (BA) under threat from Ryanair and EasyJet, turned its loss-making 
European operations around since 2005, by segregating costs as much as possible, shifting 
distribution for such flights to the internet, and away from travel agents, while yield 
management techniques akin to that used by LCCs were adopted for specific routes. This 
allowed BA to offer fares that were similar to the LCC players yet still profitable on certain 
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routes (Bingglei and Pompeo, 2002).  Nevertheless, legacy carriers need to remain 
cognisant of whether other legacy carriers are following suit, as the risk of losing business 
travellers accustomed to certain levels of service can occur if the airline alters its offering 
too much.  Loss of such passengers could lead to excess capacity and under-utilisation of 
aircraft, and therefore a very delicate balancing act is required. Decisive for an LCC is to 
have the working capital to sustain oneself through periods of predatory pricing which 
might be implemented by legacy carriers, yet another highly successful tactic utilised which 
has been utilised by LCCs particularly in Europe has been differentiating oneself through 
unique and new routes not being offered by legacy carriers. 
According to CAPA (2014), unique to the SSA market is the element of competition posed 
by hybrid carriers with home bases outside of the region which is not the case anywhere 
else in the world. One specific example given is FlyDubai, which due to the lack of 
established LCCs in SSA, has utilised its vast financial resources and economies of scale to 
enter the African market with success. Its offering includes connections to ten cities in SSA, 
with plans to expand to many more that are within reaching distance of their narrowbody 
aircraft. While not a true LCC by virtue of the carrier not offering point-to-point service but 
rather hub-and-spoke with a business class offering, a passenger can purchase a seat only, 
which does not include checked baggage or a meal, and ticket prices are substantially less 
than those on its sister carrier, Emirates, when flying on similar routes.  Therefore unique to 
this market is the fact that the leading lower-cost carrier, as far as passengers carried in the 
region is concerned, is a foreign based hybrid-carrier.  
2.6.3 Load Factors 
Achieving high load factors continues to be highlighted as one of the most essential success 
factors for an LCC regardless of the market in which it operates. According to Binggeli and 
Pompeo (2002), Ryanair targets largely secondary airports, displaying the lowest cost base 
of 65 percent below that of a legacy carrier. Based on the estimated cost base of Ryanair, 
the authors estimate that a profit is achieved if more than 55 percent of the seats are 
occupied. EasyJet on the other hand operates routes into major airports, and therefore 
appeals more to business travellers, albeit with a higher cost base than Ryanair, being 40 
percent below that of a legacy carrier. It is expected to fill more than 75 percent of its seats 
compared to Ryanair’s 65 percent below, if profits are to be achieved. O’Connell and 
Williams (2005), on the other hand, recorded that in 2005, AirAsia boasted the world’s 
18 
 
lowest unit cost of $0.023 /ASK. Due to this extremely low cost of operation, the airline had 
a passenger break-even load factor of 52 percent.  
A recurring theme in the success of LCCs globally has been the superior load factors 
exhibited by such LCCs compared to their legacy counterparts. Ensuring that aircraft are 
always as full as possible reduces unit costs per passenger, as low load factors could prove 
very costly for an LCC. Such low load factors lead to low aircraft utilisation and mounting 
costs per passenger  resulting in pressure to increase ticket prices. Oilipra (2012), shows the 
load factors exhibited by Ryanair and EasyJet from 2000-2007 compared to the average for 
legacy carriers affiliated to the Association of European Airlines (AEA) as per figure 4 below. 
Successful LCCs have always placed critical importance on targeting high load factors 
through various techniques given that the consequences of empty planes are far more 
severe for an LCC versus a legacy carrier. 
 
Figure 4: Load factors on intra-European routes in the Period from 2000 – 2007 (Oilipra, 2012) 
2.6.4 Secondary Airports and Aircraft Utilisation 
Vidovic (2013) describes how costly delays can prove to an airline, reducing aircraft 
utilisation and potentially leading to loss of passengers due to affected time schedules. 
Avoiding delays is pivotal not only for the reason mentioned, but if cost savings can be 
achieved, such reduced costs can be passed on in the form of lower ticket prices. Several 
practices have been undertaken globally to reduce delays, some of which have become 
defining features of LCCs. Due to over-congestion at large hub airports, LCCs in Europe and 
the US in particular looked to smaller, less congested airports to run their scheduled 
services. The immediate impact of this was less delays and the maximization of daily block-
hours leading to higher utilisation of aircraft. The secondary effect of this however was 
often cost savings due to lower landing fees at secondary airports. When LCCs recognized 
that cost savings from minimizing delays could have such a profound effect on overall costs, 
50
60
70
80
90
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Easyjet RyanAir AEA
19 
 
they explored other strategies to reduce delays even further. By only offering “free-seating” 
whereby seats are not reserved, passengers are also enticed to board the flight as early as 
possible in order to secure a seat of preference. Apart from the benefit associated with 
avoiding delays, much of Ryanair’s model depends highly on the secondary airport 
approach (Vidović et al., 2013). The airline was the innovator as far as extracting additional 
revenue from secondary airports is concerned, by attracting co-financing from these 
airports in exchange for electing to use these airports. As was the case with Cologne and 
Dortmund airports in the Rhine region of Germany, and Standsted and Luton in the London 
Area of England, growth of secondary airports and the local economy surrounding them is 
well documented (Vidović et al., 2013). Airport owners, authorities and local municipalities 
were cognisant of these direct benefits, and therefore at times have paid to attract LCCs to 
their airports via either profit shares from all revenues generated at the airport in question 
or payment in lieu of advertising or promoting these airports to passengers. They therefore 
saw the LCC as a mechanism to attract tourists and business to the local economy.  
2.6.5 Tourism 
The European Travel Commission (ETC) (2005) shows that LCCs continue to take the credit 
for having significantly boosted tourism to many cities in Europe. With LCCs serving many 
new destinations that were traditionally underserviced by legacy carriers, tourism exploded 
in cities following the initiation of these new routes. According to the report, in 2005, cities 
that were traditionally popular tourist destinations, such as Cyprus and Malta, yet were 
serviced well by legacy carriers saw very little growth, while Barcelona, Valencia and 
Dubrovnik saw passenger numbers from the UK more than double as these routes were 
underserviced overall. This became a mutually beneficial situation, as LCCs enjoyed high 
load factors and utilisation by initiating and promoting these new routes, while the 
locations similarly benefitted from increased tourism, thereby in turn supporting these 
LCCs. 
O’Connel and Williams (2005) describe the manner in which leisure travelers comprised the 
vast majority of airline travelers in 2001, making up 85 percent of all tickets purchased. The 
price elasticity of leisure travelers is estimated to be 2.4, and so a 10 percent fare reduction 
will cause a 24 percent increase in sales. Business travelers on the other hand are less price 
sensitive, and the price elasticity of demand for this type of passenger is estimated to be 
0.1 displaying a highly inelastic demand. In another study undertaken (O’Connell and 
Williams, 2005), price elasticity was not constant, with a small percentage fare change 
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producing little effect while price changes above 20 percent result in large shifts in demand. 
Furthermore, travelers travelling together in groups are also particularly important to 
airline revenues as in most instances more than one ticket is sold due to one leisure 
traveller having booked a ticket. This shows the clear difference between leisure and 
business travelers, with the latter tending to travel in singularity while leisure travelers 
often travel in groups. In developed LCC markets, LCCs have been shown to carry more 
group travelers than legacy carriers, as was shown by the statistic that 40 percent of 
Ryanair’s passengers travel in pairs while 31 percent of AirAsia’s passengers are part of a 
group of three of more (O’Connell and Williams, 2005).   
Tourism remains a major driver of LCC traffic in Europe in particular, where LCCs have been 
the most successful in global terms as shown by Dorsten (2014). Given the benefits of 
tourism in general, but particularly intra-regional tourism, in recent years, there has been a 
distinct trend from countries in SSA to attract regional African tourists. One example of a 
success story in this regard is the 75 percent increase in tourists to Rwanda from 2010 to 
2013 which was largely due to an increase in intra-African tourism (Schlumberger and 
Weisskopf, 2014). In South Africa, one of the most visited countries on the entire African 
continent, 70 percent of all tourists come from other SADC countries (Schlumberger and 
Weisskopf, 2014), which displays the potential for other SSA countries where tourism 
remains highly tilted in favour of tourists from Europe, the US and Asia. Intra-African 
tourism is also less seasonal, and provides sustained visitors throughout the year.  The lack 
of affordable air travel linkages has been highlighted as a major impediment to intra-
regional tourism while visa requirements, whereby the average traveller requires visas to 
visit 60 percent of the countries on the continent, is another (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 
2014). 
Shlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) highlighted a report published by the World Tourism 
and Travel Council, where tourism in SSA is expected to grow significantly in the coming 
years. Between 2013 and 2023, international tourist arrivals in Kenya are expected to grow 
to 2.6 million visitors per annum. Similarly in Uganda and Tanzania, tourism growth is 
expected to reach 5.6 and 5 percent respectively. Looking at East Africa as an example, 
tourism remains dominated by European and American tourists, and in Kenya in 2010, 
almost 50 percent of all tourists originated from five countries being the UK, US, France, 
Italy and Germany. Data from the Tanzanian National Bureau of Statistics displayed a very 
similar picture relating to Tanzania in 2012. In recent years, data relating to intra-African 
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tourism has been collected (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014), and while visitor numbers 
from nearby African countries has been increasing, what is clear is that the vast majority of 
these visitors remain business travellers, and only a small percentage of total tourists 
originate intra-Africa. Significant efforts remain underway to facilitate both intra and inter 
regional tourism in SSA, with authorities attempting to reduce or eradicate barriers relating 
to visa requirements and limited transport connectivity. In the EAC for example, the 
Secretariat coordinated the meeting of its members in 2013, to create a roadmap for a 
common passport for EAC member citizens.  Some progress has been made, however while 
EAC members have agreed to align their immigration laws and adopt the technology 
required to integrate their IT system, achieving this goal remains somewhat of a challenge 
(Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014). 
According to Thome (2013), tourism remains a major driver of LCC traffic. The African 
continent as a whole recorded the second highest growth globally as far as tourism is 
concerned in 2012 with a 6 percent increase. SSA specifically recorded the lion’s share of 
this growth with revenues received from tourism being the highest on record compared to 
previous years. In the same year, intra-Africa passenger numbers increased by 13 percent 
driven mainly by increasing trade and a growing middle class. Only the lack of liberalisation 
and over dependence on bilateral air service agreements (BASA) was holding back this 
potentially massive market. 
 
2.6.6 Airports and Infrastructure 
Gwilliam (2011) indicates that despite popular belief, aviation infrastructure, in general in 
SSA, remains adequate to support a significantly larger industry. Airport infrastructure is 
not seen to be a limiting factor, with SSA being relatively well endowed with adequate 
runways and mostly adequate terminal facilities. The region is however affected by the lack 
of modern air traffic control equipment apart from a few select airports, however 
improvement in this regard is relatively easier to achieve.  Of the 2,900 airports and 
airfields that existed in SSA in 2007, 261 of those received regular scheduled services, 
testament to the regions ability to support such regular services. While the entire region 
can boast only three major airports, another forty medium sized airports remain connected 
to large cities and serve both international and domestic traffic. On the other hand, more 
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than two hundred small airports and airfields, of the total 2,900 remain largely non-viable 
and continue to remain open despite declining domestic travel.   
Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) show that of the airports providing scheduled services, 
nearly every single one has as at least one paved runway, and in general taxiways, aprons 
and jetways only pose minor problems as far as efficient take-off, landing and parking 
facilities are concerned. Overall airports in SSA do not have primary runway capacity 
constraints, since if one assumes a five minute separation between flights, a single runway 
airport could accommodation 144 flights in 12 hours, or more than 1,000 flights per week. 
With an average assumed load of 120 passengers per flight, this is more than 17,000 
passengers a day. Very few airports in Africa come close to this number, and therefore 
runway constraints are largely non-existent. As far as terminal capacity is concerned, most 
SSA airports are close to, or only marginally above, their declared capacities. While little 
data is available to truly assess this, it appears that rescheduling of flights, and minor 
upgrades to arrival or departure halls would have a significant effect on existing capacities. 
Looking specifically at the ten largest airports in the EAC, with an assumed five minute time 
lag between flights, none of the airport in this region have reached their runway capacity. 
Only terminal capacity has been seen to be a limiting factor in some of the regions busiest 
airport such as Dar ‘Es Salaam and Nairobi.  Major terminal expansion projects are however 
already underway, such as in Nairobi which includes a new terminal, while in Tanzania, ten 
regional airports are being refurbished while the country’s main airport Julius Nyere in Dar 
‘Es Salaam is building a brand new Terminal 3 moving all domestic flights to Terminal 2 
(TradeMark Southern Africa, 2011). As shown in Table 3, 47% of all the airports in SSA are 
rated either Excellent or Very Good in terms of infrastructure, reinforcing the fact that 
airports are not a limiting factor for market growth. 
Table 3: Airport Ratings in SSA 
 
(Gwilliam, 2011) 
 
Rating Airports (number)
Percentage of total 
airports
Seats 
(millions)
Percentage of total 
seats
Excellent 31 18 67,75 68
Very good 50 29 18,49 19
Fair 46 27 8,51 9
Marginal 10 6 2,29 2
Poor 36 21 2,42 2
Total 173 100 99,5 100
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2.6.7 Labour 
Shlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) showed that the availability of well trained and 
qualified aviation personnel across the entire aviation sector is a major challenge in SSA. 
This includes pilots, flight attendants, maintenance engineers, technicians and regulatory 
staff. According to the authors, the reasons for such deficiencies does vary moderately 
across the region, however primarily it is due to both unsatisfactory training and the all too 
common “brain drain”, where qualified staff target more lucrative jobs offshore. Middle 
Eastern carriers in particular have been attracting newly-graduated talent from SSA, 
offering significantly higher salaries and superior opportunities (Schlumberger and 
Weisskopf, 2014). Nevertheless, wages for airline crew in SSA are by no means low, and 
with the current shortages being experienced, salaries have actually doubled from 2008 to 
2011 (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014). One advantage however is that in general (and 
while this again is fairly diverse across SSA) labour regulation is somewhat less onerous and 
restrictive when compared to other developing markets such as Latin America, the 
Caribbean, or the countries attempting to attract such staff in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, with many experienced personnel leaving the region, the training and overall 
capabilities of pilots and flight crew in particular has been highlighted as a major source of 
safety problems (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014). Those with superior training or skills 
can command significantly higher salaries, adding to the operating costs for airlines. 
Similarly the less competitive salaries which are paid to airport authority or regulatory 
personnel as opposed to airline jobs adds to the challenges posed to aviation authorities in 
attracting the right staff to manage their interests in SSA. Given lack of funding in this 
regard, policies which focus on air safety and the like are often mirrored on the policies of 
the protected national carrier, creating both a conflict of interest, but also standards that 
are not objective, nor formulated in line with the interests of the country and other 
competitive players in the market. Only a more coherent and collective approach by 
bothmarket participants, governments and authorities can overcome this challenge posed 
in SSA.  
2.7 Airline Specific factors affecting LCCS 
Besides market factors, other factors identified in the literature affecting LCCs may be 
categorised as airline specific and include the following: 
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2.7.1 Network Type 
Donovan (2005) notes that the hub-and-spoke system  utilised by almost all legacy carriers 
certainly has its advantages, yet one of the largest drawbacks of such a network system 
remains the complexity involved in managing flight connections. In addition, demand 
patterns are infinitely more difficult to forecast, while the variability of revenue within a 
fare class is also significant as different passengers on the same flight have multiple points 
of departure or final destination. LCCs however avoid much of this complexity through 
offering point-to-point transfers, which allow it to gauge demand more accurately and 
maximise revenues using simple techniques and system tools. 
Oilipra (2012) focusses on Southwest Airlines as the pioneer of point-to-point routes, which 
actually came about by virtue of trial and error when the airline elected not to move to 
Houston’s newly constructed airport. Rather Southwest remained at the older Hobby 
Airfield, which was much closer to the downtown area of the city and therefore had its 
benefits for passengers.  The point-to-point route offering attracted a flurry of new 
travellers where the convenience associated with the airport’s location provided significant 
benefits to a large proportion of travellers.  
2.7.2 Cost Minimisation 
LCCs in much of the literature have been able to exhibit considerably lower cost per seat-
mile than legacy carriers, generating profits at lower fares and load factors according to 
Rubin and Joy (2005). Southwest Airlines breaks even when its load factor is only 60 
percent, compared to the 90 percent requirement for legacy carriers in the US. The 
combination of non-unionised labour force, smaller more fuel efficient aircraft and quicker 
turnaround times contribute overall to this significantly lower cost overhead (Rubin and 
Joy, 2013). Similarly Flouris and Thomas (2005) describe Southwest Airlines superior 
performance versus its peers in the US market as being based on achieving a lower, more 
flexible cost structure, allowing it to breakeven at lower load factors, while being able to 
react to a changing environment more quickly than its competitors.   
Cost reduction strategies undertaken by LCCs have been shown to reduce operating costs 
per seat kilometre flown by 35 – 60 percent versus legacy carriers (Bingglei and Pompeo, 
2002). European LCCs when first establishing themselves on the continent offered fares at 
50 to 70 percent lower than legacy carriers due to higher seat load factors and reduced 
costs.  The significant difference in price was highly instrumental in attracting price 
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sensitive leisure travellers, however lack of convenience and flexibility often doesn’t lend 
itself to meeting business traveller’s requirements. 
Vidovic (2013) adds that in Europe in particular during the 1990s and early 2000s, when a 
LCC entered any market previously underserviced by such carriers, they were often able to 
achieve cost savings of up to 50 percent versus full service carriers. As legacy carriers have 
become more frugal in recent years and managed costs far better, this is often no longer 
the case, even in new markets that are still underserviced by LCCs. The effect of the global 
credit crisis and reductions in air travel demand due to terrorism has seen many legacy 
carriers undertaking significant overhauls of their cost bases. The cost advantage a LCC 
might now have over a legacy carrier flying similar routes is not as superior as before.  LCCs 
have therefore been forced to continuously and dynamically change their business models 
to retain a cost advantage while continuing to differentiate through other means.  In more 
mature markets, LCCs have focused on other means of costs savings, such as mergers with 
other airlines to achieve cost savings, while also employing innovative revenue streams, 
improved customer service and even experimenting with longer-haul flights (Vidović et al., 
2013).  
Vidovic (2013) further discusses one of the key traditional differentiating factors of the LCC 
models being a low cost approach, of which success depends on its ability to achieve 
significant cost savings by focusing on several primary points. These include: 
  seeking to achieve maximum efficiency at all times;  
 using younger, uniform and more fuel efficient aircraft;  
 servicing secondary, less congested airports;  
 scheduling point to point flights;  
 selling tickets through online channels;  
 creating one passenger class; and  
 offering no in-flight service 
 
Table 5, indicates the percentage cost reductions that can be achieved by an LCC (when 
compared to the ticket price of a full service legacy airline) by undertaking certain cost 
cutting measures. The cumulative reduction in costs is seen to go as low as 49 percent 
below that of a legacy carrier, being  a significant cost reduction. 
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Table 4: Cost reduction areas for LCC versus legacy carrier 
  Cost reduction (%) Cost per seat 
Legacy Carrier   100 
LCC     
Operating advantages     
Higher Seat Density -16 84 
Higher aircraft utilisation -2 82 
Lower flight and cabin crew 
costs -3 79 
Use cheaper secondary 
airports -4 75 
Outsourcing maintenance/ 
single aircraft type -2 73 
Product/service features     
Minimal station costs and 
outsourced handling -7 66 
No fee in-flight catering, 
fewer passenger services -5 61 
Differences in distribution     
No agents or GDS 
commissions -6 55 
Reduced sales/reservation 
costs -3 52 
Other advantages     
Smaller administration and 
fewer staff offices -3 49 
LCC compared to legacy 
carrier   49 
 
(Vidovic, 2013) 
Shlumberger and Weiskopf (2014) show that in general, due to lack of competition and the 
reduced economies of scale, aviation costs in SSA are relatively higher than many other 
regions in the world. While high costs relating to airport charges in particular can pose a 
significant challenge to LCCs in SSA, across the entire region, the authors find that both the 
magnitude of these charges and type of charges can differ significantly from country to 
country, and even from airport to airport (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014). Costs can 
be separated into those airlines pay, such as landing charges, parking and security, and 
those paid by passengers such as third party taxes and fees charged by the airports 
authorities or government. In conducting a comparison between airports of similar size in 
developing countries, being both in Africa and globally, with respect to total costs for 
regional / international short haul flights, the authors established that some airports in SSA 
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actually charge significantly lower airline charges  than fellow African and certain Asian and 
Latin American airports. Figure 5 below depicts these differences. 
 
Figure 5: Total Charges for Regional Flights in USD (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014) 
 
2.7.3 Ticket Distribution 
With internet penetration in the US alone having been 160 million people in 2002, the 
advent of direct airline ticket sales, for both legacy and LCCs revolutionalised the manner in 
which the sale of airline tickets took place (Rubin and Joy, 2013). The authors indicate that 
in 2002, 39 million people in the US booked their air travel using the internet, a 25 percent 
increase from the previous year. The authors further state that for Southwest, a ticket sold 
through a travel agent costs the airline $23, while a ticket sold through the internet costs 
only $6, resulting in a two-thirds saving. In addition to the cost savings achieved by the 
airline with internet sales, greater transparency is achieved as consumers are able to 
compare fares to a greater extent. This transparency in turn creates greater competition 
amongst airlines, and as consumers are able to better gauge alternatives, as it has been 
shown by Rubin and Joy (2013), it similarly increases price elasticity which puts downward 
pressure on prices, and therefore stimulates greater demand. 
According to Seshadri and Henry (2005), typical airline global distribution systems (GDS) 
such as Galileo or Saber, are extremely costly to implement, requiring a deposit that can 
run into the millions of USD, while a recurring fee of $4-$10 per ticket issued is levied by the 
system. This fee covers the embedded costs of credit, reconciliation and clearing house 
charges, yet if an airline is not providing credit to travel agencies, this largely eliminates the 
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need for this system, while counterparty risk is similarly non-existent, and therefore a 
clearinghouse service is superfluous. In addition. with a GDS, an airline has to have  
uninterrupted access to the system in order to issue unsold tickets prior to the flight 
departing, which creates a situation whereby the airline is at the mercy of the GDS, and 
cannot operate without the required access. On the contrary, one key universally common 
feature of LCCs is the almost total reliance on the internet as a distribution channel, which 
is an advantage for LCCs, as they don’t incur additional cost, can monitor flights in real time, 
and are not reliant on a third party system for flight bookings. 
According to O’Connell and Williams (2006), LCCs were primarily the pioneers of online 
booking systems leading legacy carriers in most markets as they looked to capitalize on cost 
savings through such systems. While internet penetration levels were significantly higher in 
the US and Europe than in Asia at the start of the millennium, in 2002, 45 percent of all 
AirAsia’s booking were made online. The airline also supplemented online sales with SMS 
bookings, and processed 2000 – 3000 messages per month. In conjunction with this 
passengers were able to book through many outlets which existed at post offices and other 
news agents (O’Connell and Williams, 2005). The authors further showed that even in 
countries where the internet is not widespread, evidence shows that passengers will seek 
out all the available booking channels to access lower fares.  
In 2003, O’Connell and Williams (2005) further showed that in 2003 Aer Lingus 
benchmarked its passenger booking cost against those of Ryanair, and found that there was 
as much as a EUR 20 difference between the two carriers, with Ryanair having the cost 
advantage due to the internet booking system it used.  In the same year, during the year 
end ‘Google Zeitgeist’ survey, which was based on 55 billion searches over the past year 
which tracked the most popular sites visited, RyanAir.com ranked as the fifth most 
searched for brand across the entire worldwide web. This is testament to airline passengers 
desire to access the cheapest and most transparent fares. 
Olusegun (2014) provides the results of a survey undertaken by the U.N. Broadband 
Commission in 2014, where eight of the ten countries with the lowest levels of internet 
penetration globally were in SSA. The eight countries were Ethiopia, Niger, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea, Burundi, Eritrea and South Sudan, all with penetration rates less than 2 percent. 
While 50 percent of the entire world is expected to be online by 2017, only a handful of 
countries in SSA have reached 40 percent, with most countries’ penetration rates being 
29 
 
low. Nevertheless, the survey indicated that mobile broadband, which is accessed by 
mobile telephones reached 20 percent at the end of 2014, up from only 2 percent in 2010.  
Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) focuses on the EAC, where Kenya has been a shining 
performer effectively doubling internet penetration rates from 2010-2014 by investing 
significantly in ICT infrastructure and in particular fibre-optic cables. They indicate that 
while the country can boast an internet penetration rate of 28 people per 100, this figure is 
still far below that of developed countries like the US or UK, and even lower than countries 
like Thailand and Mexico as indicated in Figure 6 below. According to the authors, while ICT 
infrastructure is largely to blame, computer literacy also remains extremely low in most of 
SSA.  
 
Figure 6: Internet Penetration Rates per 100 people (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014) 
Kariuki (2014) described how due to low internet penetration rates, mobile communication 
has taken off rapidly in SSA, particularly in Kenya. As the cost of mobile devices and their 
associated usage costs have come down over the last five years, mobile penetration rates 
have soured. 3G connectivity also continues to be rolled out across SSA, with connectivity 
speeds which are also highly improved from prior generation technology. At the same time 
smartphone usage has drastically increased, the release of a $50 smartphone in 2013 
provided access to mobile broadband that is faster, more enhanced and user friendly. 
Similarly, while credit card usage in SSA is low with only 3 percent of the population 
possessing such cards during 2013, in many countries in SSA, people in general do not hold 
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banks accounts at all. Mobile payment systems have therefore flourished in the region, 
whereby users can make payment via their mobile devices, without the need for a bank 
account (Kariuki, 2014). As a result, the author alludes to the fact that certain counties in 
SSA have been the global pioneers of such systems, as Safaricom in Kenya developed the 
M-Pesa payment system which has taken the market by storm since it was introduced in 
2007.  The airline Fly540 which is no longer operating for other reason, had utilised the 
system for airline bookings and claimed it offered an almost perfect substitute for credit 
cards.   
2.7.4 Ticket Prices 
In a study undertaken in 2002, the average fares of LCCs were 40 – 60 percent lower than 
full service competitors (O’Connell and Williams, 2005). According to the authors, this 
translated into Ryanair’s fares being on average EUR 50 for a one way trip, earning a 
reputation for significantly stimulating aviation travel markets. They note that Ryanair 
however did not simply enter a market and offer lower fares, but rather did so in a more 
innovative manner utilising well thought out marketing campaigns. One key tactic included 
the provision of many free tickets to its passengers, a strategy which proved to be highly 
successful. For example, in 2003, a number as high as 100,000 tickets were given away as 
the airline celebrated the opening of a new base. Later that year, it issued another 70,000 
free tickets to celebrate carrying 70,000 more passengers than its closest competitor, 
EasyJet. It later issued another 27,000 seats to celebrate 27 consecutive weeks of being 
more punctual than EasyJet. O’Connell and Williams (2005) continue that this trend 
persisted for several years, and while it came at a significant cost, this was considered to be 
a major part of the marketing budget. In their view, at the time, such a strategy had a major 
impact on passenger perceptions as despite seats not necessarily being free when one 
attempted to book, the airline was always viewed to be extremely low cost, so much so 
that tickets were sometimes free.  
2.7.5 Yield Management 
American Airlines is considered to have been the pioneer of revenue management, or 
better known as yield management in the airline industry having undertaken the practice in 
1985 as shown by Huefner (2011) . When low-cost players entered the market and 
threatened to take passengers from larger legacy carriers, the airline did not try and 
compete on a price basis, but rather sought ways to only reduce pricing for certain 
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passengers while still selling full prices tickets to passengers who were less price sensitive. 
This strategy proved to be highly successful when undertaken according to a precise 
strategy utilising thorough market analysis. 
Alderighi and Piga (2010) undertook a study in 2010 which the results showed that there 
are three types of passengers with respect to the booking of airline tickets, in general. Very 
early bookers tend to have concrete travel plans in place hence the reason for booking 
early, and therefore little flexibility. This makes their demand somewhat inelastic, and they 
are willing to pay a moderately higher price to secure a seat. Early-intermediate bookers 
are those who have a more flexible schedule, and would tend to shop around across 
different departure dates, times and even locations to save cost, making their demand 
more elastic. Lastly, last-minute bookers are those with the least flexibility, hence highly 
inelastic schedules and willing to pay a premium.  
Whitelegg (2005) states that yield management is a technique practiced by airlines which 
involves selling each and every seat at its optimal price, delicately balancing supply and 
demand to ensure maximum return. Similarly, Donovan (2005) describes yield management 
as a technique which allocates limited resources among a variety of customers in order to 
optimize the total revenue or “yield” on the invested capacity. This is explained further by 
Donovan (2005) that in such a case, the limited resource is seats, with the customer types 
being both business and leisure travelers.  An airline seat is somewhat like a fresh food that 
spoils after a certain period of time, as the aircraft departs, all the empty seats become 
worthless and so this technique depends on selling the right seat to the right customer at 
the right time for the right price.  Yield management effectively manages the balance 
between selling discounted tickets which would fill up an entire plane, and full fare tickets 
which maximize revenues yet leave seats empty. The author continues that one important 
characteristic of airline seats however, is that despite becoming worthless in an instant at 
departure time, seats can be sold in advance.  With each seat having a low marginal cost, it 
is preferred to sell the ticket rather than let it go to waste, as the accompanying revenue far 
outweighs the cost of producing the item. Airlines therefore create booking rules between 
the market segments, such as a Saturday night stay is required in order to obtain the 
discounted fare. This attracts price sensitive travelers who might be more flexible and 
travel over a weekend versus business travelers who are not and likely only travel during 
the week (Donovan, 2007).   
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That said, the manner in which legacy airlines practice yield management is vastly different 
to that of LCCs, with the former, looking to maximize revenues through complex pricing 
strategies to fill all classes of seats. LCCs on the other hand look to create hype and 
demand, by starting ticket sales at a very low price, increasing through various pricing levels 
as the departure date draws closer. Malighetti, Paleari and Redondo (2008) state that the 
success of any LCC depends on the delicate balance between fare levels, load factors and 
operating costs. That is, the structure of revenues and the manner in which prices are 
determined are nearly as vital as the minimisation of costs. 
2.7.6 Aircraft 
Vidovic (2013) highlighted a trait common to many successful LCCs which has been the 
widespread use of younger, homogeneous medium sized aircraft such as the Boeing 737-
700/800 or Airbus A319/320. These aircraft result in lower fuel, maintenance, personnel 
and capital costs when compared to larger or older aircraft. Nevertheless in his view, the 
choice whether to utilise new or old aircraft is highly dependent on the market itself. In 
highly competitive and developed LCC markets, carriers that have had the benefit of being 
well capitalised have in almost all instances purchased new aircraft. The author explains 
that by placing relatively large orders for new aircraft with the manufacturer directly, 
volume discounts are often secured. After a few years of operation, either these aircraft are 
then sold in the second hand market, or alternatively the airline enters into sale and 
leaseback transactions, allowing then to recoup some capital yet continuing to operate with 
relatively young aircraft, lowering the overall cost of ownership quite significantly.  
Furthermore, Vidovic (2013) considers the example in India and other Asian markets with 
large populations where LCCs have entered with a flurry due to large strong economic 
growth. In such markets, operating brand-new aircraft over long sector lengths is standard 
practice for an airline looking to compete with other carriers. For longer sectors, where a 
low fuel burn has a larger effect on the operational costs, the aircraft of choice are younger 
in most cases. According to the Author, in the European and South East Asian markets, 
nearly all new and existing LCCs have utilised very young aircraft given the competition that 
exists in the low cost sector while in less competitive markets, and where sector lengths are 
short or when first mover advantage is crucial, the strategy has been somewhat different. 
Older aircraft have been utilised with some success, despite being more expensive to 
operate (Vidović et al., 2013). A sound business model business model can certainly make it 
possible for a carrier with older aircraft to operate successfully. 
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Trubbach (2013) shows how market power is also a strong determinant of whether an 
airline should acquire brand new or second hand aircraft. Noting that, it has been 
estimated that Ryanair, due to its market power, is able to negotiate very significant 
discounts paying around 50 percent of the full price at $42 million for a brand new B737-
800. Further, it is estimated that the depreciation on an aircraft of that type is 
approximately $1.5 million per year for the first 7 years, losing $10.5 million of its value 
during this time. The author argues that a carrier that purchases this aircraft, will in effect 
be paying three quarters of the price that Ryanair paid, albeit for an aircraft that is 8 years 
old, with higher maintenance and running costs. On the other hand, leasing aircraft is 
traditionally more expensive in the long run despite the short term cost savings. For 
example it is estimated that Spirit, the North American LCC paid between $3.5 and $4.0 
million USD per aircraft for its fleet which consists of 100 percent leased aircraft, a 
significant sum to pay despite the relatively young age of its fleet being 4.6 years (Trubbach, 
2013). 
Trubbach (2013) also described how the fleet strategy of small LCCs is somewhat similar to 
that of small legacy carriers, where having brand new aircraft brings about little cost saving 
which is outweighed by the significant upfront capital costs. In his view, purchasing new 
modern aircraft come with significant funding requirements, and the likely pressure this 
places on a smaller airline is better avoided in most cases. On the other hand, he argues 
that the requirement for new aircraft is usually disparate between large LCCs and large 
legacy carriers, noting that the fleet utilisation of large legacy carriers is often fairly low as 
they operate schedules which have been optimised around one or multiple hubs. This 
requires specific schedules that can accommodate large crews and overnight stays away 
from the home base. He concludes that therefore it might not be efficient to operate a fleet 
of brand new aircraft as the cost savings are minimal due to lower utilisation of aircraft. 
Le Bec (2012), states that outside of South Africa a potential middle class who will fly 
regularly is small, and therefore load factors in Africa are likely to be significantly lower that 
other parts of the world. Nevertheless, the consideration taken in this study is that the 
Brazilian model might be more applicable, where smaller aircraft such as the Embraer are 
utilised instead of Boeings or Airbuses, looking to fill only 40 – 120 seats, as opposed to 180 
seats per flight in an Airbus or Boeing narrow-body aircraft. 
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2.7.7 Seating Density 
By maximizing the seating density on an aircraft, albeit at the expense of comfort for 
passengers, the overall costs per passenger is reduced as shown by Vidovic (2013). Such a 
strategy is based on the fact that   that fixed costs contribute mostly significantly to overall 
costs, and while variable costs, such as those relating to fuel do increase as the number of 
passengers on board increases, the increment is less than the decrease in fixed costs. 
Therefore overall costs per passenger are reduced as the number of passengers increase. 
2.7.8 Ancillary Revenue 
Oilipra (2012) discussed how certain LCCs have been successful at not only reducing costs, 
but actually converting such cost reductions into additional revenue streams. Such 
examples include inflight catering where snacks and warm meals are provided, but at a cost 
and at a high profit margin for the airline adding much needed revenues, while similarly 
selling check on luggage and flight changes can positively impact the top line. Furthermore, 
many LCCS earn revenues from other ancillary offerings such as selling accommodation, car 
hire, and short term insurance, while providing advertising space in both traditional and 
non-traditional places such as seat backs, trays and even the hull of the aircraft add further 
to revenue streams.  
2.7.9 Brand  
O’Connell and Williams (2013) highlight the results of a study undertaken in 2003 which 
looked to determine the most important reasons why passengers, who mostly utilised 
legacy carriers, did so, and reliability and quality came out as the most important factors. 
Interestingly, fares were less important when compared to issues such as flight 
connections. On the other hand, the same survey on customers who utilised LCCs revealed 
fares as being consistently the most important factor, with flights schedules coming a 
distant second.  This showed the principle difference in passenger’s preferences between 
legacy carriers and LCCs, whereby passengers choose LCCs primarily due to low ticket 
prices, while those selecting full service airlines do so for the additional service offering. 
Other studies (O’Connell and Williams, 2005) have shown that perceptions of price in 
particular are integral in the LCC market, such as in Malaysia where AirAsia is perceived to 
offer lower fares compared to the full service carrier Malaysia airlines when this isn’t 
necessarily always the case. Thus branding provides a means of product and service 
differentiation, and LCC brand building is very important regarding brand recognition in any 
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competitive environment. The same study (O’Connell and Williams, 2005) showed that 
even if legacy carriers in Europe decreased their prices to the same level as Ryanair, 40.6 
percent of passengers would not change, despite an increased service offering and this is 
due to brand loyalty.  
2.7.10 Safety Profile 
SSA’s air transport safety record remains the worst in the world, a factor which is well 
known and perceived to be widespread on the continent as shown in a study by Langkilde 
(2013). The study showed that in 2004, SSA accounted for 22 percent of all accidents 
worldwide despite only accounting for 4.5 percent of all traffic globally. In 2006, African 
carriers lost 4.31 aircraft per million departures, compared with 0.65 aircraft worldwide. 
Another study undertaken by the Interstate Aviation Committee (Foster and Briceno-
Garmendia, 2009) concluded that it was not the use of Russian built aircraft in Africa that 
caused higher than average accidents as it had been insinuated, but rather below standard 
safety precautions. When western aircraft were used, similarly concerning statistics are 
revealed whereby fifteen fatal accidents had occurred since the mid-1990s. From the 
various studies, it is clear that the high accident rate in SSA is a result of poor safety 
standards and lax supervision, and not operation of Eastern or older aircraft. 
2.8 Application in SSA 
Binggeli and Pompeo (2002) states that the success or RyanaIr and EasyJet is not easily 
replicated, noting that the European LCC market displayed losses of almost $300 million 
from 1996 – 2001, while the US market, excluding Southwest, lost almost $1 billion during 
the same time period with many players  having gone out of business. They contend that, in 
Europe, Ryanair and EasyJet can account for more than 88 percent of the entire LCC 
market, while Southwest boasts nearly 50 percent of the US market. In their view, this 
seems to suggest a trend whereby winner takes all in the LCC marketplace as competition 
between such carriers is considered to be far more damaging than the competition that 
exists between legacy carriers, as LCCs exhibit fewer differentiating factors and have 
smaller margins to utilise as weapons in a price war.  
Shlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) in their extensive study which focussed on the potential 
for LCCs in developing countries, outlined some of the most significant challenges that LCCs 
are likely to encounter in such markets. Some of the factors mentioned are exogenous to 
the airlines control, being liberalisation of markets, air traffic control infrastructure and 
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state protected airlines. Many of the factors mentioned are airline specific, such as aircraft 
financing, labour and safety. Overall the authors recommend that LCCs choose their 
development partner or shareholder very carefully, being one who can effectively assist in 
managing the factors that are beyond their control.  
InterVISTAS (2014), argued that the liberalisation of SSA’s aviation sector could act as a 
catalyst to a chain reaction, whereby the intra-African tourism market would be awaken, 
which would in turn spur on the LCC sector, in turn leading to greater tourism numbers. 
Projections undertaken by InterVISTAs in their liberalization impact report estimate that 
liberalisation of 12 countries out of a total of 54 would lead to an increase of more than one 
million tourists on the continent. Further, one of the major impacts of air traffic freedoms 
would be more direct journeys, bringing about more routes, more frequencies and 
eliminating some unnecessary stops which in some cases add three to six hours per trip. As 
shown in Langkilde (2014), data pertaining to liberalisation that had taken place in other 
markets supports this notion, with the WTO conducting a study in 2008 that showed that of 
184 countries which had open sky policies, on average, air traffic increased by 30 percent in 
the first year after liberalization. The same study indicates that on the South Africa to Kenya 
route, this saw a 69 percent increase in passenger numbers, while South Africa to Zambia 
saw a 38 percent increase. On the latter, fares also reduced by 38 percent due to the 
entrance of an LCC on this route. 
According to Cobb (2005), the high rate of failure of LCCs in certain markets can be 
attributed to flawed business models. Their study highlighted weak management, inept 
marketing and under capitalisation as the three key reasons responsible for the flawed 
business models. They concluded that the business model adopted was absolutely pivotal, 
suggesting that even legacy carriers would need to adopt elements of the correct LCC 
model otherwise their fates would be the same as the failed LCCs. Fageda et al. (2010) 
however suggested that only leading regional LCCs are able to compete with legacy carriers 
on short-haul routes, and therefore in markets where legacy carriers are well established, 
any LCC offering needs to be formidable, as far as market power and capitalisation is 
concerned, in order to ensure success. They suggest that consolidation of smaller players is 
therefore often a natural occurrence in markets with several large LCC participants being 
present. 
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3. Case Studies 
 
3.1 Case Study 1 
Seshadri and Henry (2005) presented a comprehensive case study on the LCC Air Deccan, 
initially describing how at the turn of the century, India’s population, being the second 
largest on the planet at over one billion, comprised of a majority of people with little hope 
of ever utilising air travel. Of the country’s roughly 150 million middle class citizens, only 
three to four million had ever utilised air travel prior to Air Deccan entering the market.  
Air Deccan not only employed traditional cost containment measures adopted by most 
LCCs, but given the somewhat unique nature of the Indian market, many innovative 
approaches were required, which proved to be highly successful in this virgin low-cost 
market. Through all these practises, Air Deccan displayed the highest civil aviation industry 
growth seen anywhere on the planet. Air Deccan undertook to make air travel accessible to 
every Indian, and the ticket price of $10 for a one way fare from Bangalore to Delhi, a 
distance of over 2000km, if purchased early enough, was testament to this. Breaking the 
perception that air travel was only for the rich was particularly challenging in a country like 
India which continues to distinguish openly between classes and casts, yet a challenge Air 
Deccan successfully embraced. If passengers planned well in advance, they could travel 
many routes for less than the cost of a second hand train fair. That is indeed why in the first 
few years of operation, 30% of all passengers on most of their flights were first time 
travellers.  
3.1.1 Load Factors 
In 2004, Air Deccan recorded passenger load factors as high as 83 percent across certain 
routes such as Bangalore-Hyderabad, and 100 percent on Bangalore-Goa. Air Deccan chose 
to lease half its aircraft, and purchase the balance, seeing over thirty aircraft having been 
delivered prior to its purchase by Kingfisher Airlines in 2007. The airline adopted an 
approach of targeting small towns in India, as opposed to competing directly against the 
incumbent carriers at the time, being Indian Airlines, Jet Airways and Sahara. With 75 
percent of the country’s population having lived in rural areas, such a strategy paid 
dividends, and saw Air Deccan being instrumental in reopening mothballed airports, many 
of which had fallen into severe disrepair. Despite this, such airports required significantly 
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less capital to recommission given their size compared to the large airports in Mumbai and 
Chennai. In certain instances, the airport was nothing more than a basic structure with 
thatched roof. Nevertheless, these small airports served their purpose, and allowed rural 
towns the access to the skies. 
3.1.2 Ticket Distribution 
Ticket sales and distribution were to some extent a significant challenge, with the majority 
of potential customers not owning credit cards. Phone booking provided some alternative, 
with customers able to collect tickets and make payment at one of the several thousand e-
ticket collections centres around the country. While agents took a five percent commission 
in such instances, this was substantially less than commissions paid by larger airlines to 
travel agents being in the range of 9-10 percent. Rather Air Deccan incentivised ticketing 
agents to make up the difference through higher volumes. In order to mitigate the risks of 
bad debts against such agents, they were required to retain a deposit with Air Deccan 
which was debited once the ticket was issued. This is in essence the existing model 
practiced between airlines and travel agencies, as the latter retain credit accounts with 
airlines and only pay them later for ticket sales they have undertaken. Furthermore, by 
utilising the telephone channel with agents who issued tickets through an internet based 
system rather than a GDS, expensive payment gateway systems were avoided. The 
cheapest tickets overall were however offered directly on the internet, enticing those who 
could do so to access the website to purchase tickets. Air Deccan became the largest e-
commerce site in the country through such practices, with in effect 100 percent of its 
transactions being done on the internet. That is, 50 percent directly by the call centre who 
essentially booked online on behalf of the passenger, 35-40 percent through travel agents, 
and the balance at the airport or through Air Deccan offices. The web based distribution 
system was developed by a Delhi based software company, saving significant sums of 
money as opposed to utilising the Galileo or Saber system used by most airlines and travel 
agents around the world. Galileo and Saber require large deposits upfront, in the range of 
several hundred thousand USD, and then between $4-$8 per ticket, excluding the cost of 
credit, reconciliation and clearing house fees. Air Deccan however spent a fraction of this 
issuing tickets through its e-commerce site. 
Through the distribution system implemented by Air Deccan, the airline incurred overall 
distribution costs of around 7-8 percent of the overall ticket price while its competitors 
incurred between 25-28 percent. Furthermore, Seshadri and Henry (2005) shows that a 
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large legacy carrier can have outstanding payments above $200 million at any one time on 
its GDS, which carries a significant cost of credit and reconciliation costs with travel agents. 
Air Deccan’s internet based system effectively made such costs redundant, despite more 
than 2800 travel agents and vendors distributing tickets for the airline during 2005. Of the 
roughly $300,000 in tickets sold daily during that year, every cent was received upfront, 
providing much needed cash flow to the airline. 
Air Deccan, through its internet based ticketing and distribution system was able to 
dynamically track load factors in real time, and then adjust fares appropriately. If a certain 
flight remained below the targeted load factors as the departure date drew closer, fares 
would be reduced to stimulate additional ticket sales through special offers. Legacy carriers 
are constrained by the rigidities of the distribution systems they tend to use as fares have 
to be announced to thousands of travel agents worldwide through either the Galileo or 
Saber ticketing systems. Furthermore, through the bespoke internet ticketing system, each 
and every flight was able to be monitored in real time recording revenues and costs per 
flight, allowing management to make decisions very quickly to ensure targets were met.  
3.1.3 Aircraft 
As far as aircraft were concerned, Air Deccan was successful in convincing aircraft lessors to 
waiver the conventional six-months lease deposit, as their convincing argument of “missing 
the opportunity to provide aircraft to Air Deccan could mean missing the fastest growing 
aviation market in the world” was recognised as ringing true.  Air Deccan however, in 2004, 
being less well funded, was able to negotiable very substantial discounts from both ATR (for 
its smaller aircraft) and Airbus (for its larger aircraft), by having the leasing deposit waived 
by the manufacturer. Typically, an airline is required to provide at least six months deposit 
for leased aircraft, however by convincing both manufacturers of the potential in the Indian 
market, both ATR and Airbus waived the deposit saving Air Deccan $360,000 per ATR and 
around $1.2 million per airbus alone. .Air Deccan maximized seat density on the Airbus 
A320s that it utilised, carrying up to 180 passengers compared to the 154 carried by Indian 
Airlines at the time. This was achieved by doing away with business class or premium 
sections of the aircraft while using all additional space as frugally as possible. 
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3.1.4 Costs 
Other innovative practices largely unique to the airline brought about unparalleled cost 
cutting measures. From short turnaround times of fifteen minutes which ensured maximum 
utilisation per day, to real time monitoring of load factors through the e-commerce site, the 
airline was able to adjust fares instantaneously. If a flight was empty close to the date or 
time of departure, reduced fares can be offered online, something legacy carriers cannot do 
due to system rigidities. Similarly through the same system, profit and losses on each and 
every flight were closely monitored, allowing for quick decision making. Due to very low 
passenger traffic levels at some of the smaller airports from where Air Deccan operated, all 
non-core activities were outsourced. Ground crew were therefore only expected to work 
for a couple of hours each day at some airports, and outsourcing mitigated idle time 
associated with having permanent employees. Similarly, maintenance was undertaken by 
external parties, with Air Deccan only paying a pre-agreed charge which included cost of 
parts and labour. Daily maintenance however remained an in-house service, as it was 
considered core to business. By ensuring that approved tools were sent to site, while access 
to hangers was pre-arranged, Air Deccan avoided sending an aircraft back to its home base 
for repair, another significant cost saving. Marketing was also an essential undertaking 
which required unconventional means of reaching the masses. Air Deccan adopted a 
strategy of advertising in railway stations and local language newspapers, mediums not 
traditionally used by legacy carriers.  
During Air Deccan’s period of exceptional growth, the carrier was able to reduce 
turnaround times to as little as fifteen minutes from landing to take-off. This compared 
favourably with legacy carriers who used to land at the same airports, yet experienced 
turnaround times of 30 – 50 minutes, which was significantly longer.  Due to this, Air 
Deccan’s utilisation was twelve hours per day compared to Indian Airlines’ nine hours. 
3.1.5 Market Obstacles 
Despite the enormous success achieved by Air Deccan at the time, many significant 
challenges remained. Government policies, which were largely archaic as far as civil aviation 
were concerned, remained a major obstacle to growth, while constant uncertainty as to 
expected changes in government, and their likely civil aviation policies, had a profound 
negative effect on the industry. Such uncertainly did not bode well for significant 
investment in the sector, while fuel prices and their related taxes, instituted by government 
departments also had a major impact on profitability.   
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Not long after commencing operations, several of the new entrants into India’s low-cost 
market ceased to operate, including Kingfisher Airlines despite having the backing of one of 
the country’s largest conglomerates (Wharton, 2013). The tragedy however was that 
Kingfisher Airlines had purchased Air Deccan in 2007, as the latter found itself in financial 
turmoil, brought about by funding constraints and mismanagement.  Despite having been 
pioneers in India’s LCC market, after only three years from inception, Air Deccan was 
experiencing operational difficulties. Regular flight cancellations, lost baggage and 
extremely poor on time performance mounted, and the reputation of the airline was 
severely affected. In 2005, the founder of Air Deccan, Captain Gopinath brought in a team 
of expat management from Europe, and while a temporary fix prevailed, the founder never 
relinquished true control. There was no Chief Executive Officer in place, and while the Chief 
Operating Officer had some operational control, the ultimate control remained with 
Captain Gopinath. Resentment between local Indian management and those brought in 
intensified, leading to several expatriates leaving, and the operational problems were never 
truly resolved. When Kingfisher Airlines and Air Deccan merged in 2007, they were never 
able to integrate the former’s upmarket luxury airline model with that of a true LCC given 
legacy cost issues. While initially the two brands were kept separate, Kingfisher later 
integrated low-cost Deccan under the Kingfisher brand in 2008 renaming it Kingfisher Red. 
Unfortunately this proved to be the final nail in the coffin as in 2008 low-cost operations 
ceased all together. 
3.2 Case Study 2 
Shlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) describe how between 2005 – 2007 in Mexico, several 
LCCs entered the market following the liberalisation of the country’s aviation sector, a 
move which involved the privatisation of airlines, airports and aviation infrastructure in the 
country. Despite the country’s large land mass, only 3 – 5 percent of the population had 
ever utilised air transport by 2007, with bus travel remaining the mode of choice with more 
than fifty five million trips having been made on buses during 2005 as it provided the only 
affordable way to travel for the majority of Mexicans.  As the economy had stabilised more-
or less post 2004, this acted as a catalyst to the emergence of LCCs following years of 
economic turmoil, seeing a 17 percent rise in the number of middle class from 2000 – 2010.  
The market still had many challenges to overcome however such as those relating to the 
lack of low cost distribution channels for the sale of tickets. In 2005, internet penetration 
was only 17.2 per 100 users while only 11.7 million credit cards were in issue out of a total 
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population of 110 million (World Bank, 2015), however LCCs employed innovative 
strategies to tackle such deficiencies. IAMSA, the country’s largest bus operator who 
transported on average 300 million passengers per year invested in VIvaAerobus, and was 
able to leverage off its existing distribution and ticket sales network, while also making use 
of its bus network to transport passengers to and from airports. One major advantage was 
the ability to both market and distribute tickets to would be bus travellers at bus ticket 
vendor offices, especially in cases where the cost of travelling by air was almost comparable 
to the cost of a bus ticket, despite travelling time being significantly reduced. In addition, 
passengers could purchase combination bus and air tickets, providing an almost door to 
door linkage which was a significant competitive advantage compared to other carriers. 
Such innovative practices allowed LCCs to capture one-third of the domestic market by 
2008 in a market which had grown significantly due to the entrance of passengers who 
were first time flyers. By 2012, LCCs had captured almost 60 percent of the domestic 
market with VivaAerobus, with the airlines having estimated that 25 percent of all 
passengers during that year were first-time travellers.  
3.2.1 Ticket Prices 
In order to wrestle additional market share from legacy carriers, LCCs also took advantage 
of the fact that there were limited slots at the country’s main airport, Mexico City Airport.  
By developing new routes which were underserved, or not served at all, several new point-
to- point routes were established between many of the country’s smaller airports. Much of 
the stellar growth exhibited was also largely attributable to the clear distinction in ticket 
prices between LCCs and legacy carriers. A study undertaken by the Mexican Government 
in conjunction with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2010 
showed that the average fare per kilometre on an LCC was 42 percent lower than its legacy 
counterpart on the same routes, while fares on a legacy carrier were 30 – 117 percent 
higher than those on the LCC Aeromexico, with the latter sometimes matching or even 
undercutting bus fares on the same routes.   
3.2.2 Tourism 
Clearly one of the most positive impacts of the emergence of LCCs in Mexico was the 
stimulation of the country’s tourism sector. In one example the Mexico City – Cancun route 
recorded growth of 39 percent in 2012, being a 900,000 passenger or one-third increase in 
domestic passenger numbers in a single year. Overall, Mexico’s domestic air transport 
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market grew nearly 30 percent from the year 2005 to 2012, and this growth is set to 
continue as the country’s aviation sector is expected to realise at least 5% growth per year 
until 2032. Much of that growth is attributed to the expected uptake in traffic between the 
US and Mexico, as “visiting friends and relatives”, or VFR travel and tourism as it has come 
to be known, takes off.  This type of tourism has been documented to be integral to LCC 
growth in developing countries where vacation tourism markets are smaller than those in 
developing countries (Graham et al., 2008).  
Schlumberger and Weisskopf (2014) further describes how Mexico continues to display 
many challenges affecting its aviation market, such as exceptionally high airport tariffs 
which far surpass those in other Latin American countries (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 
2014). These charges sometimes comprise up to 30 percent of the average ticket price, and 
further increases are expected due to airport operators having communicated their 
intentions to increase costs in the coming years.. The authors state that while airport 
authorities utilise required infrastructural improvements as the core reason for such costs 
increases, most airlines believe these investments are not required but rather attempts to 
tax the industry to supplement government earnings. With the airport operators in Mexico 
having done little to diversify their income sources in the last decade despite the 
exponential growth witnesses in the sector, they rely heavily on such revenues 
(Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014).  Some airports however, recognising the need to 
support and promote LCCs, have developed separate terminals for such airlines, which has 
decreased costs and congestion, and incentivised LCCs to fly there rather than utilising 
other airports (Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014).  
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
The key points from both case studies, most relevant to the research, are summarised in 
Table 5, on the next page. 
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Table 5: Case Studies Summary 
 
 
 
Success Factors India (Air Deccan) Mexico (VivaAerobus)
Extremely high load factors
Provided a seamless network of road 
and air transport through one 
operator
Targeted routes underserviced by 
legacy carriers
Marketed airline tickets through bus 
vending stores
Targeted rural towns given 
population residing 75% in such 
areas
Targeted new routes
VFR travel large driver of demand
Short turnaround times
All non-core activities outsourced
Maintenance managed in house 
but tooling was pre-arranged at 
required locations
Non-conventional advertising 
mediums
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s Monitoring load factors in real-
time allowed the airline to 
maximise load factors through 
altering ticket prices where 
necessary
LCC ticket prices substantially less 
than legacy, and at times largely 
equal to bus tickets
Targeted phone bookings with 
ticket collections from thousands 
of vendors countrywide
Used online ticketing system 
paying agents at ticketing centres 
small commission saving 
significant cost
Ticketing centres placed cash on 
deposit to avoid credit risk
Track load factors in real-time 
through distribution system
Convinced aircraft manufacturers 
to waive deposit
Maximised seating density
Political uncertainly and 
government policies major 
impediment
High airport charges major problem
Air Deccan being acquired by 
wrong parent was its downfall
Dedicated terminals for LCCs strongly 
supportive
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4. Theories governing Low-Cost Carriers 
 
4.1 Theories 
This study draws on various theories which are well-established in the civil aviation sector. 
These theories have been formulated over the many decades of commercial flight, which 
began in 1914 before giving rise to firstly, the traditional legacy carrier, and later, the LCC 
with the inception of Southwest Airlines in the 1970s (viewed by many as the pioneer of the 
LCC model as indicated in the literature review).  The extent to which LCCs have altered the 
air travel market in certain countries and regions is well documented (Piga and Bachis, 
2006). In particular, the success of airlines such as Southwest, Ryanair, EasyJet and AirAsia 
have been highlighted and consequently, their business models have been studied 
extensively (O’Connell and Williams, 2005).  The analysis of these models and their effect 
on their respective markets forms the backbone of modern LCC theory. This study will 
therefore draw on three theories which pertain to the objectives mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, and these theories jointly provide a theoretical basis for the study 
and help identify the critical success factors sought.  
4.1.1 Theory 1 
The first theory underpinning the framework of this study concerns factors that drive air 
travel passenger demand. According to Boeing, at a regional level, about 60 to 80 percent 
of air travel growth can be directly attributed to economic growth, which in turn is driven 
by trade (Boeing, 2013). This conclusion is based on the fact that countries whose 
economies are heavily reliant on trade, tend to have higher rates of air travel. The 
remaining 20 – 40 percent share of air travel  growth that is not directly associated with 
GDP growth, can be attributed to market specific factors such as; passenger preferences 
and behavior, arrival and departure times, routings, nonstop flights, choice of carriers, 
service class, and fare stimulated demand. Within this category, the liberalisation of the 
aviation market is the primary initial driver of air traffic demand. According to Boeing 
(2013), studies have suggested that as the relative openness of a country’s bilateral air 
service rises from the 20th to the 70th percentile, the resulting increase in traffic can boost 
air travel demand by 30 percent. In addition, improved air services and liberalisation both 
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directly and indirectly stimulates economic growth, which in turn leads to further air 
transport growth, again stimulating economic growth and creating a virtuous cycle.  
4.1.2 Theory 2 
The second theory relates to the phenomenon known as the Southwest Effect, which is well 
documented in the literature (Mertens and Vowles, 2012) on LCCs and has been utilised on 
many occasions as a basis for understanding the effect of LCCs in a number of markets. This 
theory is named after the pioneer of low-cost air travel (Southwest Airlines), and describes 
a two-fold effect which occurs when an LCC enters a new market. Firstly, there tends to be 
a significant increase in the number of airline passengers traveling in that market and 
secondly a noteworthy decrease in the average fare paid by travelers in that market 
(Mertens and Vowles, 2012).  The theory states that the Southwest Effect is not only 
evident in the market that the LCC actually enters, but spills over into other markets and 
regions which have multiple airports that are directly or indirectly linked to the market in 
question -  even if the LCC is only serving one of the airports in that market.  The Southwest 
effect is also usually magnified in markets where legacy carriers are unable to lower their 
fares in response to the entrance of the LCC. This may not only be as a result of their higher 
cost base, but rather may be due to another impact which is not immediately evident. 
Research has shown that passengers prefer non-stop service to those which pass through 
major hubs (Mertens and Vowles, 2012), and therefore a direct flight should in theory have 
a premium built into the ticket price. As legacy carriers make use of a hub and spoke 
system, they would need to lower their tickets prices even below that of an LCC (all else 
being equal) to compete from a price point of view.   
4.1.3 Theory 3 
The final theory pertains to the cost structure of airlines, being comprised of high fixed cost 
and low variable costs.  In effect, revenue decisions can be made with little concern for the 
associated increased costs. That is, adding additional passengers might only add minimal 
addition cost in the form of fuel and catering, as most of the cost has already been incurred 
in the form of a high fixed cost base (Donovan, 2007). Yield management is a technique that 
is utilised to maximize revenues due to this cost structure, by filling as many seats as 
possible, to ensure revenues are maximised. In general, the manner in which LCC’s practice 
yield management is somewhat disparate from the manner in which legacy carriers 
undertake this practice. Legacy carriers offer many different seating classes aiming to 
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maximise revenues with various types of passenger types, while LCCs simplify the process, 
filling seats early through hefty discounts.  
4.2 Theoretical Basis for the Study 
The theories documented broadly cover three key general attributes that are pivotal to the 
success of low-cost carriers, from a theoretical point of view. By understanding how these 
theories pertain to LCCs in SSA, one is able to infer how many other sub-attributes will 
similarly apply, as explained below. 
The first theory described deals with the factors that drive airline passenger demand in 
general, a factor which is absolutely key to the success of any airline, be it legacy or a LCC. 
From the literature described in Chapter 2, market demand drives the sub-attribute being 
load factors, which appears to be vital to a LCC’s success as documented in other regions of 
the world. For example, this is highlighted in Chapter 3, pertaining to the success of Air 
Deccan in India which in large part was as a result of high load factors. Therefore the 
manner in which this theory can be applied in assessing likely demand trends in Africa, and 
how such trends might drive load factors is central to the outcome of this Study. 
The Southwest Effect, named after the pioneering LCC Southwest Airlines in the US, came 
about due to an effect which continues to be documented in many regions of the world as 
described above. This effect, while being shown to drive a significant increase in passenger 
numbers in that market as a first effect (which is pivotal for load factors as shown in 4.2.1), 
it is also shown to drive pricing downward, in the region as a whole, as a secondary effect. 
The first effect, higher demand, is not necessarily as a direct result of the second effect 
being lower prices, as passenger numbers might increase due to an overall impression of 
greater accessibility for passengers, new route offerings and simpler to understand booking 
and travelling processes which are directed at the general population. Therefore this 
secondary effect is important in its own right by creating an overall impression in an 
underserviced market that air travel is accessible to those who were previously 
disregarded. This is important in creating a new market of passengers, thereby avoiding 
cannibalizing existing legacy carrier markets, which alleviates the threat of competition. 
Therefore, this sub-effect of competition, has similarly been shown to be a key attribute to 
the success of LCCs in other markets, as shown in the preceding chapters. The manner in 
which competition is managed in SSA, particularly given the multitude of government 
owned carriers, will likely be decisive to the success of LCCs in the region. 
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The final theory pertains to the cost structure of airlines and the manner in which revenues 
can be maximized in the airline industry by exploiting certain factors that apply. That is, the 
manner in which legacy carriers maximize revenues, through yield management techniques 
is somewhat different to the manner in which LCCs undertake this practice. Ensuring that 
revenues are always maximized through correctly pricing tickets, given the largely fixed cost 
base of an airline, revenue maximising is extremely important to the success of both legacy 
and low-cost carriers. Consequently, the manner in which LCCs undertake this practice in 
SSA is deemed to be vital to such airline’s success given regionspecific factors relating to  
certain sub-effects such as local airline ticket booking tastes and preferences, local 
affordability andwhether passengers will indeed book well in advance. 
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Data Collection and Analysis   
Primary research was undertaken in order to analyse the SAA market directly. The method 
utilised in this study is that of the Grounded Theory Approach (Williams, 2007) whichis a 
systematic methodology which first poses a research question, and then a multitude of 
data is collected and reviewed so that concepts can be coded into broad groups or 
categories. Through such categories, greater organisation of concepts and themes occurs, 
with core categories eventually becoming clear and apparent. Throughout the coding 
process, memos were taken constantly, drawing potential relationships between the codes 
identified and how they pertain to the overall research question. Utilising the theories 
mentioned in Chapter 4, core categories were established, in which to group information 
pertinent to supporting or discrediting these theories.  
A qualitative data analysis software package called Atlas was utilised for the purposes of 
this study which allowed both primary and secondary data to be combined and analysed 
jointly. Therefore information that was relevant to the hypothesis was identified and 
isolated. The software provides the tools necessary to manage and analyse large sets of 
qualitative information, all presented in various formats, to identify trends, linkages and 
map commonality or disparity in the data. Once codes were streamlined, they were then 
created in Atlas, and then data from the information that pertained to these themes or 
codes were extracted, combined and linked to be analysed later. 
5.2 Data Sources 
Two main types of data were utilised in the study: 
5.2.1 Primary Data 
 Questionnaire survey undertaken with 31 market participants 
 Interviews with the Executive Management from four LCCs operating in SSA. 
Questionnaire to general market participants 
The responses to the questionnaire (see Appendix A) were aggregated in order to identify 
trends and preferences. One key criteria for selection was that the respondent actually 
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resided in SSA. Various methods of obtaining responses were utilised in order to ensure 
that the sample was somewhat diverse as described in 5.5. That included, the Researcher 
utilising his own network, while also obtaining responses from participants in airports, taxi 
operators, hotel staff, and their respective networks.  
Interviews with Executive Management of airlines in SSA. 
One on one interviews with executive management at four LCCs in SSA were conducted.  
This was to enable the Researcher to access anecdotal experience of what is critical to the 
success of an LCC in SSA. This information was then compared to the secondary data 
collected, in order to draw parallels, and establish which factors were common to the 
study. The following executive personnel were interviewed and they gave permission to 
indicate their positions in the respective company. 
Fastjet 
The Researcher conducted an interview with the Chief Operating Officer of Fastjet.  
Jambojet 
The interview was conducted with the CEO of Jambojet Airlines.  
Kulula / Comair 
The CEO of Kulula / Comair was interviewed. 
FlyAfrica 
The interview was conducted with one of the Executive Managers of FlyAfrica. 
5.2.2 Secondary Data 
There is a dearth of information on LCCs in developing markets as this phenomenon is 
relatively recent and certainly less established that mature markets such as the US and 
Europe. The bulk of the secondary information collected pertained to the early LLC markets, 
focussing on Southwest, Ryanair and EasyJet, the pioneers and most successful airlines to 
have entered the low-cost space.  Information was sought from airline’s websites, journal 
articles, books, periodicals and internet articles which provided a strong literally base from 
which to initiative the research, allowing the Researcher to formulate the surveys and 
questionnaire to be used in collecting the primary data.  
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Information from airline websites 
Information obtained from airline websites provided information pertaining to route 
offerings as well as their associated ticket prices. This allowed for an analysis to be 
undertaken comparing the price of travel in SSA versus other markets and regions. 
Journal articles / Periodicals / Books / Internet articles 
As previously noted, there is a dearth of information on LCCs in developing markets as this 
phenomenon is relatively recent compared to LCCs in mature markets such as the US and 
Europe.  Information which did allude to specific LCC successes achieved in India and 
Mexico provide very useful insight for the study. Nevertheless, the bulk of the secondary 
information collected pertains to the early LCC markets, focussing on Southwest Airlines, 
Ryanair and EasyJet as indicated above. Information from secondary sources was useful in 
formulating the survey questionnaire used in collecting the primary data.  
5.3 Admissibility and Methods of achieving Validity 
 
5.3.1 Admissibility 
Data utilised were assessed for admissibility.  Table 6 below summarises how the data 
utilised to address each sub problem pertaining to the research question, were assessed.  
5.3.2 Internal Validity 
With respect to the information collected through the surveys with market participants, the 
sources were not verified and were collected through convenience sampling. Nevertheless 
the intention was to use the results for guidance purposes only, providing some possible 
trends which might apply in the SSA landscape. 
With respect to the one on one interviews, these were carried out with executive 
management at several airlines, and each was selected based on their credentials and the 
high regard in which they are held in the industry. Given that the researcher has regular 
contact with most carriers servicing SSA by virtue of his job, the respective interviewees 
were purposively selected from a larger pool of potential candidates, based on individual 
credentials and the circumstances relating to their respective airlines. An important 
selection criteria was that each airline operates in different markets in the region, and each 
has its own specific attributes and characteristics. 
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Table 6: Admissibility of data 
 
This allowed the Researcher to draw conclusions covering a wider scope and therefore 
allowing for the validity of individual responses to be tested. As an example, Kulula 
predominantly operates in South Africa which is largely a developed market while it is 
privately owned, and is also a subsidiary of British Airways / Comair, being a legacy 
domestic carrier. Fastjet on the other hand has no large legacy carrier to lean on, and 
operates only as a regional airline flying high demand international routes in the region. 
Jambojet on the other hand, while being part of Kenyan Airways, has strong regional 
aspirations, despite operating in a relatively weak domestic market in Kenya. Lastly 
FlyAfrica, being the new entrant into the market, relies on the Asian model of several 
Franchises to cover a larger geographical region, while it remains privately owned, having 
no ties to any legacy carriers whatsoever.  
 
Sub problem Type of data Admissibility of the Data
What are the critical success factors 
for LCCs in developed markets such 
as Western Europe, US and Asia. 
Literature including journal, 
magazine and newspaper articles
Fully admissible provided the sources
were credible and key points were
supported by other similar literature. 
How does the European or US
markets differ developing markets, 
or in particular SSA where possible
to compare.
Limited secondary data pertaining
specifically to developing markets
was utilised in the form of internet
articles and a single book
(Schlumberger and Weisskopf, 2014). 
Admissibility was governed by the
credibility of the respective information
sources. Therefore only information
originating from bodies such as The
World Bank Group and recognized
journals were considered.
Surveys with markets participants
With respect to surveys, general
preferences and overall trends were
identified to be used as a proxy for the
market, rather than aiming to identify
true population representative factors.
As long as the answers provided were
logical, their admissibility was not
questioned given the intent of the
Researcher to utilise these responses in
a limited capacity.
Interviews with management at four
LCCs.
All the feedback provided during the
one on one interviews were admissible
given that the interviewees are all
considered to be subject matter experts
in their respective markets and
industries.
Information obtained by the
Researcher through the nature of his
work.
The information provided by the
Researcher through his general dealings
in the aviation market was all admissible
on the basis that such insights are based
on factual occurrences in the industry
and have been presented as such,
clearly indicating the sources of the
information.
What SSA specific factors are likely
to affect the success of an LCC in
the region both positively and
negatively.
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5.3.3 External validity 
By obtaining case studies relating to LCCs in developing markets, although limited, the 
author was able to extract elements that have a strong possibility of pertaining to SSA given 
strong similarities between SSA and these specific markets. Namely, with respect to 
infrastructure, population size, incomes per capita, vast distances, and several other 
factors, Mexico and India share many similarities with SSA, despite obvious differences. 
Therefore the external validity of this research appears to be sound, and in essence 
provides the best possible primary research which might act as a proxy for the SSA region.  
By interviewing four executive managers of LCCs in SSA, all of whom have experience in 
developed markets, the challenges they have encountered and continent specific 
experience provided highly valuable information for the study. The interviews saw a 
multitude of diverse opinions being presented, given the unique circumstances of each 
person, and the airline in which he manages. The high level positions of the interviewees 
and their credibility or respective responsibilities at these airlines contributed to the validity 
while comparing information from different sources improved validity through 
triangulation. 
5.4 General credibility and trustworthiness 
The research draws on both primary and secondary information from various sources and 
locations. Overall credibility is established through triangulation, bringing agreement and 
concurrence to the outcomes of the analysis from the various sources.  
If disparities arose between the information collected in the surveys and that collected 
through the one-on-one interviews and information on the respective airline websites, the 
interviews were given preference. If disparities arose between the interviews then further 
verification was sought and the cause for disparity investigated.  
In order to limit the possibility of creating bias through his own assumptions and bias, the 
researcher took concrete steps to avoid such bias. That is, the methods relating to the 
selection of the survey participants, interviewees for one on one interviews and even the 
literature collected could be subject to personal bias. In order to limit such bias, the 
following was instituted. Participants for the survey were selected in a cascading 
convenience sampling manner, with the researcher not having contact with the participants 
in most cases. The Researcher used a network of friends, colleagues and strangers to collect 
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responses, which provided a sample size of 36 from several international locations, which 
helped reduce personal bias.  
The responses collected indicated that all participants were either employed or studying 
further, and therefore the sample collected is not representative of the whole population 
but rather provides insight into the habits and preferences of individuals who are employed 
on the continent. The survey was provided either online, or in email format, which provided 
a natural selection mechanism as only those with internet access, either at home or at 
work, could answer. This was taken into consideration in analysing and utilising the 
conclusions presented by ensuring the results were only a guide or utilised to back up the 
other data already collected. 
Five individuals who are executive management from various airlines were contacted. 
These five airlines were chosen by virtue of their differing characteristics such as locations 
of operation, stand alone or part of legacy carriers, local or international routes, and the 
like. Only four persons accepted to be interviewed, all representing airlines with differing 
characteristics. 
5.5 Population of the Study 
Surveys were filled in by 36 people from 7 countries in SSA. The sample comprised of both 
students and working individuals, the latter represented by employees with a range of 
experience across several sectors. The survey involved mostly employed individuals or 
those in the process of achieving qualifications. Years of work experience was utilised as a 
possible proxy for travel usage and affordability on the assumption that those with more 
work experience are likely to be more senior in their respective occupations, and would 
hence travel more as they are remunerated better. 
The one on one interviews were conducted with the executive management of four airlines 
with the subjects in question all having many years of management experience in the 
industry prior to their current roles, usually at legacy carriers, of larger size as far as 
turnover, aircraft and routes are concerned. 
5.5.1 Sampling Procedure 
The researcher used non probability sampling, both purposive and convenient for the 
purposes of sampling. For the surveys, convenience sampling was undertaken and 
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cascading used, thereby allowing any potential market participant to participate in the 
study. 
For the one -on-one interviews, the selection of participants was purposive. This involved 
purposely selecting subject matter experts, with proven experience on the subject matter.  
5.5.2 Questionnaire Design and Administration 
Two separate questionnaires were utilised, one for the survey, and one for the one-on-one 
interviews. The survey questionnaire, was designed as follows 
 The literature available on the general subject was utilised to formulate the 
questions, by drawing on existing airlines offerings, what consumers in developed 
markets prefer, and how pricing might be perceived by local travellers. 
 Sixteen questions were compiled in mostly multiple choice format, to ascertain air 
travel habits, tastes and preferences. 
 Participants were sent either a PDF questionnaire via email, or provided with a link 
to a website where they could answer the questionnaire. 
 No questionnaires were excluded from the analysis even if certain questions were 
omitted or not answered correctly. 
The questionnaire for the one-on-one interviews was designed and administrated as 
follows: 
 A questionnaire, comprising of ten main sections, with sub questions in each, was 
compiled utilising the existing literature on the subject. 
 Case studies were utilised in formulating the questionnaire, whereby experiences 
of LCCs in other markets provided a framework for what is currently being 
practiced by the interviewee’s airlines, how certain challenges are tackled and how 
certain market specific factors relate to SSA. 
 All the interviews were conducted face-to-face utilising a digital device to record 
the interviews. The interviews took roughly 1.5 hours each. 
 The interviews were then transcribed into text format, and the information utilised 
for the purposes of the research. 
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5.6 Research Ethics  
All respondents, both those conveniently selected for the survey and the subject matter 
experts for one-on-one interviews, were both dealt with ethically in accordance with the 
University’s ethics requirements. The following was undertaken in order to abide by the 
standard requirements: 
 Surveys – the survey provided an explanation of the purpose of the research, while 
clearly specifying that the respondent’s participation is completely voluntary and 
anonymity would be maintained. 
 One-on-one interviews – the four participants were provided with a written and 
verbal explanation as to the purposes of the research, and the manner in which the 
interview will be conducted and their consent was sought. Furthermore, they were 
informed that they may withdraw their participation at any time, and both censor 
information, or remain anonymous, should they wish to. All participants signed a 
consent form, both acknowledging that they clearly understood the terms of their 
involvement, as well as consented to being audio recorded. 
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6. Results and Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The researcher undertook four individual studies, with the results of each shown below. 
6.2 Survey 
A survey was undertaken which included responses from 36 respondents, with the results 
shown below. 
6.2.1 Respondents Countries 
The majority of the respondents resided in Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa respectively, 
with smaller proportions originating from Namibia and Zambia respectively. Single 
responses from Botswana and Ghana, completed the sample. 
 
Figure 7: Countries where respondents reside 
6.2.2 Years of experience 
The vast majority of respondents had two years or less of work experience, with the 
number of responses decreasing as work experience years increased.  
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Figure 8: Years of work experience of the respondents 
6.2.3 Travel to other cities 
Figure 9 indicates that thirteen respondents had travelled to another city in their respective 
home country more than 10 times in the last two years, seven travelled 7 – 10 times and 
nine travelled 4 – 6 times. The majority of respondents travel regularly within their own 
country with only one individual having not left his city during the last two years.  
 
Figure 9: Instances travelled to another city in own country by any mode of transport in last two years 
6.2.4 Travel to other countries 
At the same time, nineteen individuals had travelled to another country in the last two 
years, five having travelled 4 – 6 times, and another five having travelled seven or more 
times. This indicates that while international trips are not infrequent, they do not occur as 
often as domestic ones within ones own country. 
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Figure 10: Instances travelled to another country by any mode of transport in last two years 
6.2.5 Air travel utilisation 
Most notable from the results, as shown by Figure 11, 23 respondents had utilised air travel 
in the last six months, while only five individuals had never flown on an aircraft. For the rest 
of the respondents, most had utilised air transport within the last two years, with only one 
respondent having flown more than four years ago.  
 
Figure 11: Last time utilising air transport 
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Figure 12: Instances flown in last two years 
Of the thirty respondents indicated in Figure 11 who had utilised air travel in the last two 
years, most notably, as shown in Figure 12, only twelve respondents had utilised air travel 1 
– 3 times,  with eight individuals having flown 6 – 10 times, and another six more than 10 
times.  
6.2.6 Motivation for using air travel 
Figure 13 clearly indicates that while air travel might be considered more expensive, due to 
its benefits, it remains the transport method of choice amongst the majority of respondents 
in this sample. Nevertheless, a fair proportion still indicated a reluctance to fly given its 
relative expense, yet only six individuals out of the entire sample of 36 respondents stated 
they never utilised air transport due to cost. 
 
Figure 13: Reasons for utilising air transport 
6.2.7 Passenger Preferences 
Through a grading system which aggregated responses where 6 was the most important, 
and 1 the least important,  price was the most important factor in governing transport / 
airline choice. Overall, all the other attributes namely direct route offerings, strict time 
schedules, ease of booking, in-flight services and proximity of airport to the city / transport 
networks were of relative equal importance and generally secondary to price. 
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Figure 14: Preferred airline attributes 
6.2.8 Ticket Prices  
According to the results, in order for significant passenger demand to be stimulated, the all-
inclusive one-way ticket price of an international flight would  need to effectively  fall into 
the ranges shown above.. Most notably, eight respondents indicated a price of between 
$100 - $150, twelve respondents indicated a ticket price of between $150 – $300. 
Interestingly, seven respondents indicated a one-way price of between $300 - $500, largely 
equal to the prices charged by legacy carriers for regional air tickets. Only a relatively small 
proportion of respondents indicated that a one-way all-inclusive ticket price of between 
$30-60 (5) and $60-100 (4) would adequately stimulate demand for this mode of transport. 
 
Figure 15: Preferred maximum one-way ticket price in USD 
6.2.9 Potential Demand 
Based on the ticket prices indicated in Figure 15 above, if such prices did prevail in the 
market, Figure 16 indicates the number of times, per annum, that respondents would 
utilise air travel.  Of the responses, thirteen respondents would travel 1 – 3 times per 
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annum, while eleven would travel 4 – 6 times. Fewer numbers would travel 7 – 10 times per 
annum (4), while eight would travel more than ten times.  
 
Figure 16: Intended air travel utilisation per year 
6.2.10 Payment Preferences 
As shown by the results displayed in Figure 17, cash remains the payment method of choice 
for most participants surveyed, with many SSA economies being largely cash based given 
that credit card penetration is at much lower levels than their developed counterparts. 
While internet and cellphone based money transfer was only marginally less popular, the 
need to provide cash facilities remains pivotal to the success of an airline and cannot be 
discounted. 
 
Figure 17: Preferred method of payment 
6.2.11 Written responses in questionnaire 
 In addition to the multiple choice questions on the questionnaire, respondents also 
provided written responses to certain questions. The Questionnaire posed the question as 
to why respondents chose a certain form of transport when travelling either domestically 
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or internationally. The responses to this highlighted a common theme that road transport 
was utilised over shorter distances or for domestic travel given that such distances were 
more manageable, and that the high cost of flying could only be justified when there was 
little alternative. Another pertinent point that was alluded to by a respondent was that air 
travel avoids border crossing delays and issues that are commonplace in SSA, thereby 
justifying additional cost in such instances. 
6.3 Ticket Price Comparison 
From published data available on airline ticket price aggregators and bus operator websites, 
the researcher compiled comparative costs per kilometre in USD ($) based on a full one-
way ticket price for various routes using both air travel and road transport. The lowest 
possible price offered on that route was utilised to normalise the data as much as possible, 
and therefore in many cases the price returned was that on an LCC for routes in the US, 
Europe or India. In SSA, where an LCC offering existed, this flight was chosen yet in most 
instances only a legacy carrier offered services on that route. The results provide a basis for 
comparison between various regions and modes of transport. 
6.3.1 Airfares in SSA 
In Table 7, the comparative cost of flying between various SSA locations is displayed. 
Clearly, routes that are serviced by a LCC exhibit the lowest cost per km, with the 
Johannesburg (JNB) – Cape Town route, JNB-Dar Es’ Salaam (DAR) and DAR-Mwanza routes 
having the lowest USD ($) cents cost per km, being serviced by Mango / Kulula, and Fastjet 
respectively. This cost per km rises significantly on the DAR-LLW and JNB-GBE routes where 
only legacy carriers operate, and competition is limited.  Costs per km on average across 
the nineteen routes is $22 cents / km. 
Table 7: Air transport costs in $ cents / km between various SSA locations compiled by Researcher 
 
 
Cape Town Dar Es Salaam Mwanza Gaborone Nairobi
Johannesburg 6,29 10,00 18,27 45,03 10,97
Dar Es Salaam 9,52 15,67 40,74
Lilongwe Lusaka Windhoek Maputo Beira
Johannesburg 19,46 14,39 16,35 33,89 27,65
Dar Es Salaam 49,29 9,20 15,97 13,36
Lilongwe 27,47 45,43
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6.3.2 Airfares in Europe 
In Europe, which remains the world’s most developed market for LCCs, ticket costs per km, 
as shown by Table 8 are largely below $10 cents / km, with a few routes offering ticket 
prices below $3 cents / km, such as from London to Rome, Warsaw and Athens, and from 
Barcelona to Salzburg. Certain select routes incur a high cost per km, such as London-
Manchester, and London-Paris, yet given the short distances on these routes, being 265 
and 368 km respectively, the cost per km for a flight is always likely to be high as the fixed 
costs per flight, regardless of distances remain the same and this needs to be absorbed by 
the passengers over a shorter distance. The average cost across the sixteen locations shown 
is $7.3 cents / km.  
Table 8: Air transport costs in $ cents / km between various European locations compiled by researcher 
 
6.3.3 Airfares in India 
In the Indian market, as shown in Table 9, while costs are relatively higher than in Europe, 
at an average of $8.5 cents / km across the eight locations shown, they remain substantially 
lower than those in SSA. The highest cost between Udaipur and Jammu is at $15.15 cents / 
km, while being higher than any European routes (apart from the very short distances 
routes discussed), still remains below the average cost for SSA.  
Table 9: Air transport costs in $ cents / km between various Indian locations compiled by researcher 
 
Manchester Aberdeen Salzburg Prague
London 34,03 8,44 6,29 5,09
Locations Paris Berlin Munich Athens
London 14,33 3,79 5,97 1,80
Marseille 12,93 7,11
Dublin Rome Waraw Barcelona
London 2,32 2,12 3,17
Berlin 4,12
Munich 3,02
Barcelona 1,75
Locations Jaipur Jammu Mumbai
Jaipur 10,09 5,69
Mangalore 5,78
Mumbai 5,62
Port Blair 8,10
Pune 10,46
Udaipur 15,15
Bangalore 7,22
65 
 
6.3.4 Airfares in the US 
In the US market, across the sixteen locations shown in Table 10, the average cost is $14.52 
cents / km. Again certain short distance flights, such as between Los Angeles-San Diego, 
and Memphis-Atlanta, being 179 and 567 kms respectively skew the average upward, 
supporting the case for the absorption of high fixed costs on longer distance routes. This is 
evidenced by the New York-Los Angeles and New York-Seattle routes at $4.08 cents and 
$4.49 cents / litre respectively. 
Table 10: Air transport costs in $ cents / km between various US locations compiled by researcher 
  
6.3.5 Bus fares in SSA 
Table 11 displays the cost per km, for bus tickets as offered by two well-known bus service 
companies in SSA. With an average cost of $4.6 cents / km across the six routes shown, this 
is significantly lower than the average for the same six locations if one utilises air travel 
being $22.58 cents / km.  As shown in Europe, India and the US, several routes are 
comparable in cost to those relating to bus services in SSA. If carriers in SSA were able to 
offer similarly  comparable costs to bus fares, it is conceivable that passengers would make 
a shift from buses to air travel given air travel’s significant benefits over road transport 
which include being safer, quicker and far more convenient.   
Table 11: Road transport costs in $ cents / km between various SSA locations compiled by researcher 
 
 
Atlanta Detroit Ft Lauderdale
Atlanta 7,00 10,08
Austin 9,16
Chicago 6,14
Memphis 21,47
New Orleans 12,42
Los Angeles New York Seattle
Atlanta 11,16 5,96
Baltimore 5,60
Chicago 5,76 10,23
Detroit 12,34
Las Vegas 9,39
New York 4,08 4,49
San Diego 97,16
Locations Mwanza Gaborone Nairobi Lilongwe Lusaka Maputo
Johannesburg 7,04 6,39 6,32
Dar Es Salaam 2,19 3,53 2,21
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6.4 Fuel Costs 
The researcher sourced information from IATA on fuel costs at various major cities in SSA 
which were compared as shown in Figure 18 below. This shows that the fuel price in Cape 
Town, which is only moderately higher than those that prevail at large European or US 
airports, is significantly lower than the prevailing fuel costs at every other SSA location. It is 
no coincidence that the airports with the lowest fuel costs, boast both high volumes by 
relative standards, as well as the most developed infrastructure, including in-country 
refineries, pipelines, and storage facilities. As one moves away from these hubs, fuel costs 
increase substantially as the state of infrastructure gets poorer, and/or volumes decrease. 
 
Figure 18: Jet Fuel Price Comparison – September 2014 (IATA) 
6.5 One-on-one Interviews 
Based on the information provided by the four airline executives, key issues pertaining to 
their airlines, and how these apply in SSA have been summarised in Table 12 on the next 
page. All the opinions expressed in this section are those of the airline executives 
interviewed. 
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Table 12: Summarised results of one-on-one interviews 
 
 
 
 
Fastjet Jambojet Kulula FlyAfrica
38% of all passengers, 
interviewed during a recent 
survey showed they had 
never been into an airport, 
let alone flown on an 
aircraft
15 million individual road 
trips are taken each year from 
Nairobi to Mombasa, taking 8 
hours to cover 450km on 
dangerous roads
Lack of significant middle class is 
a major impediment to LCCs  in 
SSA
While current market 
doesn’t exist, 
elasticity of demand is 
pivotal, and large 
untapped market is 
waiting to be serviced. 
Demographics favour 
a young society that 
just requires 
education.
By providing a service 
offering international 
standards of reliability, 
safety and quality, a new 
demand has surfaced which 
never existed before
Kenya Airways ticket prices 
are beyond the reach of most 
people
Half-hearted attempts to launch 
regional LCC carriers with 
smaller aircraft have proven 
unsuccessful.
LCCs must target new 
routes not currently 
being serviced and 
demand will increase 
significantly.
The LCC model only works 
when a certain proportion 
of passengers book early. 
In SSA, given that many 
passengers are distrustful 
of service providers, 
substantial amount of 
education is required to 
gain trust so that 
passengers do indeed book 
early.
Survey indicated that 40% of 
people would utilise air travel 
provided ticket prices were 
affordable and safety and 
reliability standards were 
adhered to
Those who believe the 
market does not exist 
are too well 
entrenched in 
established markets, 
and do not 
understand the true 
LCC model that has 
proven successful in 
other parts of the 
world
Education remains key, and 
social media has proven 
highly successful in achieving 
this
Having any affiliation to a 
legacy carrier is more of a 
hindrance that a benefit.
In SSA, situation is vastly 
different to Europe, and it 
remains very difficult for an 
LCC to operate without legacy 
carrier association.
Utilising various hubs, as 
opposed to one single one, 
could provide a hybrid solution 
around both economies of scale, 
market demand, and bilaterals.
Each franchise is 
structured without 
affiliation to any 
legacy carriers or 
other airlines, being 
registered in home 
country to take 
advantage of 
bilaterals
While there may be some 
benefits, true cost 
separation is impossible
Economies of scale provided 
by KQ outweigh the 
negatives.
An LCC being tied to a legacy 
carrier is a major hindrance.
Economies of scale 
are achieved through 
group buying  by 
combining franchise 
purchasing.
Higher costs do however flow 
through from parent 
company
Kulula operates completely 
independently of BA, although 
still takes advantage of 
economies of scale
Fastjet do not share 
this structure being 
managed centrally 
from the UK.
Being tied to a legacy 
carrier is a significant 
disadvantage
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Fastjet Jambojet Kulula FlyAfrica
After first launching 
domestic routes in 
Tanzania, attempting to 
launch the regional routes 
to South Africa were 
extremely challenging due 
to approvals from South 
African authorities. Only 
assistance from Tanzanian 
government, threatening 
SAA landing rights in 
Tanzania, proved 
successful. Situation similar 
launching routes from 
Zambia to South Africa
Satisfying operational 
requirements is pivotal in 
route selection.
Legacy carriers like SAA defend 
their routes vehemently, and 
this improving to be the case on 
the JNB-DAR route affecting 
Fastjet's efforts.
State protectionism of 
national carriers, and 
routes is a major problem in 
Africa
Secondary is air traffic 
statistics on certain routes, 
assessing price elasticity given 
passenger type being 
business or leisure travellers. 
Each 
Given largely domestic focus in 
South Africa, looks to grow 
existing routes more than 
creating new ones.
Dynamic model is used to 
gauge demand on potential 
new routes, using customer 
feedback, and constant 
updating of the model to 
ensure greatest accuracy
Codeshares or looking to assist 
other airlines on their existing 
routes which include South 
Africa as part of the route, 
rather than looking to break into 
such markets is the preferred 
strategy
Load factors must be above 
required levels from the start 
when operating new routes, 
while operational factors such 
as likely delays must also be 
taken into consideration
Outsource as much as 
possible keeping only core 
functions such as yield 
management and 
accounting in-house
Outsources as much as 
possible keeping staff count 
to a minimum.
Aviation costs in SSA relatively 
high compared to developed 
markets. Low utilisation and lack 
of economies of scale largely to 
blame
Cost minimisation is 
absolutely key to an 
LCCs functioning and 
similar opportunities 
to reduce costs 
substantially exist in 
Africa
Ticketing system outdated 
and costly due to it being 
inherited by acquired airline
Costs between legacy and LCC 
largely the same with some 
areas for small savings, such 
as ticket distribution. Hence 
airlines focussing on 
promoting website
Too much outsourcing could be 
detrimental in the medium to 
longer term.
Reduction in oil prices 
should be used to 
reallocate finances to 
purchasing fuel 
efficient aircraft in 
anticipation of the oil 
market recovering
All transactions with KQ 
undertaken at arms length.
Despite additional cost, GDS 
system is outsourced to taking 
advantage of latest ticketing 
solution is seen to be key.
Utilise influential 
shareholders, where 
possible, to lobby 
governments for 
taxes and third party 
charge reductions.
Outsourcing brings 
much needed contract 
flexibility even if 
purchased at a 
premium
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Fastjet Jambojet Kulula FlyAfrica
Aim is to start ticket sales 
for each flight at $20 one-
way, regardless of the route 
before moving to the next 
tier. This strategy is to 
attract early stage demand
Each flight treated 
individually, assessing 
whether frequented by 
business or leisure travellers 
and treated appropriately.
Recently started offering 
unbundled seats,  stripping out 
any extras like checked luggage. 
This however doesn’t bring 
about significant cost saving. 
Therefore ancillaries not 
normally sold by airlines are 
targeted.
Ticked price 
completely 
unbundled, with seat 
used as a hook, to 
gain revenue from all 
other ancillaries.
Do not charge fuel 
surcharges, which 
they believe other 
airlines use as an 
additional tax to 
supplement revenues
Believe ticket prices 
can be brought down 
substantially given 
high price elasticity in 
the SSA market
Need for ticketing offices 
given lack of internet 
penetration and credit 
cards in SSA.
Uses sales offices in the city 
and at the airport.
Used a GDS, but passes the 
booking fee onto the passenger 
for non-internet related sales
Fully outsources non-
internet sales to 
agents, as expertise is 
providing airline 
seats, not distributing 
tickets
Amadeus GDS used, at 
additional cost, to 
accommodate ticketing 
offices
Does not use a GDS due to 
significant costs, focussing on 
internet sales as much as 
possible as internet 
penetration relatively high in 
Kenya, with 40% of all sales 
occurring through this 
medium
Internet penetration 
significantly higher in South 
Africa, hence model is different
Ticket sales through 
mobile phones being 
focussed on given 
high mobile phone 
penetration
Mpesa utilised wherever 
possible, particularly at pop-
up-shops, taking the market 
to the customer
35%  of tickets still sold for 
cash
Believe the lack of internet 
penetration in markets outside 
of South Africa poses major 
challenge to LCCs
Costs of ticketing 
through GDS passed 
onto customer
Fleet is underutilised 
currently as aircraft should 
be used for 11.5 hours per 
day. Currently have one 
spare aircraft which is 
undesirable.
Utilises two B737s on loan 
from KQ, yet these are older 
aircraft which require more 
maintenance. Third aircraft 
kept as spare to avoid delays 
and mistrust of airline
Must use latest aircraft to keep 
fuel costs low.
Unit costs are 
measured against fuel 
burn.
Despite Embraers being 
better suited to SSA 
runways, more expensive 
to run per seat, so A319s 
are used holding 177 
people.
Due to aircraft coming from 
KQ, can only fit 142 seats, 
and not the 149 maximum
Routes determine aircraft type, 
and while smaller aircraft are 
cheaper upfront, running costs 
significantly more expensive per 
passenger.
Commonality more 
important than 
aircraft type resulting 
in cost savings
A319s chosen over B737s 
as oversupply of the former 
coming out of Easyjet, so 
they are cheaper to 
purchase.
Balance demand with fuel and 
maintenance costs in 
determining which aircraft to 
use.
Central leasing 
company provides 
several financing 
options to franchises 
and method of 
financing depends on 
each franchises 
unique funding 
structure.
Market, and airline specific 
factors, such as interest rates, 
gearing, term of use and fleet 
flexibility will determine whether 
to buy or lease aircraft
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This chapter has provided the results from the analysis of the data collected from the 
survey undertaken, the interviews with executive management of select LCCs operating in 
SSA and comparative transport cost and fuel cost data compiled by the researcher from 
reliable published data. The next chapter interprets and discusses the results. 
 
 
Fastjet Jambojet Kulula FlyAfrica
Ancillary revenues provide 
much needed revenue given 
that profits from ticket sales 
can at times be minimal
Traditional ancillaries are 
offered, yet believe market is 
not ready for ancillaries such 
as accommodation, car hire 
and the like.
Non-traditional 
ancillaries only likely 
to be offered at a later 
stage, having already 
built the system to 
accommodate it, yet 
timing not as yet ideal 
given market 
structure
Well functioning website 
pivotal to achieving 
maximum benefit from 
ancillaries.
Charges a small fee for 
holding a ticket for 24 hours 
without payment given local 
circumstances
Ancillaries in SSA likely to be 
smaller proportion of 
revenues, so new 
innovative ways of earning 
revenues are required.
Does not market other 
brands in the form of 
advertising revenue until own 
brand is established.
Fastjet likely to encounter 
very strong competition from 
SAA, who serves the JNB-DAR 
route well.
Protectionism of national 
carriers is a major problem in 
SSA.
Avoids highly 
competitive routes 
such as the domestic 
ones in South Africa, 
targeting routes 
poorly serviced by 
other carriers.
Existing passengers are not 
the market, being too brand 
conscious.
Total liberalisation not ideal 
either in SSA as airlines like 
Emirates would simply take over 
due to superior economies of 
scale and positon of hub.
Look to attract those who 
have never flown before and 
are less brand conscious
People in SSA are very brand 
conscious despite popular 
belief.
Image of reliability and safety is 
most important
Cookie cutter approach will 
not work in SSA. Unique 
circumstances require 
unique approach
Leisure travellers will be 
pivotal to the success of LCCs 
in Africa
LCCs need to effectively attract 
passengers who could not 
afford to travel otherwise.
Attracting strong 
talent / employees, 
and supportive 
shareholders
First mover advantage also 
pivotal
High load factors are pivotal
Current LCCs in Africa may be 
low cost, but are not low fare.
Different cultures, tastes, 
jurisdictions and governments 
in SSA presents major challenge 
to regional LCC
Need to convince those 
utilising other forms of 
transport to utilise LCCs
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7. Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Based on the results obtained in the previous chapter, the interpretation and discussion 
follows below. 
7.2 Survey 
Given the results from the survey answered by 36 respondents, several key implications can 
be drawn, despite the relatively small sample size. 
7.2.1 Profile of travelers 
In general, it might be assumed that those with less work experience, earn less than those 
with more work experience, measured in years. The vast majority of the respondents had 
between 0 – 2 years work experience (nineteen), while eleven respondents had between 3 
– 6 years work experience. This data is somewhat skewed and implies that while there are 
others factors affecting affordability, the answers provided should be viewed in the context 
of a non-randomised sample with the majority of the respondents having relatively lower 
spending power.  
Despite the sample’s overall lower work experience, and subsequently more limited 
affordability as suggested above, younger participants tend to be more technically 
orientated, utilise bank accounts and tend to be more amenable to trying out new forms of 
transport. This is likely to represent the target market for potentially new LCCs in SSA rather 
than those who might have greater affordability. The results of the survey therefore 
represent individuals who would travel less for business purposes, yet whose affordability 
might be more limited.   
7.2.2 Travel Behaviour 
The results indicate that using any mode of transport, local trips, to domestic locations 
within ones country of abode, are commonplace, while trips to another country in the 
region are less commonplace. The reasons for this could be numerous, however, one main 
reason that surfaced was that domestic trips cost significantly less than cross border ones 
as road transport can be utilised, thereby avoiding the need to fly. Another reason that 
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transpired alluded to the fact that local trips are made regularly for personal reasons such 
as family affairs. Given that SSA’s intra-tourist market is relatively small, it follows that 
international tourism-related travel to other countries is largely insignificant. Offering more 
affordable air travel options for domestic services as a start would likely attract this 
business away from road transport as participants would likely utilise LCCs. In addition, by 
stimulating demand through price elasticity, demand for regional services, akin to that seen 
on local trips which is significant in comparison, is likely to surface. Given the lack of 
tourism related travel in Africa, this should really be the aim of any new entrants, 
particularly to stimulate tourism related travel which remains a major driver of capacity on 
LCCs in Europe, the US and Asia.  
Surprisingly, despite the lack of meaningful international trips, and limited affordability, a 
significant number of respondents utilised air travel in the last six months, with several 
having travelled on more than 6 trips in the last two years.  This displays not only relatively 
regular activity, but also recent activity, which lends some additional credibility to this 
activity continuing rather than being isolated and irregular amongst younger participants. 
7.2.3 Price versus Benefits 
The results indicate that that air travel is still considered to be the preferred option due to 
its benefits, this despite the higher cost. This suggests that while air travel demand in other 
parts of the world has been shown to be highly elastic, in Africa, it might actually be less so. 
In particular, air travel in Africa has little substitute, as it does in Europe (rail) or the US 
(road) and therefore one is likely to face the dilemma of flying, or not travelling at all. 
While price remains crucial in determining whether passengers will utilise air travel for 
transport purposes or not as shown by the results of ranking key attributes that attract 
people to use air travel, the benefits offered by air travel ensures that it remains the 
preferred mode of transport. This is surprising since affordability is indicated as a decisive 
factor. One might have anticipated that the majority of respondents would select never to 
utilise air travel due to cost, or perhaps to only seldom utilise air travel due to the cost. 
Instead it is apparent that the benefits are so profound, that one might decide to save for 
longer and postpone travelling, in order to fly as opposed to travelling by road. For 
example, a respondent alluded to the fact that air travel avoids border crossing delays. 
Further it appears that knowledge of such benefits are widespread, whereby the benefits 
are recognised, and only cost remains an impediment. 
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While price was clearly the most important attribute contributing to choice of transport 
and airline, the other attributes mentioned were secondary in importance to price, but 
largely of equal importance to each other. Therefore in SSA, it would appear that low 
pricing remains pivotal, while a focus on other attributes is relatively less important, 
provided they are balanced appropriately and equally in order to achieve maximum 
customer satisfaction and uptake. 
The maximum price that a one way ticket can cost, in order to stimulate increased demand 
from the respondents, was surprisingly higher than one might anticipate, given that the 
levels indicated by the majority of respondents was somewhat equal to those offered by 
legacy carriers in many instances. One would have anticipated these levels being lower 
given significantly lower income per capita in Africa. There are three possible explanations 
for this: 
  While ticket prices appear to be decisive, the gap between different segments of 
SSA’s middle class might be larger than anticipated with respect to affordability, 
particularly so where income disparity is very prevalent in the region. Assuming this 
fact is true, if LCCs want to ensure maximum uptake and utilisation, pricing will 
have to appeal to a larger market to ensure affordability across the segment. 
 Inaccuracies relating to responses tend to prevail when questions regarding one’s 
own affordability are posed. This is due to human nature which tends to inflate or 
overstate affordability, when real life situations might display disparate truths. If 
one assumes this is true, and that the majority of the respondents in the $150-$300 
bracket would have actually only paid a maximum of $100 - $150 per ticket, being 
one tier lower, this would appear to be more in line with reality given comparisons 
with Europe and the US. 
 The most probable explanation is that with demand being less elastic in SSA than it 
is in other parts of the world, the respondents would still fly, if ticket prices 
prevailed at the levels indicated, however such usage would be less frequent. In 
order to truly stimulate demand to levels required to ensure high load factors in 
SSA, they would have to be significantly less. That is, if ticket prices for air travel in 
SSA were at the levels indicated in the responses, the majority of respondent 
however would still only travel less than 6 times per annum, with the greater 
proportion of those only travelling between 1 – 3 times per year which remains 
relatively low, and therefore requiring lower prices to stimulate increased demand. 
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7.2.4 Method of payment 
Cash remains the method of payment of choice for most, which corresponds with the fact 
that many SSA economies are largely cash based, with credit card penetration being at 
much lower levels than their developed counterparts. This implies that the need to provide 
cash facilities remains pivotal to the success of an airline in SSA and cannot be discounted. 
7.3 Ticket price Comparison  
Air ticket prices in SSA are comparatively some of the highest in the world when viewed on 
a cost per km basis. While there may be other factors that contribute to this, largely, a lack 
of competition which breeds greater inefficiency is considered to be the root cause. In 
markets such as India and Latin America, no significant cost advantages exist as these 
markets have their own unique issues, yet certain LCCs operate profitably.  From the data 
compiled on the travel costs per km across various regions and modes of transport, it is 
apparent that there is a significant amount of leeway in which SSA ticket prices can reduce, 
to ensure that travellers reconsider their options when selecting to utilise ground transport, 
or not travel at all.  When maximising load factors and aircraft utilisation, both being 
pivotal, all attempts to reduce ticket prices, and therefore attract additional demand should 
be made.  
7.4 Fuel costs 
Fuel costs, being Jet-A1 fuel, remain comparatively higher in Africa compared to many 
other regions of the world. From information available in the industry, three main factors 
contribute to such high costs, being lack of fuel infrastructure, additional taxes and levies, 
and low volumes. As far as infrastructure is concerned, the lack of local refineries, fuel 
pipelines and often treacherous roads add significantly to logistics costs, as imported 
product requires far more intervention in order to move it from the import terminal, to the 
airport where it is required. Regional production facilities, such as refineries, are few and 
far between in SSA, and apart from Kenya and South Africa, very few others exists. In 
Zambia, despite the country having the Indeni refinery which is located in Ndola, the 
refinery does not produce enough fuel to meet annual demands, while the situation is 
somewhat similar in Ghana. Kenya on the other hand has a 90,000 barrel/day refinery in 
Mombasa, yet that said, in order to meet local requirements, approximately 56,000 barrels 
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per day of refined fuels are still imported.  Yet Kenya can boast a pipeline which runs from 
the refinery / port in Mombasa, to both Jomo Kenyata Airport in Nairobi and Mombasa’s 
Moi airports, including two other smaller domestic airports which is highly effective in 
bringing down fuel transport costs.  
Many governments in SSA continue to burden importers with significant cost and third 
party taxes, only exacerbating the already high cost of imported product at the expense of 
airlines and passengers. As an example, information available confirms that despite most of  
Zambia’s fuel product requirements being imported into the country from Feruka 
(Zimbabwe) or Dar Es’ Salaam (Tanzania), importers are required to price their fuel off the 
regulated Indeni jet fuel price rather than the import parity price of the product, which 
would allow for cost savings to be passed on. In addition, all product imported into the 
country incurs an import duty, and therefore despite imported product being historically 
cheaper than the regulated price, the import duty paid distorts this advantage. Therefore, 
airlines and in turn passengers, are subject to the regulated price as the cost base for fuel, 
while suppliers, looking to achieve reasonable margins, comparable to other countries in 
the region, apply a more significant differential to cover import costs. Third party taxes and 
charges levied by government are also passed to the airlines, and can amount to an 
additional two percent of the Indeni price, making the price significantly more expensive 
than neighbouring countries that similarly import fuel such as Tanzania or Zimbabwe. 
Zambia however is not unique in this sense with others similarly imposing non-justifiable 
taxes and duties, which add to the already high costs of fuel. 
Furthermore, lower volumes that persist in Africa are a major contributor to high fuel costs. 
Aviation fuelling equipment and facilities must meet international standards at all times as 
far as safety and product quality is concerned. This comes at high cost particularly relating 
to fuel storage and airport fuelling depots. That is, the cost to construct and run a depot is 
largely the same despite the volume. It becomes somewhat of a vicious cycle however, as 
higher fuel costs due to lack of infrastructure and government imposed duties and taxes 
only make it less attractive for airlines to either fly, or uplift fuel in certain SSA locations, 
which lowers volumes, and raises fixed costs per unit of fuel. In Zambia as an example, 
several large international carriers simply cancelled their scheduled flights to the country in 
2014 partly due to fuel costs, while other airlines tanker fuel from other locations, which 
remains more cost competitive. Tankering, which is a term used in the aviation industry, is 
the activity whereby airlines uplift additional fuel in cheaper locations, so that there 
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remains additional fuel on board to cover part or all of the return trip, while minimising the 
fuel uplifted in the expensive location. 
7.5 One-on-one Interviews 
From the one-on-one interviews conducted with executive management of four LCCs in 
SSA, the views obtained, and summarised into key themes as shown in Table 12, are 
discussed in the key themes below and shown how they pertain to the three theories 
described in Chapter 4. 
7.5.1 The Market 
The interviewees were unanimous that LCCs in SSA need to target a new market and make 
air travel accessible to the masses, however actually achieving this is a significant challenge. 
Through significantly lower ticket prices, providing new route offerings and through 
education and marketing to the under-serviced market currently utilising ground transport, 
attracting this new market could become a reality. 
The literature discussed in Chapter 2 clearly shows that common to all markets where LCCs 
have proven the most successful, LCCs created a new market, namely a significant 
proportion of passengers comprised of new entrants into the aviation travel market. This 
figure was at times as high as two thirds of all passengers that otherwise would not have 
utilised this mode of transport. Therefore, in theory, LCCs did not pose a threat to 
established legacy carriers whose service offering was somewhat different and being 
offered at a higher ticket price. In certain countries such as Mexico, LCCs adopted an almost 
bus transit operations in the sky, linking passengers from point to point utilising a 
combination of both buses and airplanes, on one ticket, purchased from a bus operators 
vending office with the airplane ticket at times even having been cheaper than a seat on a 
bus for the same route.  Education is also pivotal, in both the benefits and convenience 
relating to air travel, while also addressing what appears to be a fear factor which 
originates from naivety in as far as questions around safety and reliability are concerned. 
An LCC will have to address this as an absolutely critical success factors. 
In order to bring a new market into the sector, ticket prices will have to be to some extent 
comparable to those relating to other forms of transport.  While this will be addressed in 
more detail in the section relating to ticket prices,  the target market is highly price elastic, 
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and unless ticket prices are able to stimulate significant demand, this critical success factor 
will not be achieved. 
While Mexico and India are in many ways comparable to SSA, the fact that they are 
sovereign countries, each with one market and air traffic regime does not lend itself to 
direct comparisons with a region comprising of many different countries. In this sense, 
Europe becomes a better proxy where liberalisation of markets was absolutely key to the 
success experienced by airlines such as Ryanair and EasyJet. While this will also be 
discussed in more detail in the section relating to Ownership Structure below, the lack of 
follow through on the Yamoussoukro Decision (YD), and the continued protectionism of 
state owned carriers and routes is considered by key industry players interviewed to be a 
major challenge in the SSA market. This critical success factor pertains to the manner in 
which an LCC addresses bilaterals, of which there are really two strategies whereby an LCC 
either takes matters into its own hands, or waits for the region’s governments to take 
action, an intent that has yet to materialise in SSA despite many years of promises. 
From the theories discussed in Chapter 4, forming the theoretical basis for the study, 
Theory 1 deals with passenger demand which has been shown to drive load factors, a sub-
attribute which is a critical success factor in LCC theory. All LCCs, regardless of the regions in 
which they operate, rely on airplanes which are full and therefore revenue generating at all 
times. While education and ticket prices, as mentioned, are pivotal to this, LCCS, more so 
than their legacy counterparts rely on a steady supply of leisure passengers to fill their 
planes. This type of passenger is more price elastic and usually travels in groups of more 
than one, and are also prepared to sacrifice certain full service items in exchange for a 
saving in cost. The vast majority of passengers who frequent US and European LCCs are 
tourists in nature, and without this demand, these LCCs would surely cease to exist.  This 
perhaps remains the largest challenge for LCCs in SSA, as intra-African tourism in particular, 
remains in its infancy. Foreign tourists visiting the region would tend to be less price elastic, 
utilising expensive legacy carriers to access the region, and while FlyDubai is a lower-cost 
option for visitors to the continent and possibly carries a larger proportion of price-sensitive 
tourists, targeting intra-African tourists is vital. African tourists have minimal transport 
options available to them apart from expensive legacy carrier options or road transport 
which has its own pitfalls, and perhaps with an LCC offering, a new market of intra-regional 
tourists may develop as has been the case in parts of Europe in particular. This factor is 
however far too critical to adopt the notion of “build it and they will come”, as this may 
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never materialise, and even if it does, it could take some time leading to significant losses 
for the airline before breaking even.  
LCCs in SSA will therefore need to target the emerging middle class, from both tourist and 
business circles, this especially so in a region that has a far larger informal sector comprising 
of many entrepreneurs and small business owners who would normally not utilise legacy 
carriers at all, or only in very particular instances. Furthermore, migration patterns in Africa 
have shown significant movement of people from rural to urban areas, as well as from 
smaller, less developed and at times war affected regions to more stable ones  in the search 
for employment and safety. This also has contributed to a sizeable market of VFR 
passengers, perhaps an unexploited market which remains heavily reliant on ground 
transport. As far as intra-African tourism is concerned, LCCs will have to play a major role in 
creating this market, by providing would be tourists with affordable packages which include 
both the air and necessary ground transport, visa requirements, accommodation, and the 
like. Being less sophisticated as far as intra-regional tourism is concerned, packages that 
provide simplicity, affordability, and convenience might lend themselves to attracting a new 
market of tourists, who in the past might have feared the complexity of travelling to new 
countries, including dealing with visa requirements and arranging local transport and 
accommodation. 
7.5.2 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure provides an over-arching key theme which encompasses both routes 
and competition as sub-themes. That is, by virtue of the ownership structure of the airline, 
it will affect both route offerings and the manner in which both legacy airlines, and other 
LCCS compete in the market. Almost unanimous amongst the executives interviewed was 
the fact that being affiliated to a legacy carrier which operates from a hub, in general, is a 
major hindrance to an LCC’s ability to perform successfully. In addition, state protectionism 
of national airlines, and restricting landing rights was a major challenge for LCCs in SSA as 
per the responses obtained, and that means that the need to circumvent such restrictions, 
while also avoiding competing head-on with state protected airlines, was essential. 
As far as affiliation to a legacy carrier is concerned, it is likely to restricts route offerings and 
bring about higher costs through a hub, and that it is not necessarily required for 
economies of scale to be achieved. Rather there are other means in which to achieve this, 
while still operating independently, which is the overarching issue ensuring true cost 
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separation.  Ties to a legacy carrier in general are perceived to be a major hindrance for an 
LCC unless a complete separation exists, whereby management, operations, strategy and 
the like are accounted for independently.  While some benefits may accrue from an 
association with a legacy carrier which might initially provide comfort and a safety net, 
while also adding value during procurement of goods and services as well as economies of 
scale, in time, it is likely to be an impediment. It remains pivotal to manage the LCC as a 
separate entity, while only drawing on the benefits of an association with a legacy carrier if 
and when necessary to do so. Kulula appears to have struck the perfect balance in this 
regard, operating independently of British Airways, yet utilising its sister carrier if and when 
necessary to achieve cost advantages. The nature of Comair not having government 
involvement and thus inefficiency also reduces the negative effects associated with 
government owned and associated LCCs, yet carefully managing its association with BA 
remains pivotal.  
As far as routes are concerned, while ensuring demand on specific routes will be adequate 
to sustain the service offering of the LCC, what is more decisive is an airline’s ability to 
service a specific route, both operationally and from a landing right point of view. Therefore 
in selecting routes, likely passenger demand might actually be secondary in the decision 
making process, as many potential routes in SSA might not be feasible due to operational 
and competitive restrictions. Once such challenges are overcome, provided the LCC looks to 
attract a new market that does not current exist, theory dictates that demand is likely to 
materialise provided the LCC provides an offering that is conducive to this. 
An airlines ownership structure also largely dictates its network structure, again a factor 
which is pivotal to the manner in which it operates. Without BASAs in place between two 
countries, securing landing rights in countries outside of one’s home base can be very 
challenging if the point of origin is not the home base itself. In markets where liberalisation 
has not been forthcoming to the same extent, carriers looking to offer point-to-point routes 
have adopted two strategies in order to circumvent the restrictions posed by bilateral 
service agreements. 
 The hub-and-spoke system thereby ushering passengers through a central home 
based hub, and then onto final destinations. 
 Setting up subsidiaries in various countries, which would include a share of local 
ownership or joint venture with government. By having a locally registered entity in 
each country, it is able to obtain bilaterals with other countries where it doesn’t 
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have local ownership, and therefore set up point to point networks between many 
more destinations. This model has proven highly successful in Asia where the 
aviation market is still not fully liberalised.  
Point-to-point networks on one other hand provide added convenience for passengers and 
reduce overall travel times, while they are far less complex to coordinate for the airline 
without the need to connect passengers or send luggage to final destination. That said 
however, load factors can be significantly reduced when avoiding major hubs, a factor that 
is critical to the success of an LCC in any market. In addition, by adopting a point to point 
approach, securing landing rights in SSA, where liberalisation is not being practiced, 
additional obstacles are presented. 
One of the ways in which bilateral air agreements requirements can be circumvented is 
through a hub-and-spoke approach, and if a LCC is able to avoid the additional costs that 
are associated with this, such an approach is worth exploring.  If an LCC were able to 
establish itself in a country that was strategically located and that does not blindly support 
an inefficient national carrier, the benefits of a hub-and-spoke might outweigh those from a 
point-to-point service.  Furthermore, if passengers were responsible for ensuring that 
transfer times were adequate, while also being required to collect and recheck luggage, a 
type of hybrid approach might work best allowing for load factors not to be compromised. 
For example, considering the two countries Malawi and Tanzania, even though the former 
has a national carrier, both are strategically located to serve Southern Africa, have 
adequate aviation infrastructure, and have relatively more liberal aviation policies. Malawi 
in particular has little domestic market of its own, and with the economy remaining largely 
reliant on the export of tobacco, could benefit from an influx of passengers looking to 
connect to other regions. FlyDubai, as an example, while operating like a LCC to a large 
extent, has successfully adapted its model to cater for its individual market circumstances.  
SSA specific risks such as those related to bilateral agreements and low load factors are 
avoided by aggregating passengers through a hub.  Apart from FlyDubai, there are only two 
other truly regional LCCs by virtue of having a multi-route offerings in the region and 
exhibiting many of the attributes of the typical LCCS model, being Fastjet and FlyAfrica. 
Both have opted to set-up a franchise type structure as opposed to utilising a hub of any 
kind like FlyDubai 
Focussing on the first theory in Chapter 4 pertaining to maximising demand, and in doing 
so, high load factors, this needs to be balanced with the benefits that accrue through 
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having a point-to-point network. That is, point-to-point networks allow an airline to provide 
a comprehensive route offering and significant cost savings while providing an ability to fly 
directly between various jurisdictions, however load factors can be affected as a hub-and-
spoke type structure aggregates passengers from various places onto a single flight.  
Therefore, a hybrid approach, which takes advantage of both network structures, might 
address both the issue of landing rights and load-factors. That is, setting up various hubs, in 
countries that provide geographical advantages, do not have national carriers, and might 
also look to provide cost support to an LCC moving passengers through it could be an 
innovative, new approach. This has not as yet been exploited in other parts of the world, 
yet could be highly suited to SSA given its unique circumstances.  
Similarly, the second theory in Chapter 4 pertains to the Southwest effect, and that 
following the entrance of an LCC into a market, demand is seen to increase significantly 
through rising passenger numbers. Therefore, in selecting routes, a LCCs decision should be 
based on tackling operational and competition factors first, as once it enters, demand 
should increase in sufficient numbers to sustain that route offering. 
7.5.3 Costs 
Unanimous to all the executives interviewed was the need to outsource extensively, at least 
initially, as a means to achieving initial cost savings and much required contract flexibility. 
The opinions relating to the manner in which outsourcing is undertaken did differ 
somewhat however, yet perhaps outside the scope of this research as each individual 
airline’s own unique attributes, funding structure and the like would determine the manner 
in which it should outsource. In addition, all participants made mention of the need to 
minimise ticket distribution costs, one particular area where cost savings can be significant 
with the advent of new technological mediums providing several alternatives to do so. 
From the literature described in Chapter 2, the manner in which an LCC minimises costs is 
absolutely critical to its success, providing the ability to pass such cost savings onto 
passengers in the form of lower ticket prices, but also allowing it to operate at lower load 
factors when necessary to do so. There are several ways in which an LCC can minimise 
costs, such as utilising secondary airports, providing a basic inflight offering, outsourcing, 
using fuel efficient aircraft, and not utilising a GDS, to mention some examples. Costs may 
however differ from country to country, and also the proportional split between costs that 
an airline incurs, such as landing fees, and the costs that a passenger pays, such as airport 
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taxes.. Further, some avenues of cost saving are not yet applicable to SSA such as the use of 
secondary airports. Nevertheless, other practices, such as outsourcing can be pivotal in 
reducing costs. Outsourcing can be used to reduce costs until such a time as insourcing 
provides more cost benefit and achievement of economies of scale. Achieving the right 
balance between insourcing and outsourcing is a critical success factor, whereby costs can 
initially be minimised through outsourcing which reduces funding requirements and 
increases working capital. While LCCs tend to outsource as much as possible initially, in 
time, it appears that insourcing certain functions can bring about longer term cost savings 
and efficiencies. 
Nevertheless, based on the data presented, it is unlikely that an LCC in SSA can achieve the 
same cost savings as those in more developed markets, or even, achieve significant cost 
advantages against legacy carriers currently operating. That is, passenger volumes in SSA 
remain significantly lower than other markets where such cost advantages exist. Moreover, 
fuel costs in Africa remain some of the highest in the world. Regarding outsourcing, 
companies to which an LCC can outsource some of its services may be limited in SSA, and 
could even introduce greater inefficiency. With regard to economies of scale, this is difficult 
to achieve, particularly during the first few years of operation in a market until an airline is 
well established and has achieved critical mass. Further, government taxes continue to 
place undue pressure on regional airlines, another factor that is largely unique to the 
region, and continues to be a major burden for the regions competitive carriers. 
In view of the above constraints, LCCs in SSA may have to incur even greater cost than 
legacy carriers in certain instances, in order to achieve greater efficiency which in the long 
term would bring about cost savings, but in the short term ensure strategic advantage 
through differentiation. Most legacy carriers operating in the region are state owned, and 
years of government support allowed inefficiencies to manifest. This has created a window 
of opportunity for a new entrant to put policies and procedures in place which would 
maximise efficiencies, until such time as the continent’s legacy carriers implement 
significant changes to their existing operations. There are certain practices that an LCC can 
adopt which lowers costs without comprising efficiency such as limiting in-flight services, 
minimising delays by not offering prebooked seats and offering only an economy class 
section. This provides an LCC with greater ability to keep ticket prices lower. However a 
more drastic approach is required to achieve true cost advantage, and FlyDubai is 
testament to this, utilising a low-cost central hub, through which it feeds its African, and 
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global destinations. In a similar manner to which RyanAIr utilises secondary airports and 
secures additional revenue from the airport authority, an LCC could target a primary 
airport, or country, that is looking to similarly leverage off an airlines ability to bring new 
passengers to the airport or region. In exchange, costs might be reduced to further support 
the airline, while government in that country might be amenable to lobbying for reductions 
in costs. By also increasing fuel uplift volumes in a certain location, fuel suppliers might be 
more amenable to reducing their margins to support increased volumes, while also working 
with government to further develop infrastructure which would achieve cost savings 
through a more efficient fuel supply chain. 
Airline ticket distribution is another area where LCCs can achieve significant cost savings 
against their legacy counterparts. The latter are compelled to use expensive GDS system by 
virtue of the hub-and-spoke networks they run, whereby passengers across the globe make 
use of travel agents, and the more complex network requires a system to facilitate it. The 
lack of internet penetration, computer literacy and lack of credit card ownership in Africa 
does however pose a major problem with LCCs looking to leverage off a web based system. 
Nevertheless, there are alternatives such as the use of mobile phones, as mobile 
penetration rates are significantly higher than the internet in SSA, and mobile based 
payment systems such as MPESA are widely used.. A successful LCC in Africa will make use 
of a combination of distribution and payment options, such as internet, mobile, call centres 
and perhaps vending agents, such as those which air Deccan utilised in India.  
Theory 3, as described in Chapter 4, pertains to the cost structure exhibited by airlines. That 
is, the cost base is largely fixed as opposed to variable, and therefore does not change 
significantly as passenger numbers increase or decrease. Particularly during the inception of 
an airlines services, minimising such costs, even if this leads to higher costs in future, would 
be the preferred strategy given that they are largely fixed in nature. Outsourcing would 
achieve this aim, while also providing much needed flexibility, should it take time to 
develop a strong passenger base, or if a downturn is experienced. 
7.5.4 Ticket Prices 
Based on the accounts of the airline executives interviewed, it can be deduced that 
provided that load factors and aircraft utilisation are maximised, LCCs in SSA can reduce 
airline ticket prices to the same extent as those in Europe or the US. For example, it is 
reasonable to suggest that by stripping out the seat, and charging for any additional 
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requirements such as checked baggage, ticket changes and reserved seating, seats alone in 
SSA could be sold at extremely reduced rates particularly to passengers who book well in 
advance. In addition, all respondents indicated that the offerings that exist in markets such 
as Europe and the US, pertaining to car hire, accommodation and travel insurance are not 
suited to the SSA market, at least at the moment. Rather an innovative additional offering, 
possibly not yet seen in other markets, yet highly suited to the SSA market, is required. 
Ticket prices tie in closely with Theory 2, as one of the sub-effects of the Southwest Effect is 
an overall decrease in air ticket prices in the entire regional market in which that LCC 
operates. This overall effect is only possible due to legacy carriers similarly lowering their 
prices in reaction to the new entrant LCC. This is particularly important, as such an effect in 
general creates an impression that this mode of transport, previously inaccessible to the 
masses, is now affordable even when considering legacy carrier ticket prices. At the same 
time, it means that LCCs in general need to innovate and create differentiation through 
other means apart from ticket prices only. New route offerings are likely to achieve this to 
some degree, both avoiding competition and displaying differentiation. Yet this is not 
sufficient, as has been seen in the Europe and the US markets, where LCC differentiation 
through product offerings also provides much needed ancillary revenues obtained through 
holiday packages, car hire and insurance offerings. In SSA, where these revenues streams 
are unlikely to be a factor, an innovative approach is required, pertaining to new route 
offerings,  greater connectivity, as well as ticket offerings which include both ground and air 
transport, in one ticket.    
As far as the third theory is concerned, maximising revenues versus cost is absolutely 
pivotal for any LCC. Given the uncertainty around booking behaviour, demand patterns and 
overall price-elasticity in SSA given the lack of literature or case studies in this regard, any 
new entrant will both have to stimulate early ticket sales, as well as utilise a yield 
management system that is flexible and allows for real time monitoring. That is, an internet 
based ticketing system allowing for quick adjustment of prices, as and when necessary, is 
likely to prove decisive.  
7.5.5 Aircraft 
From the interviews obtained, it is clear that fuel efficient modern aircraft are generally 
preferred. The literature shows that LCC in developed markets have tended to utilise 
younger, more modern, fuel efficient aircraft which provide a cost advantage as far as fuel 
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and maintenance are concerned. Furthermore, these LCCs have tended to purchase aircraft 
outright rather than lease them, obtaining significant discounts from manufacturers with 
the aim of selling them later, often at a residual value which may be equal to or even 
greater than the aircraft book value. This however requires significant availability to 
financing, or start-up capital for a new entrant, given that purchasing brand new modern 
aircraft commands a significant premium over buying older, second hand aircraft or leasing 
aircraft. In more competitive markets, where several LCCs exist or legacy carriers compete 
with a less differentiated, lower cost offerings, utilising modern aircraft is pivotal. In less 
competitive markets, where funding might be constrained, or when fuel costs have reduced 
to moderate levels as they currently have, and fuel efficiency is less important, the use of 
older aircraft can provide a cost advantage which outweighs the disadvantages associated 
with older aircraft. Similarly leasing aircraft as opposed to buying them, provided that it is a 
temporary measure until such time as aircraft can be purchased, can alleviate funding 
demands significantly. 
In pertaining to aircraft type, the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 family of aircraft are the most 
common aircraft utilised by LCCs globally due to their ranges supporting shorter sector 
lengths, seating capacities which support the correct load factors and their fuel efficiencies.  
Little other options exist apart from smaller regional jets which are more costly to operate 
on a per passenger basis, less fuel efficient, and generate less revenue per passenger, per 
flight. They are however significantly cheaper than their larger counterparts, and require 
less passengers to ensure they are full. In circumstances where aircraft are not full, 
particularly in the case of utilising larger narrow body aircraft, the losses can prove to be 
extremely significant for the airline and therefore maximising load factors is a major 
consideration in the choice of aircraft. At the same time however, several LCCs operating 
smaller regional jets have gone out of business, as the revenue / cost mix just does not 
support a sustainable business model. Therefore only in instances where the revenues are 
suitable to sustain a higher cost base, should this option be explored. 
As per Theory 3 in Chapter 4, ensuring fixed costs are minimised, while the ratio of fixed to 
variable costs remains unaffected, is largely dependent on aircraft cost minimisation. That 
is, an airline’s largest fixed cost remains aircraft, and its main variable cost remains fuel 
costs. By appropriately managing the type of aircraft an airline utilises, and the manner in 
which such aircraft are financed, would adequately address this critical success factor. That 
is, utilising the right type of aircraft suitable to the market in which the LCCS operates, be it 
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newer or older aircraft, larger or smaller aircraft, or leasing or buying aircraft, market 
specific factors will dictate which approach to adopt. What does however remain key is 
utilising a uniform type of aircraft, to minimise maintenance and training costs. 
7.5.6 General Critical Success Factors 
As per the interviews undertaken, the airline executives highlighted the key critical success 
factors which in their minds were most pivotal to the success of LCCs in SSA.  
 In order for an LCC to achieve success in SSA, its approach will need to be different 
to that taken in any other markets globally. That is, a fresh, innovative approach, 
specifically tailored to the regions unique characteristics will be required.  
 In order to achieve the demand levels required, air travel will need compete with 
commonly used road transport on one end of the spectrum, while supporting a 
new age of intra-African tourists on the other.  
 First mover advantage in key markets will be pivotal in securing an early foot hold 
for any LCC. Certain LCCs such as Fastjet are already in a good position in this sense, 
yet may need to adapt their approach to appeal to the masses and create a solid 
first impression amongst would be travellers. 
 Most LCC offerings in SSA are low cost, but not low fare. That is, fares remain 
relatively higher than LCC offerings in more developed markets, and only once 
ticket prices moderate to these levels will demand patterns pick up significantly. 
 While SSA is a unique market, having strong management, with experience in other 
markets will be a major advantage for a prospective LCC. 
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8. Conclusion  
In conclusion, several specific outcomes have been achieved in the study.  These are 
highlighted in this chapter, by indicating how the research objectives specified in Chapter 1, 
the research question and propositions have been addressed.  The chapter then suggests 
limitations to the study and makes recommendations for further research.  
 
8.1 First Objective 
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, several factors, being both market related, and airline 
specific, that are largely responsible for the success of LCCs, in the markets in which they 
are well established, were identified. These factors are summarised under broad headings, 
as follows: 
 Market Demand 
 Competition 
 Load Factors 
 Secondary Airports and Aircraft Utilisation 
 Tourism 
 Airports and Infrastructure 
 Labour 
 Network Type 
 Cost Minimisation 
 Ticket Distribution 
 Ticket Prices 
 Yield Management 
 Aircraft 
 Seating Density 
 Ancillary Revenue 
 Brand 
 Safety Profile 
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8.2 Second Objective 
Through the exercises undertaken and described in Chapter 6, those critical success factors, 
specific to a LCC’s success in SSA, were identified and summarised under broad headings, as 
follows: 
 The market 
 Ownership structure 
 Routes 
 Costs 
 Ticket Distribution 
 Aircraft 
 Ancillary Revenue 
 Competition 
 Brand 
 
8.3 Third Objective 
In addressing the degree to which the critical success factors identified differ between well-
established markets, and SSA, while certain factors appear to be universal, there are several 
which are largely unique to both established markets, and SSA, respectively as discussed in 
Chapter 7. Most notably market demand factors, which impact load factors, were clearly 
universal to both, and continued to be highlighted through a causal relationship which is 
critical to the success of all LCCs regardless of region of operation. Similarly ticket prices, 
and the manner in which they are distributed, as well as the manner in which additional 
revenues are earned, are common critical success factors to both established markets and 
SSA. Similarly, maximising profits through increased revenues relies on cost minimisation, 
largely attributable to aircraft selection which encompasses both fuel costs and purchasing 
/ leasing of aircraft. This also was highlighted as being pivotal to both established markets 
and SSA. 
Notable differences however are both the reliance on tourism for passenger demand as 
well as the focus on secondary airports to save cost in established markets, which do not 
apply to the same extent in SSA. At the same time, ownership structure appeared to be 
more critical in SSA than established markets. 
89 
 
 
 
8.4 Fourth Objective 
In proposing a basic business model which would increase the likelihood for success for an 
LCC, several key factors require the most attention, as follows: 
 Absolutely integral to the chances of success for a regional LCC in SSA will be 
attracting new passengers who have never utilised air travel before. The manner in 
which this will be achieved will be dependent on lowering ticket prices to levels 
that on a risk and time basis, compare very favourably with existing ground 
transport offerings.  
 Being affiliated to a legacy carrier is likely to be a major hindrance, and therefore all 
attempts to operate independently, while targeting methods to achieve economies 
of scale, is highly preferred. 
 The network structure of choice will be paramount given the lack of liberalisation 
that exists in SSA.  While a franchise type model circumvents the lack of BASA to 
some extent, it can often be at the cost of high load factors. Therefore a hybrid 
approach, possibly utilising several well chosen hubs, could provide benefit by 
similarly circumventing landing restrictions, while also achieving greater economies 
of scale and higher load factors. 
 In SSA, it is unlikely that LCCs will be able to lower costs, to the same extent that 
their European or US counterparts are able to, given the lack of secondary airports, 
lower volumes, and generally higher costs relating to general aviation operations. 
Therefore while outsourcing, where possible, and utilising a lower cost ticket 
distribution system may bring about the largest cost benefits versus legacy carriers 
in the region, LCCs will need to ensure load factors are as high as possible, so that 
the cost per passenger km, are always minimised. 
 While ‘cash remains king’ in SSA, providing ticketing systems which both support 
this method of payment and provide  feasible alternatives through mobile based 
system or otherwise. This will ensure ticket sales are not affected in a region that is 
significantly different to many other established markets in this regard. 
 In SSA, providing a very basic seat offering, and charging for any additional add-ons, 
will likely be the best strategy. That is, many of the inclusive offerings relating to 
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checked luggage, reserved seating, ability to change tickets, catering and the like 
may be utilised less frequently in a market where pricing is pivotal.  
 Passenger mistrust and lack of education are two of the biggest obstacles for a new 
entrant in SSA. Therefore adhering to international safety and reliability standards, 
while ensuring that the market is kept abreast of this through the most effective 
means, is critical to the success of an LCC in SSA. 
 Traditional forms of ancillary income are unlikely to apply in SSA, and therefore 
airlines will need to come up with more innovative methods, applicable to the 
regions in which they operate in order to secure additional revenues for the airline 
using the seat as a ‘hook’.  
 Both aircraft type and the manner in which it is funded, will also to some extent 
depend on the specific market in which the LCC in question, is operating. Overall, 
aiming to secure fuel efficient aircraft appears to be important to the long term 
sustainability of any carrier, and all attempts to do so, should be made. This should 
not however take place at the expense of placing the airline under financial distress 
early on, and so if funding is limited, plans should be made from the outset to 
secure more fuel efficient aircraft later on, and only utilise less efficient aircraft, 
initially for a limited period. Commonality of aircraft is however important when 
looking to save costs, and this should also be taken into consideration when looking 
to acquire more modern aircraft. 
 
Overall, in addressing the research question, utilising a traditional or common LCC approach 
is likely to prove highly detrimental to the success of a LCC in SSA. While the experience 
gained in other markets however will provide much needed  skills in negotiating this 
unfamiliar landscape, innovative approaches through a deeper understanding of country 
specific factors is likely to stand a new entrant in good stead. That is, LCCs first need to 
focus on the core critical success factors which apply in any market, namely, attracting new 
entrants to the market and achieving high load factors. Critical to success will be adapting 
the means to achieve these success factors by applying region suitable methods in the form 
of ticket sales systems, innovative ancillary offerings and the unique network structures.  
As far as the three research propositions are concerned, they were also addressed in the 
outcome to the study, as follows: 
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8.5 Proposition 1 
While there are factors that are universal to all markets in which LCCs operate, particularly 
SSA, its composition of various countries, climates, cultures and landscape, as well as 
relatively lower income per capita, ensures that its unique critical success factors, overall, 
are to some extent different to other regions of the world. 
8.6 Proposition 2 
Given SSA’s unique attributes, there are factors, both positive and negative, which affect 
the likely success of an LCC in the region. From a negative point of view, and most notably, 
are the lack of market liberalisation, higher cost bases and lack of intra-African tourism. 
From a positive point of view however, there exists a massive potential market of would be 
travellers, who currently utilise ground transport to undertake treacherous routes daily 
across  landscapes that take  significantly longer than other forms of transport would 
achieve. In addition, the market remains largely underserviced in most instances, and 
competition, provided certain hurdles around landing right can be overcome, is likely to be 
relatively minimal for first movers. 
8.7 Proposition 3  
 A unique business model has been proposed as summarised above which has been 
adapted to address the chances of survival of an LCC in SSA’s unique circumstances and 
achieve the greatest  sustainable success in the region. 
8.8 Limitations of the Study 
There are several limitations which have been identified relating to the research. 
 Being a qualitative study, there remains a strong reliance on both primary and 
secondary qualitative data. From a primary point of view, Although the analysis of a 
small sample (<50) of SSA market participants to assess their preferences and 
habits with respect to air travel is not deemed to be statistically representative of 
the broader population, the results are assumed to provide a general view of 
regional preferences. 
  From a secondary point of view, reliable literature on LCCs in less mature markets 
is limited, while that relating directly to SSA is even more limited. Therefore various 
assumptions had to be made by with respect to drawing parallels between mature 
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LCC markets and less mature LCC markets, with SSA. The robustness of these 
assumptions could have a significant impact on the outcome of the study. 
 Subject matter experts may have been somewhat biased in their approach and 
responses, likely supporting their individual business model, and critical of those of 
their competitors. Without a large sample in this instance too, validation of the 
accuracy of their responses is limited. 
 Certain factors which have been present in established and mature LCC markets 
that contributed to the success of those airlines might be irrelevant to the problem 
at hand. That is, emerging markets and SSA as a region might not share certain 
attributes or market defining factors that might have been largely responsible for 
LCC success in those regions. For example factors that are either natural, such as 
the UK being an island and therefore difficult to access by land transport, or 
structural such as in the US, having several individual markets that alone are 
sizeable enough to support an LCC by themselves. Therefore while it is imperative 
to separate factors that are highly specific to certain regions or markets from those 
that are generic critical success factors, it is a difficult task to do so. That is a 
limitation to the study as such factors might not be recognised as having been the 
primary reason for success, instead highlighting others which might be less critical. 
 
8.9 Recommendations for further research 
While this study is intended to identify critical success factors for LCCs in SSA, and whether 
such factors are achievable, the recommendations given in the study provide only a general 
and simplified business model, and cannot be specifically applied to every country and type 
of LCC. Therefore dependent on the countries in which an LCC intends to operate and the 
attributes of its specific model, any specific recommendations require further research.  
Future studies on this subject should consider improving the study by: 
 By increasing the sample size, and including several hundred respondents in the 
survey, if possible, more robust results relating to specific passenger attributes, in 
SSA, would likely be achieved. Such results could be utilised to formulate a model 
that addresses true passenger specific requirements more closely. 
 Focussing on a specific region in SSA, such as West Africa, or the EAC, would be 
required to obtain  better understanding of local regulations, customer behaviour 
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and the like, so as to obtain  a specific, tailored business model be applied to that 
region.  
 By investigating which BASAs currently exist in SSA, one would gain a better 
understanding of which specific countries would be best suited for housing 
prospective hubs, thereby facilitate a more widely serviced network.  One could 
then attempt to match other country specific attributes which are supportive of an 
efficient and effective hub, such as not having a national airline as one example. 
This would allow one to better identify which countries are best suited to being 
hubs, as part of a hybrid type network. 
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Appendix B - One-on-One interviews detailed 
summary 
Fastjet 
Fastjet was formed on the back of Fly540, when Lonhro, the previous parent company, had 
looked to sell off the troubled airline and refocus on its core activities. With the airline 
business not being core to its other activities. Fastjet was formed on 29th November 2012. 
From the outset, the approach adopted was one of a true LCC model, quite different to the 
approach taken by Fly540 that was in theory just a smaller, legacy carrier utilising older 
aircraft, which usually had a smaller capacity, while it charged the same fares as legacy 
carriers.  
Initially, it proved to be extremely challenging as far as Fastjet was concerned, in dealing 
with the respective authorities in each country in order to secure the necessary landing 
rights. This was particularly so in South Africa, when the Tanzanian government stepped in 
to support Fastjet through threatening SAA’s landing rights in Tanzania, and so landing 
rights were granted. Fastjet initially launched with three core routes domestically in 
Tanzania, before branching out to flying the DAR to JNB route in Oct 2013 and DAR to LUN 
in Feb 2014. Fastjet currently services four domestic routes in Tanzania, as well as 
regionally from DAR to JNB, Lusaka, Harare and Entebbe. 
Jambojet 
The airline was started in 2014 as a fully owned subsidiary of Kenya Airways with a target of 
being a cheaper offering compared to existing legacy carriers in Kenya. The CEO was 
familiar with Kenya Airways and the Kenyan market due to having been seconded from 
KLM to Kenya Airways during 1996-1999 when the former had taken a share in the latter.  
The current Kenya Airways ownership structure comprises 26 percent government, 26 
percent KLM, with the balance being listed publicly on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The 
intended business model was initially one of a hybrid between an LCC and legacy carrier, 
however in September 2013, the airline adopted a true low cost model on the CEO’s advice, 
with the model only deviating where necessary to allow for local circumstances. For the 
moment Jambojet only offers domestic services in Kenya, between Nairobi, Mombasa, 
Eldoret and Kisumu. 
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Kulula / Comair 
When the South African airspace was deregulated in 1992, this opened the market for 
private entrants, the likes of Kulula, which was formed in 2001, being SSA’s first LCC. Since 
then, the airline has diversified somewhat, having moved into other travel related offerings 
such as car hire and hotels, while also providing the back end technology for travel package 
providers, as well as travel fulfilment for the likes of Ebucks and Vitalty. Kulula operates a 
fleet of new fuel efficient Boeing 737s, targeting domestic routes in South Africa, although 
offering certain regional flights through codeshares with British Airways, its sister company, 
and Kenya Airways. 
FlyAfrica 
FlyAfrica, the newest entrant into the SSA market appears to have adopted the true LCC 
model, particularly akin to that of LCCs in Asia with different franchises combining to serve 
the overall market.  According to FlyAfrica, they do not believe that any previous attempts 
by other LCCs in Africa have thus far truly adapted the model to local circumstances, yet 
feel their business model is proven to be successful in a region such as SSA. FlyAfrica 
currently offer flights from JNB to Harare, Victoria Falls and Windhoek. 
Detailed Interview Summary 
The Market 
In Kulula’s view, the relative small size of the middle class in SSA is a major challenge to any 
proposed regional LCC. While there are a substantial amount of aviation travelers in SSA, a 
vast number still utilise business class only, being business travelers, while most of the 
regions inhabitants simply don’t utilise air travel at all. As an example, airline services 
between most countries and Nigeria or Ghana have large business class sections that are 
always full, and economy class is often under-utilised. Therefore until SSA has a significant 
middle class, to create sustainable volume, the airline does not believe that a true LCC is 
possible in the region. Attempts to establish LCCs in the region have thus far been half-
hearted, with such airlines making use of 50 seater regional jets, in an attempt to keep load 
factors high. These models however have not worked. In addition, the investment required 
for an airline to operate effectively from inception is significant. Therefore one cannot 
simply sustain losses for any undetermined length of time in anticipation of the market 
arriving. This has lead to a reluctance from LCCs to enter the market and invest significantly, 
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and only a substantial increase in regional GDP, leading to a sustained growth of the middle 
class, will create the market required to facilitate the Success of LCCs in SSA. 
According to FlyAfrica, market growth and increasing volume is dependent on elasticity of 
demand. In Africa there is a large untapped demand for low cost air travel, yet while the 
airline is looking to tap this sleeping giant, their investors are involved in a number of other 
infrastructure projects on the continent and therefore have a view which is broader than 
just aviation. Such a vision involves connecting people, facilitating trade and securing food 
supply. The airline is of the view that if one looks at SSA where air service just doesn’t exist 
in any substantial form, would it make more sense for a carrier to begin operations 
targeting routes that are already being serviced, or to rather enter a market that is 
deficient, and create the market for aviation travel. By their own admission, the market at 
the moment doesn’t exist, and therefore will require a significant amount of work to create 
it. Educating passengers is pivotal, while leveraging off the efforts of other LCCs who have 
failed, or are currently operating yet with less impetus, can prove to be an important 
weapon in gaining market share. FlyAfrica intends to disrupt the industry as much as 
possible, and while the they appreciate the views of Kulula relating to SSA’s non-existent 
market, they opine that such views are from an airline which comes from an established 
market. That is, its focus is too narrow to appreciate the market potential in the region. 
Overall, FlyAfrica is unable to comprehend that such a large market remains completely 
untapped, especially where the demographics favour a young society, and therefore by 
educating them early, and enticing young people to fly, a new market is likely to be formed. 
Fastjet undertook a survey with its passengers during the first six months of operation and 
the outcome was somewhat surprising, as 38 percent of all passengers surveyed had never 
even been into an airport let alone flown on an airplane. The conclusion drawn was that the 
airlines entrance into the market had stimulated a new market of travelers, and in effect 
created “a larger pool from which to fish.” Furthermore Fastjet provided a level of 
international standard as far as services, reliability and safety were concerned, in a market 
where that was not necessarily the norm.   In the first year of operation, 95 percent of 
flights were on time, only cancelling three flights in total, far superior that that of their 
competitors. In East Africa, a trend that has appeared is that passengers tend book tickets 
far later, any prefer doing so in person at the airport given suspicion relating to previous 
airlines which have exited the market, it is therefore imperative to build up trust as well as 
incentivise people as much as possible to book early, a win-win situation for passenger and 
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airline alike Through Fastjet’s efforts in this regard despite common consumer behavior in 
this market, on average, passengers are booking 22 days in advance. 
According to Jambojet, in Kenya, 15 million individual trips are taken per year from Nairobi 
to Mombasa, and while it is only 450km, the trip takes eight hours on average. Roads are  
generally dangerous, so much so that the government has banned night buses as a risk 
mitigation strategy. With inter-country tourism being somewhat limited, most people travel 
for personal reasons such as VFR, unerals, weddings and the like, yet with KQ fares 
remaining too high for the majority of the population, there remains a significant market to 
target. .The question remains however, how does one convince this group to travel, and 
book tickets in advance, utilising the internet.  Many have preconceived ideas regarding air 
travel, not understanding the logistics or what’s involved, and this is really what the 
challenge in Africa entails.  
Jambojet undertook a survey in several large cities in Kenya in an effort to gain a better 
understanding of what forms of transport most people used. While almost all utilised 
ground transport of some kind, 40 percent of the respondents said they would fly when an 
airline could display safety and reliable. This sense of mistrust is also reflected in the fact 
that people don’t generally book tickets well in advance despite the price advantage of 
doing so. Overall people don’t understand this concept, either booking at the last minute, 
or misunderstanding that all the tickets are being sold at the advertised early booking price. 
Once this fare class has been exhausted, passengers are increasingly disappointed when the 
prevailing price has increased. Social media has proven very effective for educational 
purposes, as well as for explaining how ticket sales work. For Jambojet, it took sometime 
before the first bookings came in, as suspicion in Kenya remains an issue, and until one sees 
the actual aircraft on the ground, potential passengers are apprehensive.  
Ownership Structure 
Fastjet’s view is that having an affiliation to a legacy carrier is more of a hindrance than it is 
a benefit. Rather what has occurred in instances where legacy carriers create LCCs is that 
LCCs tend to fail due to the relationship, or are propped up by their parent, which is 
inefficient and anti-competitive. True cost separation from the parent proves nearly 
impossible, and therefore while there might be some benefits, they are outweighed by the 
negatives. The question remains how a carrier is able to become truly low cost if attached 
to a legacy carrier; as to truly practice the LCC model, the airlines need to be completely 
divorced from, and even compete with, legacy carriers on certain routes. 
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Jambojet remains a fully owned subsidiary of KQ, with the legacy carrier’s ownership 
structure comprising 26 percent by the Kenyan Government, 26 percent by KLM, with the 
balance being listed publicly on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Jambojet are of the opinion 
that in SSA, it remains very difficult for an LCC to survive without a link to major carrier, a 
situation which is vastly different from Europe. The benefits of being linked to a legacy 
carrier are mainly political, which is required in order to obtain landing rights in most 
countries In addition, the LCC is able to procure goods and services as part of a larger 
entity, bringing down costs such as those relating to fuel, maintenance, aircraft and ground 
handling, as economies of scale play a role. As far as Jambojet is concerned, KQ provides 
many of the required services such as finance, legal, treasury and call centre services, which 
without this arrangement, Jambojet would be required to establish dedicated departments 
for these tasks. By Jambojet’s own admission however, there remains certain pitfalls 
related to being affiliated to a legacy carrier. The higher cost base of Kenya airways does 
flow into that of Jambojet, such as Kenya Airway’s use of unionised pilots. Overall however 
he believes the positives outweigh the negatives. 
FlyAfrica is a private company registered in Mauritius. Licenses are held and the trademark 
registered, in Mauritius, while a separate entity which leases aircraft to the various 
intended FlyAfrica franchises, is also registered in Mauritius. While the airline has a project 
office in South Africa, no local registration exists, with the office being utilised to attract 
talent as expats prefer the city to other African cities in general, while it remains convenient 
due to the air service the city offers. The intended model of FlyAfrica is similar to that of 
AirAsia, whereby a separate franchise is registered locally in certain countries which 
provide benefits as far as bilaterals and landing rights are concerned for point to point 
services. In addition, economies of scale can be achieved by combining the buying power of 
the various franchises.  
FlyAfrica is of the view that despite Fastjet’s claim that they are structured in the same 
manner, they are not. Rather the holding company is registered in the UK and managed 
from London. With Africa being tied up with many bilaterals, it remains very difficult to 
maximise utilization as institutional inhibitors are a constraint. The model that a LCC 
employs therefore needs to circumvent the politics, something that franchise model is 
trying to achieve, and its therefore surprising that other haven’t adopted this model to the 
same extent 
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In Kululas view, a hub-and-spoke system could provide an initial entrance into the regional 
arena, highlighting an example where Malawi once considered such a notion, to create a 
hub servicing the surrounding region, even though it really has no real domestic market of 
its own. While this would be somewhat of a shift from the traditional LCC model which 
attempts to offer direct point to point service, the LCC model could still persist in such a 
case. For example, the LCC could avoid offering costly services associated with legacy 
carrier travel such as luggage being checked through to final destination, but rather 
passengers would have to collect and recheck it at each stop, and that perfect connections 
are not a prerequisite if substantial cost savings are passed onto customers. This model 
would however be highly dependent on where the LCC decided to base the hub, as while 
the service offering would be somewhat comprehensive than that of the legacy carrier 
offering, a sort of hybrid model could prove to be successful with the right implementation.  
Furthermore, Kulula does not believe that a LCCs needs to be tied to a legacy carrier in 
order to be successful. Quite the contrary, Mango would do better without South African 
Airways as its parent, and while Kulula is part of Comair / BA, it operates completely 
independently of the latter, based on its own merits, however still benefitting from 
economies of scale. While Mango claims that all transactions with SAA are at arm’s length 
to appease competition authorities, they simply land up duplicating cost centres which 
accumulate additional cost. Recently, Mango has stated that it intends to share services 
with tits parent once again, but now SAA’s inefficiencies will simply flow into the LCC. 
FlyAfrica is of the opinion, and emphatically so, that being tied to a legacy carrier is a 
significant downfall for an LCC. Cross subsidization of Mango and SAA is case in point. LCCs 
without this connection to a legacy carrier are in a much stronger position, as they are not 
tied into any long term contracts, and therefore have far greater flexibility. Noting Jambojet 
as a specific example, KQ also are unlikely to ever allow them to grow into profitable 
routes. 
Routes 
Fastjet, on inception, launched with three core routes domestically in Tanzania. The airline 
then branched out to flying the DAR to JNB route in Oct 2013 and DAR to LUN in Feb 2014. 
It was however extremely challenging dealing with authorities in each country in order to 
secure the necessary landing rights as local authorities in South Africa presented every 
barrier possible for the airline. Only when the Tanzanian government stepped in to support 
Fastjet through threatening SAA’s landing rights in Tanzania, were landing rights granted. 
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This reaffirms the need for local support through local ownership in each home base. 
Overall politics remain the largest obstacle when choosing routes in SSA, as despite 
promises to liberalise the skies, open markets and ensure competitive playing fields, very 
little follow through has taken place. Rather countries continue to subsidise their own 
national carriers to no end despite losses and inefficiencies. Similarly to the case in 
Tanzania, Fastjet required that the Zambian government support them against South 
African authorities by restricting SAA to LUN if they in turn didn’t open the same route to 
Fastjet. 
As far as picking routes are concerned, Fastjet first analyses existing traffic on a route. The 
route DAR – JNB was chosen at inception based on the strong demand on this route at the 
time, as shown by the demand for SAA’s route between these cities, being the only legacy 
carrier providing this service. That said, route picking is a challenging exercise, especially 
when statistical analysis is performed as data in SSA is historically unreliable. Fastjet has 
therefore undertaken to develop its own statistical interaction model which accounts for 
local cultures, operational requirements at the location, and several others factors which 
contribute to the model’s outcome.  It applies a weighting criteria to the individual 
elements scoring both quantitative and qualitative information, and in backtesting, the 
model was found to be surprisingly accurate, becoming even more accurate as additional 
data is collected over time. Fastjet also looks to obtain feedback from passengers on social 
media which is further used to populate the model with data. Based on this route picking 
strategy, Fastjet report that the DAR – LUN route is above the required capacity and has 
been from the start, while the DAR to Mbeya route has been an overnight success.  
Kulula on the other hard are of the view that the utilization of the two A320s that Fastjet 
have, is not being maximised at all. Kulula believe that the midnight flight from DAR to JNB 
is not ideal due to times the route flies, while the route from DAR to MWZ, is similarly 
underutilised.  SAA has simply come in and lowered prices on the DAR-JNB route, and filled 
up capacity to eliminate competition. It is pivotal that the JNB – DAR route is full all the 
time, as the airline lands up taking an aircraft out of circulation for an entire day and it 
therefore has a very high opportunity cost. 
As far as Jambojet is concerned, primary to their route selection process is operational 
requirements and can they be satisfied at the applicable location or airport. Secondary to 
this is the air traffic statistics and how busy the existing carriers on that specific route are. 
Once both of these factors have been considered, one needs to consider price elasticity, as 
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even if one lowers the price, will demand increase on that specific route. As an example, if 
most passengers on a route work for an NGO such as the United Nations, is demand 
expected to increase, if most passengers are price inelastic. One also needs to better 
understand what type of passengers a certain route might attract, for example in Kenya 
vehicle traders can make up a significant portion of Jambojet’s customer base as their 
profession usually requires that the trader collects the car from Mombasa port, and then 
drives it back to another city, such as Nairobi Route by route is assessed based on business 
or tourism demand, and each individual attribute is gauged.  
Kulula selects routes on a different basis, especially given its more domestic focus. With 
South African volumes being somewhat saturated and passenger numbers still below the 
2008 levels, GDP growth remains pivotal to air travel demand. Therefore in the absence of 
strong economic growth, caution is being exercised. In Kulula’s opinion, usually an airline 
looks to grow existing routes first, by putting a larger aircraft on that route as opposed to 
starting new routes. Codeshares are also often utilised on new routes initially, and so while 
one airline operates the route, the other sells tickets and earns revenue, simply buying 
tickets in bulk at a reduced cost from the carrier operating the route, and then onselling 
them to passengers without using its own aircraft. Once growth materialises, with the 
consent of the airline operating the route, the second might place an aircraft on that route 
having established that the demand is there.  
In Kulula’s opinion, it remains almost impossible to work with government owned airlines, 
and so one can only tie up with private carriers, of which very few exist. Ideally, Kulula’s 
strategy is to approach struggling national carriers to assist them, by bringing in technology, 
know-how and experience. Furthermore, with SAA being the dominant player in South 
Africa, there remains a gap for other international airlines to enter the South African 
market and take market share on routes on which SAA flies between South Africa and their 
respective countries. SAA however has a strong local ticket distribution network, and 
therefore unless a foreign airline works with a local partner, such as Kulula, it is very 
difficult to take market share from the incumbent. An example would be LAM of 
Mozambique typing up with Comair to sell tickets on the JNB to Maputo route, but due to 
protectionism from the Mozambiquan government, even though such a partnership would 
be beneficial, it has not materialises. Overall politics remain a major problem in SSA. 
For Kulula, planes need to be 80 percent full, on average, in order to make the airline 
viable. Requiring around six flights or ten hours of flying time per day is also required to 
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make it viable. Therefore empty seats and delays can prove very costly indeed. In South 
Africa, turnaround times are 45 minutes and 30 minutes at Johannesburg, and the country’s 
other airports respectively, yet as a comparison, turnaround times are more than one hour 
in Victoria and two hours in Ndola, in Zambia. Kulula believe this has to be taken into 
consideration picking routes, as certain routes might lead to additional, unwarranted costs 
being incurred. 
FlyAFrica’s view is somewhat simpler; fly any routes that make commercial sense, being 
unrestricted in one’s view with less focus on operational factors and more focus on 
economic ones. 
Costs 
Fastjet’s philosophy is to outsource as much as possible such as maintenance, fuel 
procurement and its call centre functionality, with only core functions such as yield 
management and financial accounting being handled internally, and then farmed out to the 
different operating offices in country. The ticketing system used by the airline however was 
inherited from Fly540 and remains outdated, not being dynamic in nature and not ideally 
suited to Fastjet’s business. Given the cost associated with overhauling the system, a 
decision has been made to utilise the existing system for the time being despite the 
drawbacks. In Jambojet’s view, the costs incurred by an LCC in SSA are largely the same as 
those incurred by legacy carriers. Albeit small, there are some areas to save costs, such as 
through the manner in which most tickets are distributed. For this reason, Jambojet puts 
significant efforts into targeting customers through the internet, having been successful in 
their pursuits, and having reduced distribution costs by 80 percent compared to their 
parent. In addition, the airline utilises only three cabin crew instead of four or five, and 
outsources all its catering needs to avoid the high costs of running such an operation in 
house. In total, Jambojet employs 24 people, which includes only more than one staff 
member in the commercial, sales and ecommerce services, which are not outsourced. In 
addition, only one staff member per discipline manages outsourced contracts as a means to 
keep the staff count low. As an example, one staff member handles the entire maintenance 
function which is outsourced to KQ. Through this employee type model, ties to unions are 
non-existent or low at best, reducing overall staff costs. Further, despite KQ’s ownership of 
Jambojet, all transactions are undertaken at arm’s length, ensuring that a traditional 
supplier-customer relationship is constantly upheld. 
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FlyAfrica reiterated the need to reduce costs as much as possible in Africa, in the same 
manner that LCCs in other markets have done so. The significant reduction in oil prices is 
currently viewed as an absolute windfall for LCCs in particular, stating that if oil prices were 
even currently $85 or even $95 per barrel (currently they are significantly less), Onetime 
Airlines, a South African and small regional LCC that recently filed for bankruptcy, would 
still be in business today. This highlights how crucial oil prices are to the functioning of an 
airline, as when oil prices are elevated, as they have been for the last several years, the 
need for modern aircraft and larger funding requires was far more important. With oil 
prices however currently being at multi-year lows, a carrier can utilise a significantly 
cheaper and older aircraft that largely performs the same task as a brand new modern 
aircraft. That all being said, oil prices will at some stage increase in FlyAfrica’s opinion, and 
therefore, while some cost savings are accruing to carriers, they should be planning ahead 
by modernising their fleets in a similar manner to what Kulula are currently doing.  
FlyAfrica utilise their shareholders, wherever possibly, to lobby governments to reduce 
costs that are significantly high, and not justifiable. While this can prove challenging, some 
successes have been achieved when a compelling case has been brought in front of 
authorities displaying the proven case that if costs are reduced, volumes will increase and 
therefore additional taxes won’t be necessary. Certain governments have proven to be 
receptive.  In addition, as far as the airline is concerned, the balance between insourcing 
and outsourcing is a critical success factor. When demand is lower, the airline requires 
flexibility which allows it to terminate contracts at short notice if necessary, and while this 
might command a premium to do so, such flexibility could prove pivotal during more 
difficult times. 
According to Kulula, aviation costs in SSA are relatively higher than established markets, 
and until such time as economies of scale can be achieved, one cannot remedy this 
situation. There is low utilization of airports, equipment, fuel trucks, and the like, which 
lead to higher costs for all concerned.  Regarding outsourcing of services, it is not necessary 
to outsource all services to achieve cost savings, as this could actually have a detrimental 
effect on costs in the long term. Outsourcing is seen to be a short term solution to keeping 
costs low, and bringing about investor returns, however not investing in catering assets or 
flight simulators leads to higher costs being paid over the medium to longer term. What is 
common to many LCCs globally is that almost all cost are initially outsourced, but in such 
cases, the initial shareholders tend to look to maximise returns in the first five years prior to 
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selling out, and therefore outsourcing is used to achieve this. Also in SSA specifically, 
outsourcing is likely to be both more costly and inefficient given that lack of market depth. 
That said, one area of the business that Kulula does outsource is its GDS, as while it used to 
make use of an in-house ticketing system, this has been outsourced in order to keep up 
with advances in technology. The platform for care hire and hotels is however in-house and 
they intent to maintain this.  
Ticket Prices 
The Fastjet model, as far as ticket prices are concerned, is to aim to offer fares for the 
rough equivalent of $20, for all seats, on all routes, prior to third party charges when sales 
first commence. This is in order to stimulate volume initially on each flight, yet once a fair 
class is filled, of which there are twelve, it moves to the next level until that one is similarly 
fully allocated.  
According to Jambojet, the manner in which it prices its tickets is quite different, 
considering every flight as being a different market in itself. That is, the Tuesday night flight 
is a different market to the Friday or Monday night flight according to the passenger types 
travelling for business or leisure. One therefore needs to look at each in isolations, and 
ascertain which flights will be in high demand and which really require yield management. 
Therefore only a certain proportion of flights have discounts for booking early. On each and 
every flight there are those who will fly regardless of the price and therefore one wants to 
avoid discounting tickets too significantly. While Jambojet considers yield management to 
be effective at selling seats, the revenue from the cheapest seats does not cover costs 
adequately and therefore a focus on higher fares is pivotal. Also, yield management is not 
considered to be a perfect science, especially initially as it takes time to build up reliable 
data which really enables one to manage the yield management system effectively. That 
said,  Jambojet also acknowledge that yield management provides a different benefit in 
SSA, as passengers tend to prefer not to book tickets long in advance, and hence the model 
is an attempt to stimulate sales early. In addition, in order to infer and promote the LCC 
model, it is also a public relations exercise to gain publicity and market attention by selling 
tickets early at such a low price.  
Kulula has recently begun to offer completely unbundled seats, that is, a passenger 
purchases the seat only, and anything else may be acquired for an additional cost. This 
accommodates very cheap seats being on offer, yet the pitfalls of this approach is that 
when stripping all basic ancillaries out, an airline might have to further discount the ticket 
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price. This is due to the market expecting such a basic seat offering to be much cheaper 
that a normal ticket including such ancillaries like catering and checked luggage, yet this 
isn’t necessarily the case... That is, basic ancillaries don’t add that much to the overall ticket 
price and therefore stripping them out provides little overall saving to the passenger. 
Furthermore, charging the passenger additional for these services adds little revenue for 
the airline. Therefore the best way to earn ancillary revenue is to sell items or services that 
an airline normally wouldn’t, and which wouldn’t be stripped out anyway such as holiday 
packages and insurance. 
With FlyAfrica, the ticket price is completely unpacked, whereby one buys the seat, buys 
the seat allocation, as well as the amount of luggage to check. Whatever can be unpacked, 
is unpacked, so basically the seat is the hook, with the airline then looking to earn revenue 
on top of that with the additional ancillaries. The airline also advertises that no fuel 
surcharge will be levied, which is largely an attempt to draw people’s attention to this 
practice by their competitors. They feel that while their competitors misrepresent the 
charge as a fuel surcharge, it simply goes toward growing revenues, with the airline 
disguising it as an additional tax. Overall FlyAfrica are of the view that ticket prices in SSA 
can be brought down to the level required to really stimulate the market, as there is major 
price elasticity in this market and volumes will increase substantially with the right 
stimulation. 
Ticket Distribution 
The relatively limited amount of internet penetration in the countries currently being 
served by Fastjet, apart from South Africa, present additional obstacles to the airline. In 
generally, most countries in SSA are predominantly cash based economies, and there is 
therefore an additional cost requirement for the airline given the need for ticketing offices 
that can accommodate this. This requires the use of a GDS system such as Amadeus or 
Sabre, leading to additional cost being incurred.  That said, when the website is utilised to 
book tickets, there is an 80 percent conversion rate as the difficulty to actually get online 
commands more intent on the part of the passenger, as passengers are unlikely to just be 
browsing. Mpesa is also widely utilised by passengers, and at times, 30 percent of all 
revenue comes through the Mpesa payment system. There are also no transaction fees 
incurred by the airline through Mpesa, and therefore for all parties concerned, this remains 
a preferred way to make payment. Fastjet also makes use of pop up shops which sell tickets 
using Mpesa, a strategy that originated from the notion of going to the market instead of 
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waiting for the market to come to you. This has proven most successful in Tanzania, which 
remains the airlines largest market. Given that it is largely cash driven, the airline needs to 
make provision for this by not waiting for potential passengers to log onto the website, but 
by taking the market to them. 
Jambojet has deviated from the true LCC model by setting up sales offices, having five in 
Nairobi, two in Mombasa and two in Kisimu, apart from the sales offices at the airports 
themselves.  They have however decided not to utilise a GDS due to its exceptionally high 
cost.  Internet sales still account for 40 percent of all sales, which in itself is high for SSA 
even though Kenya does have greater internet penetration than many other markets in the 
region. The other 50 percent is split between the call center (10 percent), and the sales 
offices mentioned (remaining 40 percent). In terms of paying for tickets, Mpesa is used 45 
percent of the time, with credit cards making up 20 percent, yet require additional 
verification due to very high rates of fraud. The remaining 35 percent is paid for in cash. 
Kulula charges the passengers for the GDS booking fee, and therefore while tickets are 
more expensive at a travel agent, which is viewed negatively by the agents, Kulula is 
indifferent to internet or agent sales. The GDS fee is approximately $5 a booking, which 
does stimulate additional internet traffic to some extent, in a country where penetration is 
significantly higher than other countries in SSA. This is in stark comparison to countries such 
as Mozambique, where almost the entire market of airline tickets is sold through travel 
agents given low internet penetration or access to credit cards. Similarly low penetration in 
other countries, coupled with the credit card issue poses major problems to the mass 
uptake of internet bookings, and the subsequent cost savings for the airline associated with 
this method of booking. 
FlyAfrica utilises an existing network of agents, and therefore outsources the non-internet 
distribution function in totality to one service provider. Their model is that their expertise is 
providing airline seats and not distributing tickets, and therefore this function is best 
outsourced.  They are therefore less concerned by the manner in which the tickets are sold, 
however with tickets being a high ticket article, they do not distribute through newsagents 
or vendors, however in time this model might be considered.  Mobile ticket distribution 
through cellular telephones is also being explored given high mobile penetration rates. The 
airline utilises both a GDS and web based distribution system despite the cost of the 
former, however in the same manner that Kulula do so, FlyAfrica passes the cost relating to 
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booking on the GDS onto the passenger. Similarly if the travel agent sells the ticket to the 
passenger, they are required to add on the commission, as the airline does not fit the bill. 
Secondary Airports 
Jambojet’s view is that as far as utilising secondary airports are concerned, SSA just doesn’t 
have appropriate options like in many parts of the world and therefore the secondary 
airport cost savings approach is immaterial. 
In Kulula’s view, the revenues streams that Ryanair earns from secondary airports which 
amounts to a percentage of car rentals and food sales, just for bringing passengers there 
are pivotal to its success.  Yet that is a model that just won’t work in SSA given the lack of 
secondary airports, while primary airports remain underutilised. Therefore other innovative 
approaches are required in the SSA setting. 
Aircraft 
By Fastjet’s own admission, currently the airline is over-fleeted with their aircraft being 
underutilised. It remains preferable to utilise aircraft for 11.5 hours per day, which is 
currently not the case. Regarding their choice of aircraft, Fastjet utilise Airbus A319s and 
while an Embraer E119 or E195 would have been better suited to the runways in SSA, these 
aircraft are more expensive per seat, to run. At the time of selecting aircraft, the airline was 
confident in its ability to stimulate demand, and therefore decided to acquire slightly larger 
aircraft which hold 177 people. While Boeing 737s are more common in in SSA, the lease 
costs compared to an A319 are substantial as there is an oversupply of second hand A319s 
coming out of EasyJet.. Currently Fastjet has three aircraft, with one acting as a spare due 
to lower than expected demand, as opposed to a pure redundancy option. This is an 
undesirable situation as they hope to have all three aircraft being used regularly.  
Jambojet currently uses three B737-300s which have been provided by KQ. Currently two 
are in operation with the third remaining as backup given the age of the aircraft and the 
possibility of break down. Older aircraft tend to lead to greater delays due to breakdowns 
and required maintenance becomes more frequent. What the airline has noted however is 
that in SSA, delays and breakdowns make passengers increasingly suspicious, and delays 
create an impression that the aircraft are unsafe. Therefore delays can be costly from both 
an operational and reputational point of view, and with airports in SSA not being congested 
as far as Jambojet is concerned, delays are really only due to mechanical issues. It is 
therefore essential to have a spare aircraft at all times.  
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Furthermore, according to the airline, it’s essential that the capacity of the aircraft chosen 
by the airline, can indeed be filled. That is, purchasing an aircraft which is too large in the 
hope that the market will grow could prove very costly until such time as those seats are 
filled.  For Jambojet’s purposes, the likes of an A319 or A320 (150/186 seats), and Boeing 
737-300 or 737 -700 are ideal. In the 737, 149 seats is the maximum, however Jambojet can 
only fit 142 seats per aircraft as the planes came from KQ where the maximum was not 
exploited. In addition, aircraft capacity needs to be suitable for both low fares which are 
sold well in advance, as well as the higher ones that come in within days of the actual flight. 
Both the aircraft types mentioned have been proven to meet this demand, as there are not 
many other jet aircraft of that size available, and while Embraer of Brazil are working on 
one, it remains sometime before it is released.  
According to Kulula, is it essential that an airline utilises the latest aircraft in order to keep 
fuel costs as low as possible. Usually airlines which go out of business do so using the same 
aircraft they started with, pointing to the fact that their initial model, and possible aircraft 
of choice were not right from the start. Being caught in a trap, the airline was never able to 
purchase new, fuel efficient, reliable aircraft, which continued to take its tolls on operating 
cash flows Regarding the aircraft make of choice, the specific routes flown are pivotal in 
determining what aircraft to utilise. While smaller aircraft are cheaper upfront, the running 
cost per seat are significantly higher when compared to say B737 or Airbus A320. That said, 
if passenger numbers only justify a fifty seater aircraft, losses will be substantial if larger 
aircraft are utilised. Furthermore, at times of high oil prices, utilising older less fuel efficient 
aircraft leads to significantly higher overall costs running costs. It therefore remains pivotal 
to balance demand and fuel / maintenance costs, when electing which aircraft to utilise. 
Regarding where aircraft should be bought or leased, Kulula is of the opinion that, one 
needs to consider market specific factors such as local interest rates, while balancing them 
with and the airlines own ability to leverage its balance sheet based on short and long term 
factors. If an airline intends to operate aircraft for a long period such as 20 or 30 years, then 
all else equal, it remains better to purchase the aircraft as with a lease you have effectively 
paid for the aircraft in 10 years. If however a bridge is required between a current fleet and 
delivery of new aircraft, it remains better to lease the aircraft. Another factor to consider is 
the level of flexibility that one has with respect to replacing the fleet later, given the risk 
involved in replacing an entire fleet at once, only being required to do the same at a later 
stage. Airlines therefore tend to both buy and lease aircraft, with the exact proportions 
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differing per jurisdiction. Overall, one’s own balance sheet and individual gearing, as well as 
local tax issues, will play a significant part in an airlines individual airline finance model of 
choice. 
Regarding specific type of aircraft utilised by FlyAfrica, unit costs are analysed, with fuel 
burn assessed versus aircraft capacity and utilization.   Having one common aircraft within 
the group remains pivotal however, and therefore not type, but commonality is important, 
as spares, to training, are uniform, assisting with cost minimsation.  On the other hand, the 
financing choice relating to outright purchase or lease depends on each franchises unique 
financial gearing and funding structure. FlyAfrica has established its own leasing company 
within the group, and each franchise leases aircraft from that entity. It also provides 
funding to franchises for the purposes of outright purchase of aircraft directly from the 
manufacturer. This allows certain franchises to purchase new aircraft while also leasing 
older aircraft to other franchises. Overall the structure that has been set up offers flexibility 
to each franchise, which depends on individual circumstances which are influenced and 
affected by the country and markets in which they operate 
Ancillary Revenue 
Fastjet noted that certain LCCs have actually incurred losses from ticket sales while 
profiting from ancillary revenues.  This underlies the major importance of these revenues 
which are in fact the low hanging fruit once an air ticket has been sold to a passenger. It’s 
therefore remains pivotal to have a well-functioning website, as regardless of where the 
ticket is actually purchased, be it a ticket counter, a vendor, travel agent or online, ancillary 
purchases can be made later on the internet.  Examples of ancillaries range from the likes of 
checked luggage, itinerary changes and food. That said, in a SSA context, typical revenues 
earned by carriers in the more developed markets such as from hotels, car hire or car 
parking, are negligible. These extra ancillary type revenues are expected to remain 
significantly smaller in SSA as a percentage of revenues compared to Europe or US markets, 
and therefore any new entrant looking to diversify revenue streams, or leverage off tickets 
sold, would need new and innovative ideas to stimulate ancillary revenue in the region. 
Jambojet remain increasingly apprehensive to offer any a kind of extra   ancillaries at the 
start, as this could confuse the less seasoned airline traveller. The basic ancillaries 
associated with the actual air travel, such as additional suitcases, selecting seats and 
charging for food is certainly offered by the airline, and in response to local preferences, 
given common uncertainty exhibited by passengers when booking tickets in SSA, a small fee 
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is charged by the airline for holding a ticket for 24 hours without payment. Car rental, 
hotels and the like are not seen to be suitable at all. Furthermore, no advertising revenue is 
earned from other brands until such time as the Jambojet brand is established. 
In the case of FlyAfrica, ancillary income such as those offered in other parts of the world 
will be introduced at a later stage, once traffic is generated on the site.  System have 
already been developed to accommodate the sale of such extra ancillaries, yet they await 
the right time for implementation. 
Competition 
Jambojet anticipate that the Tanzanian market will remain challenging for Fastjet and 
particularly so on the JNB -DAR route. In their view, if the airline operating on such a route 
is not a legacy carrier from South Africa or Tanzania, nor a South African registered 
company, it will remain challenging to secure preferred landing rights in JNB. Further, the 
airline will have to spend significant sums of money to gain exposure and convince 
passengers to utilise the alternative, which might be less attractive due to the flight times 
offered. SAA can simply introduce extra frequencies, as well as lowering lower ticket prices 
in order to squeeze Fastjet out of the market.  
Kulula are of the opinion that the pricing offered by SAA and Mango is neither realistic nor 
market related. In SSA, private carriers are forced to compete against government owned 
national carriers that have no regard for realistic pricing, and therefore smaller, private, and 
more efficient players are forced to exit the market. Furthermore, protectionism of national 
carriers continues to be a massive problem as local governments limit landing rights for 
competing airlines. While there has been limited liberalization on the continent in countries 
such as Kenya and Botswana, many other markets are completely closed, such as 
Mozambique. Angola remains the worst in this sense, whereby even if rights are secured, 
one is required to come to a commercial decision with TAAG, the local Angolan airline. 
Landing rights are very much reciprocal, and therefore South Africa will not approve landing 
rights to foreign carriers unless the other country does the same for SAA or Mango. That 
said, while total liberalization could however deal a deadly blow to local airlines as the likes 
of Emirates would have free reign in the region, current conditions are untenable and too 
extreme in the other direction whereby liberalization is largely absent. 
FlyAfrica has chosen to avoid highly competitive routes such as the domestic ones in South 
Africa given that airlines such as Kulula have the financial resources to aggressively defend 
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their market and push new entrants out. Also as far as the industry lifecycle is concerned, 
the South Africa market is extremely mature, and has actually plateaued to a large extent. 
FlyAfrica will only look to enter the South African market when the time is right, and 
despite the size of this market, the airline will treating South Africa in the exact same 
manner it does in any other market when assessing the prospects for entrance.  
Brand 
Kulula believes that despite popular perception, people in SSA are actually extremely brand 
conscious, as in South Africa, as an example, bankers won’t fly Kulula in general as it seen to 
create a negative perception with the bank’s clients. Kulula is of the opinion however that 
the airline’s culture, and the manner in which it is portrayed in flight is less important, as 
long as an image of safety and reliability is always upheld. Guarding those two aspects are 
absolutely pivotal to an airlines success while culture is not considered to be a critical 
success factor in SSA. 
For Jambojet, a factor which is somewhat unexpected, is that despite per capita incomes 
being significantly lower in SSA compared to Europe as an example, if you are seen to be 
travelling low cost in SSA, the perception is that you are not well off. Therefore existing 
travelers are not the market for LCCs. This is not the case in Europe or the US where cost 
saving is pivotal on short haul flights and many business people utilise the likes of Ryanair 
and EasyJet in preference over legacy carriers. Therefore in SSA, LCCs should look to attract 
those who have never flown before, and who remain less brand conscious. 
Concluding Remarks 
In Fastjet’s view, adopting a cookie cutter approach from the European LCC model and 
expecting it to be equally effective in SSA would be commercial suicide. Internet 
penetration is much lower and therefore sales offices are required. Secondary airports in 
effect don’t exist and therefore landing costs are higher, and will remain so, while potential 
revenue streams from those airports are eliminated.  That said, there is a case for working 
with government in developing new locations, as the airline did when identifying strong 
local demand for flights from DAR to Mbeya, and with an existing runway being there, 
despite it requiring extension, the location was developed by government into a new 
commercial airport. Other locations in the same frame have been identified, and Fastjet is 
working with the Government of Tanzania to develop these airports and allow its A319 to 
land. Furthermore safety is a given in Europe, however this is not so in SSA. One needs to 
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therefore ensure that safety standards are communicated in a clearer manner in SSA, 
ensuring passengers are aware of the rigorous standards upheld by the likes of a Fastjet 
and other airlines, which abide by such international regulations. 
Jambojet’s view is that many LCCs in the US in particular have failed because legacy carriers 
attempted to set up LCCs which were simply managed by another department, rather than 
being a complete separation from the legacy parent. In Europe, he believes that first mover 
advantage was pivotal for the likes of Ryanair and EasyJet, who were the true pioneers in 
low cost business and therefore were able to establish a substantial head start to 
streamline their business models and secure new volume. Airlines entering later had to 
effectively share the remaining market share amongst themselves, and when there are too 
many players, the smaller ones inevitably disappear. Overall not many markets are really 
suitable to sustain LCCs as has been shown in other parts of the world where LCCs have 
failed. In order for an LCC to be successful, it firstly needs steady and sustainable volume, 
which includes leisure travelers, as this remains the segment responsible for the most of 
the RPKS globally. Nigeria remains a good example of a strong potential market, yet many 
other factors in the country make it very difficult to run an airline efficiently, and at low 
cost.  In South Africa on the other hand, despite the market being well established with 
solid volumes, both 1time Airlines and VelvetSky were unable to compete with the two 
incumbents being Kulula and Mango, and therefore failed not having the financial means to 
compete. Currently with only two LCCs left, profits have returned and ticket prices have 
increased significantly. Overall LCCs in South Africa are not deemed to be true LCCs, as 
while they might be low cost, they are not low fare. When a third entrant enters the 
market, being either Fastjet or FlySafair, (as the latter have recently done) all the 
participants are likely to sustain difficulties once again as competition for market share 
resumes.  
Further, in Jambojet’s view, in SSA, the income per capita is significantly lower than 
Western Europe or the US, this notwithstanding the fact that SSA’s middle class has 
expanded significantly in recent years. In order to be successful, an LCC has to convince 
those utilising some form of ground transport to utilise LCCs, otherwise the likes of a 
Jambojet will simply land up cannabalising air traffic from KQ. Therefore Jambojet’s model 
is exactly this - attempting to attract new flyers to the aviation market.  
Kulula are of the belief that the main reasons why LCCs fail in general is because the model 
relies on attracting passengers who couldn’t afford to travel previously, and if LCCs don’t 
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attract this specific market, they are unable to fill planes. Seating density is also pivotal in 
increasing profits given a high fixed cost base, this considering that by not offering basic 
ancillaries that a legacy carrier does such as free catering only provides minimal cost 
benefit. Therefore planes need to be full all the time, and the model tends to only be 
successful in developed countries that have large middle classes that might have flown 
previously on special occasions, yet now fly regularly. 
Furthermore, Kulula believes that SSA remains a very challenging place to do business, 
given the array of countries, cultures and interests. The EU on the other hand has several 
airlines that have been successful due to consolidation, with European airspace being one 
large market. In SSA each country insists on having their own airspace regulations and air 
traffic control regime which is a clear duplication of services. If countries battle with 
consolidating simple airspace regulations and services, consolidating an airline will prove 
very challenging indeed. Air France actually attempted to create a regional West African 
carrier sometime back, and while all stakeholders initially agreed, when it came down to 
choosing where to domicile the  head office, no one could agree, and so the airline was 
never formed. 
FlyAfrica’s model for success for an LCC is rather simple in their opinion. The key factor, and 
most important attribute for the success of an airline in SSA is attracting strong talent, 
being both management and employees to run the airline. Having strong supportive 
shareholders, is another.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
